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ABSTRACT 
Today, investors have become increasingly interested in corporate environmental practices and 
federal agencies have become actively involved with monitoring the environmental impact of 
corporations. As a result, organizations are increasingly recognizing environmental sustainability 
as an important driver of customer satisfaction and loyalty, quality, operational and financial 
performance. Such changes highlight the importance of environmental issues in today’s business 
environment.  
To actually bring about positive environmental change in firms, ‘Source Reduction and 
Reuse’ strategies are often considered “the most preferred” form of corporate environmental 
management compared to other initiatives such as Recycling, Energy Recovery and Disposal. It is 
widely acknowledged that Source Reduction and Reuse strategies can conserve energy and 
resources, curb pollution and maximize resource utilization. Yet, as companies face increasing 
competition, economic crises and customer expectations, Source Reduction and Reuse strategies 
are often sidelined in favor of other potentially easier-to-implement but environmentally-
degrading options. To this end, my dissertation explores the feasibility of policy-based and 
market-based approaches, for promoting Source Reduction and Reuse within and across firms.  
The policy-based approach provides insights into developing policies for externally 
promoting source reduction practices within firms. Using the context of government agencies 
promoting environmental change in firms, Essay 1 shows how supportive (e.g. environmental 
assistance, improvement recommendations) and punitive (e.g. regulatory inspections, sanctions) 
policies can be implemented in a complementary manner to promote source reduction initiatives.  
The market-based approach develops insights for developing and operating online 
channels to promote material reuse across firms. Using transaction-level data, Essay 2 lays the 
foundation for understanding buyer and seller behaviors on online industrial reuse marketplace. 
Essay 3 explores the role of online intermediation and market design in reuse marketplaces. 
Together, these studies have important implications for developing policies to increase reuse of 
by-products, materials and wastes. 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
Increasingly, organizations are recognizing environmental sustainability as an important driver of 
customer satisfaction and loyalty (Kassinis & Soteriou 2009), quality (Noori & Chen 2003), 
operational performance (Klassen & Whybark 1999; Sroufe 2003) and financial performance 
(Klassen & McLaughlin 1996; Jacobs et al. 2010). Investors have also become increasingly 
interested in corporate environmental activities. As of 2010, more than $3 trillion in 
professionally managed financial asset investments were made based on corporate environmental 
performance (2010). To put this in perspective, nearly one out of every eight dollars was invested 
based on a firm’s record of environmental practices. In response to claims from investor 
advocacy groups and shareholder resolutions over the past decade (CERES 2014), federal 
agencies such as the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) have become actively involved with monitoring the environmental impact of 
corporations. Such changes highlight the importance of environmental issues to corporations and 
its stakeholders. As a result, corporations have started undertaking various environmental 
initiatives as they relate to their operations and supply chains. 
 According to the EPA’s Waste Management Hierarchy1 (see Figure 1-1), ‘Source 
Reduction and Reuse’ strategies are “the most preferred” form of corporate environmental 
management compared to other initiatives such as Recycling, Energy Recovery and Disposal. 
Source Reduction and Reuse strategies can conserve energy and resources, curb pollution and 
maximize resource utilization. Yet, as companies face increasing competition, economic crises 
and burgeoning customer expectations, Source Reduction and Reuse strategies can easily be 
sidelined. I take the perspective that we need innovative approaches for promoting adoption of 
Source Reduction and Reuse strategies. While corporations, today, are engaged in a wide gamut 
of environmental initiatives, I primarily focus on ‘Source Reduction and Reuse’ strategies since 
they are especially important to operations and supply chain management. To this end, my 
dissertation explores the feasibility of two such approaches, one policy-based and the other 
market-based, for promoting Source Reduction and Reuse within and across firms. The policy-
based approach provides insights into externally promoting source reduction within firms. The 
market-based approach develops insights for the design of online markets to promote material 
reuse across firms. In my dissertation, I identify and examine ways to effectively implement these 
approaches in practice. Table 1-1 provides a scope of this dissertation. 
                                                     
1 http://www.epa.gov/waste/nonhaz/municipal/hierarchy.htm  
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Figure 1-1. EPA’s Waste Management Hierarchy 
 
 
Table 1-1. Scope of the Dissertation 
Strategies Source Reduction Material Reuse 
Approach Policy-based Market-based 
Primary Challenge 
Externally driving Source 
Reduction through coordination 
Driving Material Reuse efforts 
through Online Markets 
Focus Area Environmental Operations Environmental Supply Chains 
 
1.1 Policy-based Approach: Externally driving Source Reduction through 
Coordination 
The Pollution Prevention Act of 1990 established source reduction as a United States national 
policy. Source reduction strategies typically imply changes in the design, manufacturing, 
purchase, or use of materials or products (including packaging) to reduce their amount or toxicity 
Source Reduction & Reuse
Recycling/Composting
Energy Recovery
Treatment &      
Disposal
Most  
Preferred 
Least 
Preferred 
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before they enter waste streams. Manufacturing companies in the U.S. spent close to $30 billion 
in 2013 on capital expenses and operating costs related to source reduction initiatives2. Yet, 
despite many of these initiatives being located on the “locus of profitable pollution reduction”, 
companies often fail to successfully adopt ongoing source reduction initiatives. Why is this so? 
We posit that one of the major reasons is the policy approach being taken to externally promote 
source reduction efforts. The challenge of externally promoting change is ubiquitous in 
environmental operations, supply chain and policy settings. For example, downstream buyers, 
regulatory institutions, private auditing firms, as well as environmental assistance programs are 
involved in externally promoting source reduction efforts industrial facilities, with significant 
economic and environmental implications. Despite the diversity of institutions involved in 
externally influencing environmental changes, one of the fundamental ways to do so is through 
improvement recommendations. In this study, we decompose the typical external influence 
process into (i) managing the nature of influence (ii) managing recommendation-making and (iii) 
managing the implementation. Essay 1 – “Promoting Change from the Outside: Channeling 
Managerial Attention in Environmental Improvements” delves deeper to examine this approach. 
 We develop a research design based on our work with Minnesota Technical Assistance 
Program (MnTAP). Using longitudinal archival data on 650+ environmental improvement (EI) 
projects in industrial facilities located in Minnesota, we examine how various external influence 
tactics spur as well as disrupt implementation. Specifically, we highlight the effect of the 
variation in managing the above processes on an operational metric of project performance – 
implementation duration. We examine the implications of our findings under operations, supply 
chain and policy settings. These findings have implications for structuring policies for 
maximizing adoption rates of source reduction efforts in firms.  
1.2 Market-based Approach: Material Reuse through Online Material & Waste 
Exchanges 
Four of the world’s leading industrialized countries (United States, Germany, France and United 
Kingdom) produce more than a billion tons of material waste annually3. Although repurposing 
(through various reuse programs) rates have increased over the years, most waste still gets 
disposed. According to 2010 estimates, the United States generated 250 million tons of solid 
waste, but repurposed only 87 million tons4. Furthermore, many corporate repurposing programs 
                                                     
2 US Census Bureau 2008. Pollution Abatement Costs and Expenditures  
3 OECD. (2011). Environmental country reviews. 
4 EPA. (2011). Municipal Solid Waste Generation, Recycling, and Disposal in the United States:  Facts and Figures for 
2011. 
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focus mostly on high residual value products such as computers, copiers, auto batteries etc. 
Unfortunately, low-valued products (chemicals, paints, textiles, leather etc.) account for more 
than 70% of the total solid waste, but have historically suffered from low repurposing rates due to 
lack of markets for matching buyers and sellers.   
 Recently, Online Material and Waste Exchanges (OMWEs) have provided an innovative 
approach to match producers and consumers of low valued waste. In this dissertation, I examine a 
market-based approach which utilizes the power of online markets to effectively increase 
repurposing of industrial and commercial materials. My research investigates ways to maximize 
the number of successful matches and transactions on OMWEs. As a step forward, we ask the 
following questions: (1) what are the buyer and seller-side factors that influence transactions in 
OMWEs?  (2) what is the appropriate design for OMWEs? Essay 2 – “Repurposing Materials & 
Waste through Online Exchanges: Overcoming the Last Hurdle” tackles the first question, while 
Essay 3 – “The Role of Online Intermediaries in Coordinating Industrial Surplus Chains: 
Operational Policy Change and Adverse Outcomes” examines the second question. 
 To address the questions, we analyze a dataset consisting of more than 4000 waste 
listings and 100,000 buyer-seller interactions from the Material Exchange Program 
(www.mnexchange.org) hosted by MnTAP. Our primary outcome of interest is an ‘exchange’ i.e. 
a successful transfer of waste between producer and consumer. Our analysis gives interesting 
insights into the exchange activity. On the seller-side, (i) poor regional repurposing norms and (ii) 
access to alternate disposal options are significantly associated with failed exchanges. Hence 
sellers are influenced by county-level policies on waste management, which has strong 
implications for policy-making. On the buyer-side, (i) product information and (ii) transaction 
information richness are significantly associated with successful exchanges. Hence, buyers are 
influenced by online information content, which has implications for designing online interfaces 
for waste markets. Further, our results also show that the more experience users gain on these 
exchanges, the more likely they are of engaging in successful exchanges. Finally, we also show 
that OMWE design requires the presence of physical (human) intermediaries or match-makers to 
alleviate uncertainty about the product quality, transaction outcomes and regulatory policies. This 
is especially true for certain categories of products and materials, as we highlight in Essay 3.  
1.3 Practice-Focused Research: Minnesota Technical Assistance Program 
In order to ground this research in practice, I have partnered with Minnesota Technical Assistance 
Program (MnTAP). MnTAP has implemented innovative policy- and market-based approaches in 
Minnesota with varying degrees of success. With these approaches as the research backdrop, I 
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have strived to ask questions that have a direct impact on corporate environmental sustainability 
and policy development. My collaboration with MnTAP has allowed me to integrate academic 
insights with practical knowledge. Recommendations generated from our research findings are 
being applied on the field – in Minnesota and elsewhere in US and Canada. Some of the findings 
have been used by MnTAP to develop a new recommendation and follow-up system for 
Minnesota businesses. I hope these changes will improve the state of corporate environmental 
management and spur adoption of source reduction initiatives. Findings from to the market-based 
approach have been shared with state-level environmental agencies, the Materials Exchange 
Managers’ Network and other exchanges in US and Canada. Over time, these findings will likely 
transform material and product reuse through online marketplaces.   
 The next three chapters delve deeper into specific research questions. Essay 1 examines 
the policy-based approach and provides solutions to achieve higher implementation rates. Essays 
2 and 3 examine the market-based approach and provide ways to improve the efficiency of 
OMWEs. Finally, chapter 5 presents conclusions and general prescriptions for sustainable 
development.   
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Chapter 2  
ESSAY 1 - Promoting Change from the Outside: Channeling Managerial 
Attention in the Implementation of Environmental Improvements5 
Summary 
Government agencies, supply chain partners and non-governmental organizations externally 
promote improvements in firms. In such setting, effectively channeling managerial attention to 
improvement efforts is the key to externally promoting change. Yet, the two most commonly used 
external influence approaches represent fundamentally opposite philosophies. While one 
approach uses punitive tactics to coerce companies, the other approach uses supportive tactics to 
encourage them instead. Using the context of government agencies promoting environmental 
change in firms, we examine whether such supportive (e.g. environmental assistance, 
improvement recommendations) and punitive (e.g. regulatory inspections, sanctions) tactics can 
be implemented in a complementary manner. Using a unique longitudinal dataset collected from 
two state-level environmental agencies in Minnesota, we analyze over 1100 supportive 
environmental improvement (EI) projects in combination with intermittent (but currently 
uncoordinated) punitive tactics. One key finding of our research is that the timing and nature of 
punitive tactics is critical for the efficacy of supportive tactics. Classifying punitive events as (1) 
either inspections or sanctions and (2) either related or unrelated allows us to further specify the 
type of punitive tactics that influence EI implementation the most. Further, our models explain 
the moderating role of managerial involvement and technological complexity.  
 
Keywords: sustainable operations, environmental policy, managerial attention, inspections, 
hazard modeling 
2.1. Introduction 
Externally promoting change in firms is pivotal to managerial practice and public policy (Pfeffer 
& Salancik 2003). Federal regulatory agencies spend millions of dollars on programs intended to 
set firms onto a path of sustained quality and environmental performance (EPA 2011a; FDA 
2013). In private sector supply chains, “gatekeeper” organizations (Short et al. 2010) and 
management consultants (Menon & Pfeffer 2003) influence industrial facilities through audits, 
inspections and recommendations. Similarly, downstream buyers increasingly face the challenge 
of influencing process (Plambeck & Taylor 2012) and environmental improvements (Klassen & 
Vachon 2009; Jira & Toffel 2013) at their supplier facilities. The implications of externally 
promoting change are also significant. For example, shortcomings in the federal regulatory 
                                                     
5 Paper Co-authors: 
Suvrat Dhanorkar*, Enno Siemsen+, Kevin Linderman** 
Carlson School of Management, University of Minnesota 
*dhano002@umn.edu, +siems017@umn.edu, **linde037@umn.edu 
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approach can have severe implications for human lives6, and failure of corporations to manage 
supplier quality can have significant monetary repercussions7. In the environmental domain, 
external influence efforts of environmental agencies collectively help prevent billions of pounds 
of pollution annually8.  
Despite its widespread importance, externally promoting improvements in firms is 
challenging. For instance, consider the case of externally promoting environmental initiatives. 
Government agencies have used a variety of punitive and supportive tactics to promote positive 
environmental change in firms (Spence 2001), with limited success. In response, manufacturing 
companies in the U.S. have also spent approximately $30 billion in 2013 on various 
environmental improvement initiatives. Yet, many of these initiatives never reach completion 
despite being located on the “locus of profitable pollution reduction” (King & Lenox 2002). In 
other words, non-implementation and abandonment of perfectly viable environmental 
opportunities is surprisingly commonplace (Charles 2009). The resulting environmental non-
compliance can have severe economic implications. In 2013 alone, the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) handed out $4.5 billion in fines and $1 billion in civil penalties. Such non-
implementation of even profit-making improvement initiatives has been a long-standing problem 
(Beer & Walton 1987; Armenakis & Burdg 1988), since improvement projects are prone to 
various managerial biases and behavioral effects. Additionally, implementation of improvement 
initiatives is an inherently temporal phenomenon (Tyre & Orlikowski 1994), which presents 
challenges in sustaining managerial attention (Ocasio 1997). Hence, effectively channeling 
managerial attention to improvement efforts is the key to externally promoting change. What 
external influence tactics are most effective in channeling managerial attention and driving 
environmental change in firms? In this study, we show how supportive (e.g. environmental 
assistance, improvement recommendations) and punitive (e.g. regulatory inspections, sanctions) 
tactics can be used in a complementary fashion to drive positive environmental change. 
Traditionally, regulatory agencies at the national- and state-level have heavily relied on 
punitive tactics such as environmental inspections, sanctions and penalties (Spence 2001). 
Punitive tactics are expected to deter firms from polluting in the future. Such tactics have, in the 
past, had some success in curbing pollution. According to the EPA, such policy efforts prevented 
approximately 1.8 billion pounds of pollution in 2011 (EPA 2011a). However, critics of punitive 
tactics have claimed that this regulatory approach is excessively castigatory. Most firms try to be 
                                                     
6 http://www.nbcnews.com/id/9443039/ns/health-heart_health/t/guidant-recalls-thousands-
pacemakers/#.VBcI2vldV8F 
7 http://money.cnn.com/2014/05/27/autos/biggest-auto-recalls/  
8 http://www2.epa.gov/enforcement/enforcement-annual-results-fiscal-year-fy-2013  
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in compliance with environmental regulations and any non-compliance is unintentional (Spence 
2001). As a result, the past few decades have experienced a growth in the number of agencies and 
programs employing supportive tactics. Examples include Technical Assistance Programs 
(TAPs), Industrial Assessment Centers (IACs) in the United States and the recently initiated 
Environmental Compliance Assistance Program (ECAP) in Europe. The means used by these 
programs include expert assistance, environmental improvement (EI) recommendations, and 
follow-ups to promote EI implementation. Yet, given their voluntary nature and varying firm 
motivations, most supportive programs have failed to deliver significant environmental benefits 
(Koehler 2007). Although the effectiveness of punitive and supportive tactics has been 
individually examined by scholars (Spence 2001; Koehler 2007), these approaches continue to be 
viewed as fundamentally opposite. As a result, their complementarity with each other is unclear 
(Rothenberg & Becker 2004; Parker et al. 2009). Our paper fills this gap in our understanding of 
the complementary usage of punitive and supportive tactics to effectively promote environmental 
change in firms. 
 To ground this study in a real context, we develop a research design based on our 
interactions with two state-level environmental agencies - Minnesota Technical Assistance 
Program (MTAP) and the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (MPCA). Borrowing ideas from 
the literature on managerial attention and environmental policy, we develop empirically testable 
hypotheses to generate broader insights for externally influencing improvements within firms. We 
build a longitudinal dataset of more than 1000 environmental improvement projects tracked over 
several months (sometimes years). Using various econometric modeling techniques, we estimate 
the success of supportive tactics (i.e. EI implementation probabilities and hazards) attributable to 
the ‘timing’ and ‘nature’ of punitive tactics. Broadly, our results indicate that the timing of 
punitive tactics (e.g. regulatory inspections, sanctions) is critical for the efficacy of supportive 
tactics. Greater coordination between punitive and supportive tactics can increase the EI 
implementation rates by a factor of 1.2 to 1.7. Conversely, a lack of coordination reduces EI 
implementation rates by a factor of 0.5 to 0.3. We further show how this effect varies depending 
on the nature of punitive tactics – inspections vs. sanctions and related vs. unrelated. Finally, we 
show that coordination between punitive and supportive tactics is even more critical in projects 
with higher managerial involvement and technological complexity. Our study has broader 
implications for using the punitive and supportive tactics in a complementary manner.  
The rest of the paper is presented as follows. Section 2 describes the empirical setting. 
Section 3 presents the related literature and contributions made by this study. Section 4 develops 
 9 
 
hypotheses and Section 5 presents the data, modeling approaches and results. Section 6 discusses 
broader implications. 
2.2. Empirical Context  
2.2.1 Background on Punitive & Supportive Influence Tactics 
In the U.S., the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulates environmental activity. The 
EPA works in partnership with state-level environmental agencies (e.g. Minnesota Pollution 
Control Agency, New York Department of Environmental Conservation etc.), which are 
charged with the task of monitoring and enforcing environmental laws and regulations (EPA 
2013b). Although EPA and state-level regulatory agencies have, in the past, explored supportive 
environmental initiatives (e.g. Environmental Leadership Program, Star Track Program etc.), the 
bulk of policy initiatives have been punitive in nature. In general, the punitive approach is based 
on the fundamental assumption that firms are “rational polluters” who pollute to the maximum 
possible extent given the threat of being sanctioned (Spence 2001). As a result of this ideology, 
the traditional punitive tactics have used the coercive threat of inspections, sanctions and 
penalties for ensuring environmental compliance. However, given the widespread criticism for 
punitive tactics (Spence 2001) and limited empirical support for the long-term effectiveness of 
regulatory approaches (Toffel & Short 2011), supportive programs have now emerged at the 
regional- and state-level. Today, hundreds of such federal and state-funded environmental 
agencies use supportive tactics to influence firms across the U.S. For example, Technical 
Assistance Programs (TAPs) are typically grant-funded intervention programs which provide 
pollution prevention assistance. According to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 
“Technical Assistance Programs provide businesses with cutting edge environmental 
management assistance and help identify and implement measures that reduce or eliminate 
pollution at its source” (EPA 2011c). The EPA lists more than 100 such TAPs across different 
regions in the United States9. Other programs such as the Department of Energy’s Industrial 
Assessment Centers (IACs) provide similar services. Industrial Assessment Centers “…conduct 
the energy audits to identify opportunities to improve productivity, reduce waste, and save 
energy” (DOE 2013). Previous studies have used IACs as a research context for examining the 
adoption of energy efficiency projects (Anderson & Newell 2004; Muthulingam et al. 2013). The 
supportive programs primarily rely on providing expert assistance through environmental 
improvement recommendations. Such environmental improvements (EIs) consist of operational 
                                                     
9 http://www.epa.gov/opptintr/p2home/pubs/assist/index.htm  
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changes to technology, materials or procedures that aim to reduce the negative impact on the 
environment (adapted from Simpson et al.(2004)).  
2.2.2 Research Setting 
To examine the complementarity of punitive and supportive tactics, we develop a research design 
based on our discussions with two state-level agencies in Minnesota--MTAP and MPCA. MTAP 
is a state-level organization that uses supportive tactics in the form of EI recommendations and 
reminders to encourage pollution prevention. MTAP specialists make site visits to manufacturing 
or service facilities, typically by invitation. Each site-visit consists of a detailed assessment of the 
facility and results in one or more EI recommendations (see Appendix for examples). This EI 
initiation is followed by a time period during which the facility engages in the adoption of EIs led 
by the EI “owner” (i.e. the person responsible for the improvement). It is important to emphasize 
that the adoption of these EIs is not mandated but strongly encouraged. After each site-visit, 
MTAP specialists make reminders to the EI owner to influence implementation and to record the 
implementation status. In summary, MTAP’s approach, based on EI recommendations and 
reminders, is representative of supportive tactics. However, facilities receiving assistance from 
MTAP are also under the constant surveillance of environmental regulatory agencies, irrespective 
of their initiation or implementation of the supportive EIs. In Minnesota, the MPCA monitors and 
regulates facility-level compliance to environmental regulations. MPCA conducts regular facility 
inspections to identify environmental problems and sanctions facilities if found out of 
compliance. As such, MPCA’s approach, based on inspections and sanctions, is representative of 
the traditional punitive tactics.  
Although MTAP and MPCA communicate regarding policy matters, facility-level tactics 
are not coordinated. As a result, a facility undertaking EIs outlined by MTAP may be inspected 
and potentially sanctioned by MPCA. In other words, the same facility could be simultaneously 
facing both – punitive and supportive tactics. Since these tactics are not endogenous or 
coordinated, an interesting empirical question is what sequence of punitive and supportive tactics 
leads to complementary (or counterproductive) results, and under what circumstances? Hence, the 
aim of this study is to reconcile the supportive tactics (EI recommendations) with the punitive 
tactics (inspections and sanctions) by showing that the complementary and/or counterproductive 
influence of these tactics depends on their timing and nature. Based on discussions with MTAP 
and MPCA, we distinguish between the 12-month periods before and after EI initiation, and then 
estimate the impact of punitive tactics occurring before (i.e. 12-month “pre-improvement phase”) 
and after (i.e. 12-month “improvement phase”) initiation of supportive EIs on the EI 
implementation probabilities and hazards. We further decompose the punitive tactics into (1) 
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inspections vs. sanctions and (2) related vs. unrelated to gain more nuanced insights about the 
interplay between punitive and supportive tactics. Finally, we examine the contingent effect of 
managerial involvement and technological complexity. 
2.3. Literature Review and Contributions  
Earlier studies have examined various economic (Anderson & Newell 2004), behavioral (Charles 
2009; Muthulingam et al. 2013), technological (Sroufe 2003; Klassen & Whybark 1999), 
organizational (DeCanio 1998), supply chain (Klassen & Vachon 2009), institutional (Bansal & 
Clelland 2004) and stakeholder related (Sarkis et al. 2010) factors that promote EIs in firms. 
More broadly, previous research has also examined the role of knowledge capital (Dewar & 
Dutton 1986), quality-based learning (Fine 1986), trade-offs (Ferdows & De Meyer 1990), 
behavioral factors (Repenning & Sterman 2002) and work systems (Tucker 2007) in driving 
improvement efforts in general. Our study departs from these earlier studies in three major ways. 
First, we examine how two fundamentally opposite intervention approaches can be reconciled to 
externally influence environmental improvements. Second, we highlight behavioral factors that 
moderate the degree of managerial attention given to EIs. Third, we apply various modeling 
approaches to longitudinal project-level data to confirm findings. 
2.3.1 Intervention Approaches & Externally Promoting Change in Firms 
Externally influencing firms in policy implementation and supply chain management can be 
difficult. Recent research has questioned the effectiveness of regulatory (Spence 2001; Ball et al. 
2013) and command-and-control (Short et al. 2010; Plambeck & Taylor 2012) tactics for ensuring 
process and environmental compliance. Researchers have also examined the challenges faced by 
policy-makers (Short & Toffel 2010) and NGOs (Kraft et al. 2013) in externally influencing 
environmental activities in firms. Past research in environmental policy has examined 
complementarities between policy instruments (Foulon et al. 2002; Rousseau 2007; Short & 
Toffel 2010), revealing several contingencies. For example, Short and Toffel (2010) found that 
voluntary self-regulation can work, albeit for already environmentally-proactive firms. Kraft et al. 
(2013) analytically examine whether NGOs should target industry or regulatory bodies to 
influence firms to replace hazardous substances. Our research contributes to this literature by 
showing how government agencies can externally influence improvements in firms by using 
punitive and supportive approaches in a complementary fashion.  
While our study is grounded in the context of government agencies externally influencing 
private firms, similar questions exist in the context of private sector supply chains. Researchers 
(Krause et al. 1998; Modi & Mabert 2007; Klassen & Vachon 2009; Muthulingam & Agarwal 
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2013) have examined how downstream firms in a supply chain can influence the improvement 
initiatives of their upstream partners. The root cause of quality problems often lies with suppliers, 
and thus managing quality requires a broad supply chain perspective. The field of supplier 
development differentiates between various approaches, which include, ‘basic’ and more punitive 
tactics such as evaluating their performance and inspecting/certifying their plants, as well as more 
‘advanced’ and supportive forms, such as joint process improvement initiatives (Sánchez-
Rodríguez et al. 2005; Klassen & Vachon 2009). Notions of a hierarchy of supplier development 
approaches (basic vs. advanced and evaluative vs. supportive) indicate a progression, where one 
form of supplier development succeeds another as firms progress in their relationships. Similar 
questions are also being examined in the context of third-party auditors influencing industrial 
facilities (Bartley 2007; Short et al. 2010). Yet little research exists in this area to study whether 
these approaches are substitutes, such that more advanced techniques can replace simpler ones, or 
that these approaches are complementary, where one approach requires the other. We discuss our 
findings more broadly to show how external influence can be productively used under different 
settings. Finally, our study also contributes to the scant research on using externally-sourced 
knowledge (Menon & Pfeffer 2003).                                 
2.3.2 Managerial Attention & Behavioral Issues in Improvement Projects  
Gutierrez and Kouvelis (1991) were one of the first to recognize behavioral effects in 
improvement projects. In their paper, Gutierrez and Kouvelis (1991) applied the widely accepted 
Parkinson’s law (1957) to show how the deadlines affect the actual amount of work done or as 
the law states “work expands so as to fill the time available for its completion.” A recent study 
(Deo et al. 2014) empirically examines this behavioral phenomenon in a healthcare setting, to 
show the effect of operational goals and deadlines on worker pace. Muthulingam et al. (2013) 
highlight how “order effects” (i.e. effect of presentation order of recommendations) and “choice 
overload” (i.e. effect of too many options) can influence the implementation outcomes in the case 
of energy efficiency recommendations made by the Industrial Assessment Centers (IACs). 
Related research on energy efficiency (Blass et al. 2014) and IT projects (Tyre & Orlikowski 
1994) is also very relevant to our context. For example, Tyre and Orlikowski (1994) highlight 
how improvement projects (especially timelines and outcomes) are influenced by various 
managerial biases and pressures.  
 Previous seminal research on attention-based view (ABV) (Ocasio 1997; Ocasio 2011) 
also highlights the behavioral issues (Simon 1979) in implementing improvements. A central 
premise of this view is that organizational structures, problem domains and external influences 
can divert managerial attention towards and away from improvements. For operations managers, 
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this implies a rethinking of ways in which improvement projects are structured and executed over 
time. Understanding the temporal aspect of improvements is immensely important, yet it is rarely 
addressed in research. “It is ironic that time may be the most important and most overlooked 
variable in our management discipline” (Van de Ven 2013). Although scholars in OM have 
alluded to the dynamic nature of change (Sterman et al. 1997), few studies, to our knowledge, 
have tried to empirically examine the temporal nature of improvement projects. Past studies 
(Sroufe 2003; Sarkis et al. 2010; Muthulingam et al. 2013) examining EI adoption have also 
primarily taken a static perspective on improvement initiatives. Yet, discussions we conducted 
with MTAP experts and facility managers provided strong evidence in favor of temporal effects. 
For example, our discussants expressed that the managerial attention and resource allocation 
decisions were dynamic and influenced by external events. To accurately capture these nuances, 
our research accounts for behavioral explanations and temporal effects.  
2.4. Hypotheses Development 
It is not merely the internal resources, participants and processes that drive organizational change, 
but external influences also play a crucial role (Weick & Quinn 1999). External influences, in the 
form of punitive and supportive interventions, can affect internal processes (Anand et al. 2012) by 
providing critical feedback and (re)directing managerial attention. We develop hypotheses to 
identify situations when the feedback received through punitive tactics is complementary vs. 
counterproductive to supportive tactics. Our discussions with facility managers revealed that 
punitive tactics can trigger entirely different managerial responses, resource allocation and 
employee behaviors depending on the timing and nature of their occurrence. How managers 
attend (Ocasio 2011) to punitive tactics in relation to the supportive interventions is therefore a 
relevant question.  
2.4.1 Timing of Punitive Tactics in Relation to Supportive Tactics 
The timing of events can generate varying cognitive and behavioral reactions from managers 
(Ocasio 1997). In our context, we therefore argue that the timing of punitive tactics in relation to 
the supportive tactics will play a significant role in driving EI implementation. Improvements are 
often a reaction to episodic events such as punitive regulatory events (Weick & Quinn 1999). 
Punitive tactics stimulate environmental improvement initiatives by endangering corporate 
legitimacy. Prior research has examined the impact of regulatory events on product recalls 
(Haunschild & Rhee 2004), quality compliance (Anand et al. 2012) and firm performance 
(Haveman et al. 2001). These studies have argued that regulatory actions (e.g. audits, sanctions) 
act as “renewals” to stem the degradation of internal processes (Anand et al. 2012), and thus have 
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a lasting effect on organizational systems (Shimshack & Ward 2005). By acting as “jolts” or 
“shocks” (Romanelli & Tushman 1994), regulatory actions can focus managerial attention 
(Ocasio 1997) to specific systems (e.g. environmental) or issues (Cho & Hambrick 2006) and 
spur improvements. We therefore expect that the lingering effect (Tushman & Anderson 1986) of 
punitive tactics occurring in the pre-improvement phase (i.e. 12-month period before initiation of 
supportive EIs) can positively affect EI implementation. 
 How do punitive tactics occurring during the improvement phase (i.e. 12-month period 
after initiation of supportive EIs) affect EI implementation? By causing perturbations in the 
resource allocation mechanisms (Haveman et al. 2001), badly timed regulatory events could 
impede ongoing improvement efforts. The intention behind regulatory actions is to bring to 
surface environmental issues that may be hidden or neglected by facilities. Our discussions with 
MPCA suggested that regulatory events occurring during the improvement phase brought to light 
new environmental concerns. In such cases, a natural response of facility managers is reallocation 
of existing resources to tackle the more recent (and conceivably more urgent) environmental 
compliance issues. Naturally, attending to the issues brought to light by the regulatory 
inspections/sanctions creates an appearance of legitimacy. Punitive tactics can therefore spur new 
activities, which often come at the cost of “replacement” of ongoing initiatives (Ford & Ford 
1994). And so, we expect that punitive tactics occurring during the improvement phase could 
have a detrimental impact, leading to delays and abandonment of ongoing EIs. 
H1a: Punitive Tactics in the form of inspections/sanctions that occur in the pre-improvement 
phase will promote EI implementation 
H1b: Punitive Tactics in the form of inspections/sanctions that occur in the improvement 
phase will disrupt EI implementation 
2.4.2 Nature and Relatedness of Punitive Tactics 
Not all punitive tactics are alike. Some inspections lead to sanctions, whereas others simply 
provide informational feedback. In our empirical setting, MPCA conducts facility inspections to 
identify environmental non-compliance and sanctions facilities only if found out of compliance. 
While sanctions certainly illustrate the use of punitive tactics against the facility, inspections per 
se are not punitive in nature. As a result, we believe that inspections and sanction will differ in 
their effects on EI implementation. While inspections (which do not result in sanctions) may 
simply provide informational feedback to organizations (Anand et al. 2012; Ball et al. 2013), 
sanctions are intended to bring urgent attention to compliance problems. Therefore, sanctions 
represent a significantly higher threat to the facility’s environmental legitimacy. As a result, we 
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expect sanctions will have a significantly stronger (promotive and disruptive) effect on EI 
implementation. 
H2a: Punitive Tactics in the form of sanctions that occur in the pre-improvement phase will 
have a stronger promotive influence on EI implementation compared to inspections 
H2b: Punitive Tactics in the form of sanctions that occur in the improvement phase will have 
a stronger disruptive influence on EI implementation compared to inspections 
The fact that a facility is engaged in “…[air] emissions improvements does not guarantee 
that it will not face regulatory actions for other [compliance] issues…say solid waste disposal 
(MPCA Officer 2014).” In the pre-improvement and improvement phases, a facility may 
experience punitive events which might or might not be directly related to the supportive EI being 
undertaken. It is important to understand the effect of these related and unrelated punitive tactics 
on attentional processes (Simon 1979; Ocasio 2011) within the facility, to accurately identify 
complementarities between punitive and supportive tactics. In general, related punitive tactics 
(compared to unrelated punitive tactics) that occur in the pre-improvement phase will focus 
greater attention to environmental issues that are closely related to the EIs and should hence have 
a greater promotive effect. On the other hand, unrelated punitive tactics (compared to related 
punitive tactics) that occur in the improvement phase should focus attention away from ongoing 
EIs and towards the new compliance issues, thus having a greater disruptive effect. This 
explanation suggests a more nuanced effect that what was hypothesized in H1.  
H3a: Related Punitive Tactics that occur in the pre-improvement phase will have a stronger 
promotive influence on EI implementation compared to Unrelated Punitive Tactics 
H3b: Unrelated Punitive Tactics that occur in the improvement phase will have a stronger 
disruptive influence on EI implementation compared to Related Punitive Tactics 
2.4.3 Managerial Involvement & Technological Complexity 
The above hypotheses highlight the importance of timing and nature of punitive tactics in relation 
to the supportive EIs. Yet, it is important to emphasize that not all EIs are alike. We expect that 
the coordination (or lack thereof) between punitive and supportive tactics may be more (or less) 
important for certain types of EIs. Hence, we develop moderating hypotheses based on two 
characteristics of EIs – Senior Manager Involvement and Technological Complexity.  
 Attention is differentially distributed across the chain of command (Rerup 2009; Ocasio 
2011). In other words, issues that hold high relevance for senior managers might not necessarily 
take precedence for all other employees. Given the nature of punitive events, senior managers are 
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often held liable for any compliance failures. Naturally, punitive tactics hold a position of 
prominence for senior managers which, we expect, should result in amplified responses (both 
promotive and disruptive) to punitive tactics.   
H4: The influence (both promotive and disruptive) of Punitive Tactics on EI implementation is 
amplified under Senior Manager Involvement in EIs.  
Technologically complex improvement projects require greater coordination from 
organizational sub-units. Successful coordination in technologically complex projects may hence 
require external triggers (Hoffman & Ocasio 2001), in the form of events that signal crisis (e.g. 
punitive tactics). As a result, pre-improvement punitive tactics will likely have a greater 
promotive influence on technologically complex EIs. Given the need for greater coordination, 
ongoing technologically complex projects are also more prone to abandonment resulting due to 
attentional shifts (Ocasio 2011) and dissolution of improvement teams (Tyre & Orlikowski 1994) 
over time. As a result, ill-timed punitive tactics occurring in the improvement phase are also 
likely to be more disruptive in the case of technologically complex improvement projects. 
H5: The influence (both promotive and disruptive) of Punitive Tactics on EI implementation is 
amplified under Technological Complexity of EIs. 
2.5. Methods 
2.5.1 Data  
We take advantage of an empirical setting where facilities were being influenced by two different 
types of governmental agencies practicing punitive and supportive tactics respectively. Our 
primary dataset was obtained from a supportive environmental intervention program in 
Minnesota – Minnesota Technical Assistance Program (MTAP). We had initial access to data 
consisting of approximately 1200 EI recommendations, characteristics and implementation 
timelines from MTAP. An additional dataset used in our analysis comes from the Minnesota 
Pollution Control Agency (MPCA), through a request for information made to their Data Service 
Center. The compliance dataset consisted of facility-level information regarding all 
environmental inspections and sanctions since 1999. This dataset provided information about 
each facility’s compliance history in addition to a record of punitive tactics that were used in the 
pre-improvement and improvement phases of EI initiatives. Previous studies have used similar 
data to assess the effectiveness of punitive shocks under different contexts (Karpoff et al. 2005; 
Darnall et al. 2009). In order to compile complete information about each EI and the associated 
context, it was essential to accurately match the MTAP and MPCA datasets. Matching the two 
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datasets was a non-trivial task, especially since we required accurate information on regulatory 
events in the improvement and pre-improvement phases. The matching was done manually by 
one of the co-authors. Following initial coding, we had multiple interactions with officials at 
MPCA and MTAP, as and when additional clarification was required. Additional compliance 
level information related to type and relatedness of inspections/sanctions was obtained through an 
online tool10 recently made publicly available by MPCA. This resulted in additional verification 
and elimination of cases, which indicated data recording errors (e.g. missing EI-initiation date, 
reminder date, implementation date, implementation status).  
Table 2-1. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Variables Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Implementation Status 0.40 0.49 1               
Implementation Time (Days) 370.75 362.64 -0.0509* 1             
Ln(Savings) 6.27 3.90 0.1890* 0.1815* 1           
Ln(Hours) 2.27 1.46 -0.1234* -0.1711* 0.0249 1         
Ln(Employees) 2.65 2.73 0.0051 0.1795* 0.1867* 0.0898* 1       
Senior Manager  1.59 0.49 -0.0759* -0.0744* -0.0186 0.0945* 0.0091 1     
Ln(Recommendation Number) 1.10 0.85 -0.1775* 0.1255* -0.0990* 0.2153* 0.0639* 0.0717* 1   
Ln(Total Recommendations) 1.78 0.84 -0.1870* 0.1179* -0.0763* 0.3171* 0.0910* 0.0819* 0.6876* 1 
Ln(Time between follow-ups) 4.37 1.02 0.1370* 0.5175* 0.1424* -0.2666* 0.0906* -0.1489* -0.0423 -0.0219 
Punitive Tactics (Pre-Improvement) 0.37 0.73 0.0429 0.1315* 0.0592* -0.0061 0.1761* -0.1073* 0.0059 0.0453* 
Punitive Tactics (Improvement) 0.26 0.64 -0.0312 0.2814* 0.1513* -0.0566* 0.2622* -0.0626* -0.0147 -0.0062 
Inspections (Pre-Improvement) 0.15 0.36 0.028 0.1104* 0.0018 -0.0018 0.1793* -0.1726* 0.0186 0.0592* 
Sanctions (Pre-Improvement) 0.14 0.52 0.0796* 0.0518* 0.0548* -0.0237 -0.0325 0.037 -0.0242 -0.011 
Inspections (Improvement) 0.09 0.28 -0.032 0.2253* 0.1501* -0.0672* 0.1840* 0.0476* -0.0245 -0.0276 
Sanctions (Improvement) 0.12 0.48 0.0212 0.1469* 0.0495* -0.0151 0.1568* -0.1410* -0.0036 0.0064 
Related Punitive Tactics (Pre-Improvement) 0.07 0.26 0.1154* 0.0381 -0.0529* -0.0353 -0.0674* -0.0994* -0.0136 0.0133 
Unrelated Punitive Tactics (Pre-Improvement) 0.30 0.71 0.0021 0.1201* 0.0796* 0.0066 0.2046* -0.0738* 0.0109 0.0416 
Related Punitive Tactics (Improvement) 0.04 0.19 0.0291 0.0995* 0.0716* -0.0692* 0.0796* -0.0467* -0.0408 -0.0374 
Unrelated Punitive Tactics (Improvement) 0.22 0.63 -0.0407 0.2573* 0.1335* -0.0372 0.2446* -0.0501* -0.0028 0.0049 
 
Variables 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
Implementation Status                     
Implementation Time (Days)                     
Ln(Savings)                     
Ln(Hours)                     
Ln(Employees)                     
Senior Manager                      
Ln(Recommendation Number)                     
Ln(Total Recommendations)                     
Ln(Time between follow-ups) 1                   
Punitive Tactics (Pre-Improvement) 0.1158* 1                 
Punitive Tactics (Improvement) 0.1839* 0.3332* 1               
Inspections (Pre-Improvement) 0.0657* 0.7536* 0.2069* 1             
Sanctions (Pre-Improvement) 0.0764* 0.4926* 0.1840* -0.1161* 1           
Inspections (Improvement) 0.0710* 0.2342* 0.7216* 0.0922* 0.1877* 1         
Sanctions (Improvement) 0.1646* 0.2364* 0.5582* 0.2495* 0.028 -0.0772* 1       
Related Punitive Tactics (Pre-Improvement) 0.0081 0.2401* -0.0024 0.4007* 0.2858* -0.0322 0.0771* 1     
Unrelated Punitive Tactics (Pre-Improvement) 0.1150* 0.9363* 0.3418* 0.6261* 0.4007* 0.2513* 0.2140* -0.1161* 1   
Related Punitive Tactics (Improvement) 0.0293 0.1310* 0.2260* 0.1648* -0.0078 0.2983* 0.3534* 0.0697* 0.1088* 1 
Unrelated Punitive Tactics (Improvement) 0.1791* 0.3019* 0.9562* 0.1624* 0.1908* 0.6494* 0.4655* -0.0234 0.3173* -0.0690* 
 
Additional facility-level data for the control variables was obtained from other secondary sources 
- Hoover’s and ORBIS. After matching several datasets, our final sample consisted of 
longitudinal data on 1110 EIs undertaken at 296 facilities across Minnesota. Descriptive statistics 
                                                     
10 MPCA’s What’s in my Neighborhood Online Application: http://cf.pca.state.mn.us/wimn/search.cfm  
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and correlations for the measures are summarized in Table 2-1. Figure 2-1 provides descriptive 
information about EI characteristics. 
Figure 2-1. Descriptive Information on Industry and EI Characteristics (# of EIs) 
 
 
2.5.2 Measures 
Dependent Variables  
Our interest lies in capturing the probabilities of EI implementation as well as the evolution of EIs 
over time. We therefore use two dependent variables – implementation status [dichotomous] and 
implementation hazard [longitudinal]. Implementation status has been the preferred outcome 
variable in similar studies (Anderson & Newell 2004; Muthulingam et al. 2013), but can suffer 
from measurement errors. The recorded EI implementation status is dependent on the last 
interaction between the environmental agency (MTAP in our case) and the facility. Using either a 
logit or probit model here can bias the findings since the recorded status from the last interaction 
might differ from the final (i.e. actual) implementation status. By estimating instantaneous 
implementation rates, hazard models (e.g. Cox model) significantly overcome this limitation by 
using the best available information about implementation status at recorded times. Therefore, we 
use hazard models in addition to logit models. Hazard/duration modeling requires specification of 
beginning and ending times for each unit (EI). In our case, the time (t0) begins with MTAP’s site-
visit and ends (tend) either with implementation or with “censoring,” i.e. the last interaction 
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between the facility and MTAP. For our logit models, we assume information on the EI 
implementation status as being accurate. Together, these modeling approaches provide substantial 
robustness to our findings.  
Independent Variables   
We capture punitive tactics using regulatory inspections and sanctions data from MPCA. As is 
evident from the research design, our study differentiates between punitive tactics that occur in 
the pre-improvement and improvement phases. For Punitive Tactics (Pre-Improvement Phase) 
occurring before initiation of EIs, we used MPCA data to collect information on all regulatory 
actions taken during 365 days leading up to the EI initiation, since the coercive effect of 
regulatory actions is likely to last for at least a year (Shimshack & Ward 2005). The length of the 
improvement phase might differ based on the time to EI adoption, with the maximum being 365 
days where the time to EI implementation either equaled or exceeded 365 days. For EIs that were 
implemented within 365 days after their initiation, the improvement phase is taken as the time 
period between EI-initiation and implementation (or censoring i.e. last follow-up made by 
MTAP). For Punitive Tactics (Improvement Phase), we used MPCA data to collect information 
on all regulatory actions taken during the improvement phase. We created additional variables to 
test hypothesis 2 based on whether the punitive tactics involved an inspection with or without a 
sanction. These variables are Inspection (Pre-Improvement), Inspection (Improvement), Sanction 
(Pre-Improvement) and Sanction (Improvement). Next, we created variables to test hypothesis 3 
based on whether the punitive tactics were related/unrelated to the supportive EIs. These variables 
are Related Punitive Tactics (Pre-Improvement), Unrelated Punitive Tactics (Pre-Improvement), 
Related Punitive Tactics (Improvement) and Unrelated Punitive Tactics (Improvement). Senior 
Manager Involvement in EIs was coded as a dummy variable [1 = Senior Manager (plant 
manager, vice president, director, facility manager etc.) is identified as the “owner” of the EI 
being undertaken; 0=Otherwise]. See Appendix for examples. Further, we categorized 
Material/Equipment EIs modifications as High Technological Complexity, and Procedural EIs as 
Low Technological Complexity. See Appendix for examples of EIs in each category. 
Control Variables  
We controlled for various industry-, year-, firm- and EI-specific effects using data obtained from 
MTAP, MPCA and other public data sources – ORBIS and Hoover’s. In line with Anderson and 
Newell’s (2004) study, we controlled for log of expected net savings [Ln (Net Savings)] and 
squared log of net expected savings [Ln (Net Savings)2]. Our discussions with MTAP revealed 
that there was significant uniformity across their staff regarding the protocol followed for 
conducting site-visits and estimating net savings. Hence, we safely assume accuracy of expected 
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net savings. We controlled for the type of EI being undertaken [Procedural/ Material/ 
Equipment]. Recent research (Muthulingam et al. 2013) found that the number of simultaneous 
improvements and the sequence of presenting these improvements to the management can affect 
adoption. Hence, two additional variables were included to control for the number of EIs being 
undertaken at the facility [Ln (Total Recommendations)] and the serial position of the EI [Ln 
(Recommendation Number)]. We controlled for number of hours spent by MTAP staff on the site 
visit [Ln (Hours) and Ln (Hours)2] to account for any differences in effort exerted on the EI 
initiatives. Additionally, 4 material type dummies were included to control for the type of 
pollution prevention [Solid Waste/Water Emissions/Air Emissions/Energy Efficiency] effort being 
undertaken. MTAP conducts follow-ups (via email or phone) with the EI owner during the 
improvement phase. Frequent follow-ups are likely to influence implementation. We therefore 
control for the Ln (Time between Follow-ups) which occurred between the date of site-visit and 
EI implementation (or censoring i.e. last reminder made by MTAP). Number of Employees at the 
facility was controlled for in all models [Ln (Employees)]. Industry dummies were included to 
account for industry level differences in regulatory activity and EI implementation. We also 
included year dummies for 1999-2012 to account for any differences in economic conditions and 
other time-varying exogenous factors.  
2.5.3 Estimating EI Implementation Probabilities  
We used two modeling techniques to ensure robustness of results. First, we used panel probit 
models with robust standard errors. Facility-level unobservable effects (managerial commitment, 
resources, facility structure etc.), which might not have been accounted for through control 
variables, were captured through a panel random effects specification. Previous studies in 
environmental operations have used similar models to estimate implementation likelihood of 
environmental initiatives such as ISO 14001 (King et al. 2005) and energy efficiency 
recommendations (Muthulingam et al. 2013). 
 The results are shown in Table 2-2. Punitive Tactics (Pre-Improvement) have significant 
promotive influence on EI implementation probability (Table 2, Column 1, β = 0.58, p<0.01; 
Odds Ratio=1.78). We find that Punitive Tactics (Improvement) have a significant disruptive 
effect on EI implementation probability (Table 2, Column 1, β = -1.15, p<0.01; Odds Ratio=0.31) 
of EIs. Hence, H1a and H1b are supported. This further stresses the importance of timing of 
punitive tactics.  
 H2 examines the effect of inspections vs. sanctions. We find that both, Inspections (Table 
2, Column 2, β = 0.41, p<0.05; Odds Ratio=1.50) and Sanctions (Table 2, Column 2, β = 0.87, 
p<0.01; Odds Ratio=2.39) occurring in the pre-improvement phase, have a positive influence on 
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EI implementation. A Wald’s test (F=3.28, p<0.05) suggested that, in the pre-improvement phase, 
sanctions have a significantly stronger promotive effect compared to inspections, thus providing 
support for H2a. In the improvement phase, we find that both, Inspections (Table 2, Column 3, β 
= -1.25, p<0.05; Odds Ratio=0.28) and Sanctions (Table 2, Column 3, β = -1.01, p<0.01; Odds 
Ratio=0.36) have a disruptive influence on EI implementation. A Wald’s test (F=0.20, p>0.10) 
suggested that, in the improvement phase, sanctions did not have a significantly stronger 
disruptive effect compared to inspections. Hence, H2b is not supported in the case of punitive 
tactics occurring in the improvement phase.  
 H3 examines the effect of related vs. unrelated punitive tactics. We find that Related 
Punitive Tactics (Table 2, Column 3, β = 0.96, p<0.01; Odds Ratio=2.60) had a marginally 
stronger (Wald’s F-test=1.56, p=0.105) promotive effect compared to Unrelated Punitive Tactics 
(Table 2, Column 3, β = 0.42, p>0.01; Odds Ratio=1.50) occurring in the pre-improvement phase. 
In the improvement phase, we find that Unrelated Punitive Tactics (Table 2, Column 3, β = -1.43, 
p<0.01; Odds Ratio=0.23) had a significantly stronger (Wald’s F-test=5.23, p<0.05) disruptive 
influence compared to Related Punitive Tactics (Table 2, Column 3, β = -0.32, p>0.01; Odds 
Ratio=0.72). Overall, H3a is not well-supported in the case of pre-improvement punitive tactics, 
but H3b is strongly supported for punitive tactics occurring in the improvement phase. 
 H4 and H5 predict the amplified promotive and disruptive influence in the case of Senior 
Manager Involvement and Technological Complexity respectively. We find that the promotive 
influence of Punitive Tactics (Pre-Improvement) is significantly stronger under Senior Manager 
Involvement (Table 2, Column 4, β = 0.68, p<0.10; Odds Ratio=1.96); the disruptive influence of 
Punitive Tactics (Improvement) is significantly stronger under Senior Manager Involvement 
(Table 2, Column 4, β = -1.26, p<0.05; Odds Ratio=0.28). Hence H4 is supported. Next, we find 
that the promotive influence of Punitive Tactics (Pre-Improvement) is not significantly stronger 
under Technological Complexity (Table 2, Column 5, β = -0.15, p>0.10; Odds Ratio=0.86); but 
the disruptive influence of Punitive Tactics (Improvement) is significantly stronger under 
Technological Complexity (Table 2, Column 5, β = -0.97, p<0.05; Odds Ratio=0.38). H5 is 
partially supported.   
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Table 2-2. Random Effects Logit Models for EI Implementation Probabilities 
 
  Punitive Tactics Characteristics Moderating Effects 
  Timing Type Relatedness Manager Complexity 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Ln(Savings) 0.40*** 0.40*** 0.40*** 0.42*** 0.40*** 
  (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) 
Ln(Savings)^2 -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Ln(Hours) -0.73*** -0.73*** -0.80*** -0.83*** -0.71*** 
  (0.25) (0.26) (0.26) (0.27) (0.25) 
Ln(Hours)^2 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.19*** 0.19*** 0.17*** 
  (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Ln(Employees)  0.13*** 0.13*** 0.12*** 0.04 0.14*** 
  (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) 
Senior Manager 0.07 0.05 0.05 -0.03 0.06 
  (0.38) (0.35) (0.37) (0.41) (0.42) 
Ln(Recommendation Number) -0.31** -0.31** -0.31** -0.31*** -0.36*** 
  (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13) 
Ln(Total Recommendations) -0.35* -0.35* -0.35* -0.42* -0.33 
  (0.20) (0.20) (0.19) (0.23) (0.20) 
Time between follow-ups 0.35** 0.33** 0.36** 0.34** 0.36** 
  (0.16) (0.15) (0.16) (0.15) (0.16) 
Punitive Tactics (Pre-Improvement) 0.58***     0.29 0.72** 
  (0.20)     (0.22) (0.36) 
Punitive Tactics (Improvement) -1.15***     -0.52 -0.59 
  (0.39)     (0.34) (0.38) 
Inspection (Pre-Improvement)   0.41**       
    (0.20)       
Sanction (Pre-Improvement)   0.87***       
    (0.31)       
Inspection (Improvement)   -1.25**       
    (0.60)       
Sanction (Improvement)   -1.01***       
    (0.27)       
Related Punitive Tactics (Pre-Improvement)     0.96***     
      (0.31)     
Unrelated Punitive Tactics (Pre-Improvement)     0.42     
      (0.26)     
Related Punitive Tactics (Improvement)     -0.32     
      (0.49)     
Unrelated Punitive Tactics (Improvement)     -1.43***     
      (0.45)     
Punitive Tactics (Pre-Improvement)       0.68*   
× Senior Manager       (0.41)   
Punitive Tactics (Pre-Improvement)       -1.26**   
× Senior Manager       (0.53)   
Punitive Tactics (Improvement)         -0.15 
× Technological Complexity         (0.47) 
Punitive Tactics (Improvement)         -0.97** 
× Technological Complexity         (0.40) 
F-Tests (Pre-Improvement)   3.28** 1.56     
F-Tests (Improvement)   0.20 5.23**     
Constant -0.07 0.15 -0.20 -0.29 -0.34 
  (1.78) (1.77) (1.77) (1.84) (1.65) 
Observations 1110 1110 1110 1110 1110 
Wald's chi2 83.61 84.17 86.11 78.43 78.38 
Log Likelihood -602.61 -602.20 -599.93 -606.30 -607.43 
Robust Standard Errors in parantheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 *p<0.1 
 
2.5.4 Estimating EI Implementation Hazards 
Next, we also use a hazard modeling approach to overcome limitations of the logit models and to 
explore longitudinal effects. Past research in management (Hom & Kinicki 2001) and medical 
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sciences (Stukel et al. 2007) has extensively used these methods to examine questions which 
involve temporal elements. Hazard models are commonly used where the interest is in 
understanding the relationship between the risk of an event (implementation) occurring at time t 
and the values of explanatory variables of interest to the problem. We model the EI 
implementation hazard (where higher hazard is good) using Cox Proportional Hazard (PH) 
Models. The baseline hazard function in a Cox PH model is estimated non-parametrically, which 
provides additional flexibility (Bradburn et al. 2003a). Recent studies in operations management 
have also used Cox models (Ramdas & Randall 2008; Levine & Toffel 2010).  
 The results are shown in Table 2-3. Punitive Tactics (Pre-Improvement) have significant 
promotive influence on EI implementation hazard (Table 3, Column 1, β = 0.19, p<0.10; Hazard 
Ratio=1.21). We find that Punitive Tactics (Improvement) have a significant disruptive effect on 
EI implementation hazard (Table 3, Column 1, β = -0.77, p<0.01; Hazard Ratio=0.46) of EIs. 
Hence H1a and H1b are supported, which provides further support for the importance of timing 
of punitive tactics.  
 H2 examines the effect of inspections vs. sanctions. We find that Sanctions (Table 3, 
Column 2, β = 0.49, p<0.01; Hazard Ratio=2.39) occurring in the pre-improvement phase, have a 
significantly stronger (Wald’s F-test=12.37, p<0.01) promotive influence on EI implementation 
hazard compared to Inspections (Table 3, Column 2, β = 0.02, p>0.10; Hazard Ratio=0.98). This 
provides support for H2. In the improvement phase, we find that both, Inspections (Table 3, 
Column 3, β = -0.79, p<0.01; Hazard Ratio=0.45) and Sanctions (Table 3, Column 3, β = -0.77, 
p<0.05; Hazard Ratio=0.49) have a disruptive influence on EI implementation hazards. A Wald’s 
test (F=0.03, p>0.10) suggested that, in the improvement phase, sanctions did not have a 
significantly stronger promotive effect compared to inspections. Hence, H2a is supported in the 
case of pre-improvement punitive tactics, but H2b is not supported for punitive tactics occurring 
in the improvement phase.  
 H3 examines the effect of related vs. unrelated punitive tactics. We find that Related 
Punitive Tactics (Table 3, Column 3, β = 0.32, p<0.01; Hazard Ratio=1.37) do not have a 
significantly stronger (Wald’s F-test=0.57, p>0.10) promotive effect compared to Unrelated 
Punitive Tactics (Table 3, Column 3, β = 0.17, p>0.01; Hazard Ratio=1.18) occurring in the pre-
improvement phase. In the improvement phase, we find that Unrelated Punitive Tactics (Table 3, 
Column 3, β = -0.91, p<0.01; Hazard Ratio=0.40) had a significantly stronger (Wald’s F-
test=3.64, p<0.05) disruptive influence compared to Related Punitive Tactics (Table 3, Column 3, 
β = -0.43, p>0.10; Hazard Ratio=0.64). Overall, H3a is not supported in the case of pre-
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improvement punitive tactics, but H3b is strongly supported in the case of punitive tactics 
occurring in the improvement phase. 
 H4 and H5 predict the amplified promotive and disruptive influence in the case of Senior 
Manager Involvement and Technological Complexity respectively. We find that the promotive 
influence of Punitive Tactics (Pre-Improvement) is not significantly stronger under Senior 
Manager Involvement (Table 3, Column 4, β = 0.07, p>0.10; Hazard Ratio=1.02); but the 
disruptive influence of Punitive Tactics (Improvement) is significantly stronger under Senior 
Manager Involvement (Table 2, Column 4, β = -1.13, p<0.05; Hazard Ratio=0.31). Hence H4 is 
partially supported. Next, we find that the promotive influence of Punitive Tactics (Pre-
Improvement) is not significantly stronger under Technological Complexity (Table 2, Column 5, β 
= -0.15, p>0.10; Hazard Ratio=0.86); but the disruptive influence of Punitive Tactics 
(Improvement) is significantly stronger under Technological Complexity (Table 2, Column 5, β = 
-0.75, p<0.05; Hazard Ratio=0.47). H5 is partially supported. Overall, the moderating effects of 
Senior Manager Involvement and Technological Complexity are much stronger during the 
improvement phase.    
2.5.5 Robustness Checks  
Alternate Modeling Approach for EI Implementation: The Cox model assumes that survival 
curves for the different strata (determined by different levels of covariates) have hazard functions 
that are proportional over time. However, this proportional hazards assumption is likely to fail 
when implementation times are excessively long. Hence, we use accelerated failure time (AFT) 
analysis to provide robustness to our results. In longitudinal survival analysis, the length of time 
(i.e. duration) is typically modeled for examining whether an explanatory covariate either 
stretches or shrinks the duration to the event (i.e. EI implementation) (Kiefer 1988; Bradburn et 
al. 2003b). AFT models require distributional assumptions but do not require the proportional 
hazard assumption which makes these models more flexible to handle changes over time. Overall, 
the results from the AFT models (Table 2-4) are very consistent with the results from the logit 
(Table 2-2) and Cox models (Table 2-3), implying robustness across modeling techniques and 
distributional assumptions. 
Follow-up Frequency and Intrinsic Motivations: Based on our discussions with MTAP, we 
wanted to examine whether follow-ups can be used as a policy lever to influence firm behaviors. 
To address this issue, we created two subsamples based on the median Time between follow-ups 
(90 days). 
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Table 2-3. Cox Models for EI Implementation Hazards 
 
  Punitive Tactics Characteristics Moderating Effects 
  Timing Type Relatedness Manager Complexity 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Ln(Savings) 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.23*** 0.20*** 0.22*** 
  (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) 
Ln(Savings)^2 -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
Ln(Hours) 0.06 0.07 0.03 -0.02 0.07 
  (0.16) (0.17) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) 
Ln(Hours)^2 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Ln(Employees)  0.02 0.03* 0.02 -0.01 0.02 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Senior Manager -0.01 -0.07 -0.04 0.08 -0.02 
  (0.20) (0.18) (0.20) (0.21) (0.22) 
Ln(Recommendation Number) -0.32*** -0.31*** -0.32*** -0.31*** -0.34*** 
  (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Ln(Total Recommendations) -0.19* -0.19* -0.19* -0.24*** -0.17 
  (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.07) (0.11) 
Time between follow-ups -0.57*** -0.61*** -0.56*** -0.59*** -0.57*** 
  (0.15) (0.15) (0.16) (0.11) (0.15) 
Punitive Tactics (Pre-Improvement) 0.19*     0.20 0.33* 
  (0.11)     (0.17) (0.17) 
Punitive Tactics (Improvement) -0.77***     -0.29 -0.31* 
  (0.20)     (0.27) (0.18) 
Inspection (Pre-Improvement)   -0.02       
    (0.13)       
Sanction (Pre-Improvement)   0.49***       
    (0.12)       
Inspection (Improvement)   -0.79***       
    (0.29)       
Sanction (Improvement)   -0.71**       
    (0.29)       
Related Punitive Tactics (Pre-Improvement)     0.32***     
      (0.11)     
Unrelated Punitive Tactics (Pre-Improvement)     0.17     
      (0.16)     
Related Punitive Tactics (Improvement)     -0.43     
      (0.30)     
Unrelated Punitive Tactics (Improvement)     -0.91***     
      (0.22)     
Punitive Tactics (Pre-Improvement)       0.07   
× Senior Manager       (0.26)   
Punitive Tactics (Pre-Improvement)       -1.13**   
× Senior Manager       (0.45)   
Punitive Tactics (Improvement)         -0.15 
× Technological Complexity         (0.18) 
Punitive Tactics (Improvement)         -0.75*** 
× Technological Complexity         (0.19) 
            
F-Tests (Pre-Improvement)   12.37*** 0.57     
F-Tests (Improvement)   0.03 3.64**     
Observations 1089 1089 1089 1089 1089 
Wald's chi2 825.25 1579.92 6571.93 748.05 2226.25 
Log Likelihood -2271.59 -2269.03 -2269.38 -2272.09 -2281.95 
 
Robust Standard Errors in parantheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 *p<0.1 
 
The results based on a subsample analysis are shown in Table 2-5. The results indicate that the 
promotive influence of Punitive Tactics (Pre-Improvement) is much stronger for EIs with low 
follow-up frequency; disruptive influence of Punitive Tactics (Improvement) is much stronger for 
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EIs with low follow-up frequency. These promotive and disruptive effects are almost negligible 
for EIs with high follow-up frequency. These results can have two possible explanations. First, 
projects with high follow-up frequency are simply more resistant to both, promotive and 
disruptive effects of Punitive Tactics. This implies that MTAP could successfully use this policy 
lever to encourage implementation. Such steps are being taken, based on our findings, by MTAP 
through an initiative called ‘Follow-up Tuesdays’. Second, we cannot ignore the possibility that 
the frequency of follow-ups is likely to be influenced by the MTAP staff’s expectations and 
beliefs about EI implementation probabilities and hazards. Discussions with MTAP revealed that 
all of their officials followed a standard protocol for conducting site-visits. Although the officials 
rejected the notion that their expectations might influence their timing of follow-ups, they 
admitted that they were often able to identify signs during site-visits indicating whether or not a 
recommendation was likely to be implemented. Hence, follow-up frequency is likely to be 
correlated with MTAP staff’s expectations of EI implementation, which, on the other hand are 
likely to be correlated with the unobservable level of ‘intrinsic’ commitment that facilities may 
have at EI initiation. This explanation might imply that facilities, potentially exhibiting low 
intrinsic commitment to EIs, are more likely to be influenced by external influences through 
Punitive Tactics. 
Additional Sensitivity Checks: We identified the pre-improvement and improvement phases as a 
12-month periods before and after the EI-initiation respectively. However, one might argue that 
the results might be affected by the time period selected. In order to alleviate this concern, we 
extended (14 months) and reduced (10 months) the time window. This approach did not have any 
significant impact on the findings (detailed results from this analysis available upon request). One 
could argue that any Punitive Tactics could impact operational activity, irrespective of their 
strength. Next, we suspected that certain EIs (Material Type = Water) in our sample might have 
been influenced by another regional regulatory authority (Metropolitan Council Environmental 
Services), which manages wastewater permits and monitors industrial sewage discharge. We 
therefore reanalyzed all our models by excluding these potentially biased EIs from our sample. 
Doing so did not change our results (available upon request) qualitatively, thereby alleviating 
concerns of other exogenous effects driving our findings. During the process of matching our two 
datasets, we were not able to identify the exact identities of seven facilities. These facilities were 
among the many facilities owned by a single firm in the same city. Although we matched datasets 
based on interviews and information from the public data sources, errors were likely to have 
occurred in these seven cases. As a final sensitivity test, we dropped these cases (seven facilities; 
24 EIs) from our models to avoid biases. This procedure did not have any impact on our findings. 
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Table 2-4. AFT Models for Robustness Checks 
  Punitive Tactics Characteristics Moderating Effects 
  Timing Type Relatedness Manager Complexity 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Ln(Savings) 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.20*** 0.22*** 
  (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06) 
Ln(Savings)^2 -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Ln(Hours) 0.05 0.04 0.00 -0.04 0.05 
  (0.18) (0.19) (0.18) (0.16) (0.17) 
Ln(Hours)^2 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.01 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Ln(Employees)  0.03* 0.04** 0.03 -0.01 0.04** 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Senior Manager -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 0.03 -0.05 
  (0.19) (0.17) (0.19) (0.20) (0.20) 
Ln(Recommendation Number) -0.29*** -0.28*** -0.29*** -0.29*** -0.31*** 
  (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Ln(Total Recommendations) -0.16 -0.17* -0.17* -0.22*** -0.14 
  (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.08) (0.10) 
Time between follow-ups -0.48*** -0.49*** -0.45*** -0.50*** -0.48*** 
  (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.08) (0.11) 
Punitive Tactics (Pre-Improvement) 0.17**     0.16** 0.24*** 
  (0.07)     (0.08) (0.09) 
Punitive Tactics (Improvement) -0.46***     -0.23 -0.23*** 
  (0.10)     (0.16) (0.08) 
Inspection (Pre-Improvement)   0.03       
    (0.12)       
Sanction (Pre-Improvement)   0.44***       
    (0.12)       
Inspection (Improvement)   -0.74***       
    (0.28)       
Sanction (Improvement)   -0.70***       
    (0.26)       
Related Punitive Tactics (Pre-Improvement)     0.31***     
      (0.11)     
Unrelated Punitive Tactics (Pre-Improvement)     0.18     
      (0.15)     
Related Punitive Tactics (Improvement)     -0.42     
      (0.30)     
Unrelated Punitive Tactics (Improvement)     -0.86***     
      (0.20)     
Punitive Tactics (Pre-Improvement)       0.01   
× Senior Manager       (0.10)   
Punitive Tactics (Pre-Improvement)       -0.71*   
× Senior Manager       (0.39)   
Punitive Tactics (Improvement)         -0.12 
× Technological Complexity         (0.14) 
Punitive Tactics (Improvement)         -0.36** 
× Technological Complexity         (0.14) 
            
F-Tests (Pre-Improvement)   10.50*** 0.51     
F-Tests (Improvement)   0.01 3.34**     
            
Constant -3.74*** -3.16*** -4.04*** -3.49*** -3.49*** 
  (0.83) (1.05) (1.08) (0.82) (0.74) 
Observations 1089 1089 1089 1089 1089 
Log Likelihood -939.22 -937.18 -936.93 -941.77 -945.38 
 
Robust Standard Errors in parantheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 *p<0.1 
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Table 2-5. Robustness Models for Follow-up Frequency and Intrinsic Motivations:  
  Logit Models Hazard Models 
  Follow-ups Follow-ups Follow-ups Follow-ups 
  High Low High Low 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ln(Savings) 0.43*** 0.36*** 0.29*** 0.16** 
  (0.12) (0.11) (0.09) (0.08) 
Ln(Savings)^2 -0.03*** -0.02** -0.03*** -0.01** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Ln(Hours) -1.18*** -0.13 -0.02 0.40 
  (0.43) (0.52) (0.21) (0.25) 
Ln(Hours)^2 0.23*** 0.06 0.00 -0.07 
  (0.08) (0.17) (0.04) (0.08) 
Ln(Employees)  0.15 -0.00 0.01 -0.02 
  (0.09) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) 
Senior Manager -0.16 0.43 -0.16 0.08 
  (0.74) (0.40) (0.20) (0.19) 
Ln(Recommendation Number) -0.31 -0.20 -0.26** -0.40** 
  (0.24) (0.13) (0.12) (0.17) 
Ln(Total Recommendations) -0.02 -0.51** -0.30* -0.21 
  (0.33) (0.25) (0.17) (0.17) 
Punitive Tactics (Pre-Improvement) 0.16 1.14** -0.01 0.30*** 
  (0.51) (0.50) (0.14) (0.11) 
Punitive Tactics (Improvement) 1.11 -1.74*** -0.01 -0.65** 
  (0.79) (0.44) (0.19) (0.27) 
Constant 3.59 1.31*     
  (4.21) (0.68)     
Observations 596 514 587 502 
Wald's chi2 41.66 73.66 94.02 235.82 
Log Likelihood -291.67 -406.87 -912.64 -1260.61 
 
Robust Standard Errors in parantheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 *p<0.1 
 
Table 2-6. Effects of Implementation on Long-Term Compliance 
  Logit Model Negative Binomial Model 
Variables DV=Penalty Received DV=Days to Closure 
Facility Fixed Effects (258 facilities) Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects (1999-2013) Yes Yes 
Compliance Issue Dummies (15 Issues) Yes Yes 
Compliance Action Dummies (14 Action Types) Yes Yes 
      
Facility Implemented At Least One EI -3.01*** -0.18**  
  -0.66 -0.09 
Constant 3.53*** 8.00*** 
  -0.87 -1.03 
Observations 878 758 
Log Likelihood -40.56 -4677.16 
 
Robust Standard Errors in parantheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 *p<0.1 
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2.5.6 Economic and Environmental Implications of Well-timed and Ill-timed Punitive 
Tactics  
In this section, we present the estimated economic and environmental implications of well-timed 
(pre-improvement phase) and ill-timed (improvement phase) Punitive Tactics. Although we make 
necessary assumptions to arrive at these numbers, the idea is to provide baseline estimates in 
order to inform policy decisions. We present estimates for two types of EIs – those related to 
Energy (601 EIs) and to Solid & Hazardous Waste (188 EIs). It might be useful to reiterate that 
the Odds Ratio (OR) represents the odds that EI implementation will occur given a particular 
event, compared to the odds of the outcome occurring in the absence of that event. Hazard Ratios 
(HR) can be interpreted as the exponent of coefficients, such that ratios below 1 indicate reduced 
hazard (of implementation) and ratios above 1 represent an increased hazard. As shown below, 
HRs provide more conservative estimates of energy-efficiency savings and waste elimination 
compared to ORs. Together, they can be viewed as providing a range of expected benefits (or lost 
opportunities) related to the use of well-timed and ill-timed Punitive Tactics. 
The average savings for energy-related EIs in our sample were 83,000 KWh and $8600. 
Considering the total energy related [Material Type=Energy] improvements in our data set, the 
“potential” annual energy savings (from 601 EIs) accumulate to 50 million KWh and $5.1 
million. Factoring in the current average implementation rate (50%), this would lead to potential 
“base-level” energy savings of 25 million KWh resulting in approximately 2.5 million dollars’ 
worth opportunities. The OR for Punitive Tactics (Pre-Improvement) was 1.78 which implies that 
the odds of implementation are 1.78 times higher for EIs when facilities face punitive tactics 
during the 12-month pre-improvement phase. This would, ideally, provide estimated savings of 
44 million KWh and $4.6 million, which is a significant improvement over base-level 
implementation savings. With similar calculation using Hazard Ratio (HR) of 1.21 for Punitive 
Tactics (Pre-Improvement), we can arrive at more conservative savings of 30 million KWh and 
$3.1 million, which still indicates a 20% rise over base-levels. The OR for Punitive Tactics 
(Improvement) was 0.31 which implies that the odds of implementation are 0.31 times lower for 
EIs when facilities face punitive tactics during the improvement phase. This suggests estimated 
savings of 7.7 million KWh and $ 0.8 million, which is a drastic reduction over base-level 
implementation benefits. With similar calculation using Hazard Ratio (HR) of 0.46 for Punitive 
Tactics (Improvement), we arrive at estimated savings of 11.0 million KWh and $1.2 million, 
which is a conservative, yet significant reduction over base-levels. 
The average waste eliminated from Waste-related EIs in our sample was 373,000 lbs. 
Considering the total Waste-related improvements in our data set, the “potential” annual waste 
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eliminated (from 188 EIs) was approximately 70 million lbs. Factoring in the current average 
implementation rate (50%), this would lead to potential “base-level” waste elimination of 
approximately 35 million lbs. The OR for Punitive Tactics (Pre-Improvement) was 1.78 which 
would, ideally, eliminate an estimated 62 million lbs. of waste, representing a significant 
improvement over base-level estimates. With similar calculation using Hazard Ratio (HR) of 1.21 
for Punitive Tactics (Pre-Improvement), we can arrive at more conservative number of 42.5 
million lbs., which still indicates a 20% rise over base-level waste elimination. The OR for 
Punitive Tactics (Improvement) was 0.31 which implies that the odds of implementation are 0.31 
times lower for EIs when facilities face punitive tactics during the improvement phase. This 
suggests estimated waste elimination of 10.8 million lbs., which is a drastic reduction over base-
level estimates. With similar calculation using Hazard Ratio (HR) of 0.46 for Punitive Tactics 
(Improvement), we arrive at estimated waste reduction of 16.1 million lbs., which indicates a 
conservative, yet significant reduction over base-levels. 
Although we might need to be cautious in extrapolating our results to other similar 
settings, the cumulative benefits (and lost opportunities) from assistance programs across United 
States (at least 100 programs currently exist) would be substantial. Our study suggests re-thinking 
the timing of punitive tactics, especially during the facility’s improvement phase, would be a 
crucial next step for policy. For ease of understanding, we do not provide estimates of energy 
savings and waste reduction based on inspections vs. sanctions and related vs. unrelated punitive 
tactics. Yet, our analysis suggests a need to carefully consider not only the ‘timing’, but also the 
‘nature’ of punitive tactics in relation to supportive tactics. 
2.5.7 Effect of EI Implementation on Long-Term Compliance Outcomes 
Our hypotheses hinge on the assumption that EI implementation is beneficial for facilities. 
Above, we illustrated the potential economic and environmental benefits from ensuring EIs 
implementation. Yet, from a policy standpoint, one might question whether EI implementation 
provides any long-term environmental benefits. In the absence of significant long-term 
environmental benefits, any policy efforts to coordinate supportive and punitive tactics may be 
futile. On the other hand, as expected by proponents of voluntary environmental programs 
(Koehler 2007), EI implementation could really be an important starting point in a facility’s 
trajectory toward improved environmental compliance. If that is truly the case (i.e. EI 
implementation matters in the long-run), our findings should inform environmental policy and 
attempts at coordinating supportive and punitive tactics are justified. To answer this question, we 
compiled data on all compliance records of facilities participating in MTAP’s assistance 
programs. The compliance records spread across 1999-2013 consisted of facility-level 
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compliance events, compliance issue type (water, air, solid waste etc.), compliance action type 
(e.g. Notice of Violation, Administrative Penalty Order, Warning), dollar penalties and days to 
compliance case closure.  
 We used this data to test for within-facility changes in (i) likelihood of receiving a dollar 
penalty and (ii) days to case closure after (vs. before) implementing at least a single EI. The two 
outcome metrics capture overall compliance and ability to address compliance issues 
respectively. One might question the validity of using ‘implementation of at least a single EI’ as a 
dichotomous measure. However, we believe this measure should adequately capture a facility’s 
transition to improved environmental standards. Similar modeling strategies have been used 
earlier to capture intent to adhere to improved environmental standards (Reid & Toffel 2009). A 
fixed-effects logit model (Table 2-6) shows that odds of a facility receiving a dollar penalty for a 
compliance issue went down more than 90% when a facility implemented at least a single EI. 
Similarly, facilities that implemented at least a single EI significantly improved their ability to 
resolve compliance issue faster. On average, case closure durations for facilities implementing at 
least one EI are 0.83 times lower. Overall, these results show that EI implementation can have 
significant implications for long-term compliance outcomes. As a result, the issue of coordinating 
punitive and supportive tactics is relevant from both short-term (EI implementation) and long-
term (reduced penalties, faster case closures) perspectives. 
2.6. Discussion 
Our findings have important policy implications for the timing of punitive and supportive tactics. 
Past research has highlighted the advantages (Haveman et al. 2001; Christmann 2004) and 
disadvantages (King & Lenox 2000) of regulatory institutions. Although regulatory actions might 
be necessary for long-term improvements (Anand et al. 2012), our results show that they may 
also hold implications for operational activity (EIs in this context) in the short-term. Our findings 
suggest that existing regulatory approaches can be complementary and/or counterproductive, 
depending on the timing of their usage. Policy-makers need to be wary of the disruptive impact of 
their punitive tactics occurring in the improvement phase. On the other hand, assistance programs 
can generate more effective outcomes by aligning their EI initiatives with existing punitive 
tactics. Information on environmental inspections and sanctions is widely available, which should 
allow greater cooperation between regulatory agencies and assistance programs in the coming 
years. Such targeting policy (Short & Toffel 2007; Rousseau 2007) has been shown to have 
increased environmental compliance. As noted earlier, currently there is limited communication 
between many regulatory agencies and intervention programs, especially when it comes to 
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specific facilities. A more coordinated effort could lead to more favorable environmental 
outcomes.  
 We examine whether punitive and supportive tactics can be implemented in a 
complementary manner in the context of government agencies influencing environmental 
improvement (EI) projects in firms. However, improvement projects can be related to various 
other corporate functions such as quality management and human resources. While we believe 
that our findings are generalizable to other contexts where firms are externally influenced, it will 
be interesting to examine complementarity between the two tactics under different contexts. 
Using archival data collected from two state-level environmental agencies in Minnesota, we 
conduct a longitudinal analysis of over 1000 EI projects tracked over several months. Yet these 
projects were undertaken in a single state – Minnesota. Although this approach minimizes the 
spurious effect of other factors, such as state level policies, it also limits generalizability to some 
extent. Future research could examine whether differences in organizational contexts (e.g. 
regulation, competition) moderate the effect of punitive and supportive tactics. Furthermore, 
organization-specific (e.g. location, parent influence) and firm-specific (e.g. centralization, supply 
chain structure) factors could also have a moderating influence. Our study uses archival data from 
state level agencies, which is prone to recording and measurement errors. Hence, a potential 
extension of this study is to experimentally examine complementary effects between punitive and 
supportive tactics. While quasi-experiments or field studies will help ground this phenomenon 
empirically, laboratory experiments will give additional insights into behavioral responses to the 
timing of polar tactics. We examine two policy approaches in this study. Yet, other policy 
approaches, such as voluntary environmental programs (VEPs), might also offer interesting 
empirical settings for future research on coordinated policy-making. Finally, future research 
could also examine the role of internal influence tactics, incentives and managerial control.  
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Chapter 3   
ESSAY 2 - Repurposing Materials & Waste through Online Exchanges: 
Overcoming the Last Hurdle11 
 
Summary 
 Online Material & Waste Exchanges (OMWEs) face several challenges in providing online 
channels to repurpose by-products, unused materials and waste from industrial and commercial 
facilities. First, sellers may have access to other disposal options, which limits their commit to the 
exchange. Second, buyers can face high uncertainty about the product and transaction. 
Overcoming these challenges is the ‘last hurdle’ to make OMWEs successful. This study 
investigates factors that increase the sellers’ commitment to the OMWE and reduce the buyers’ 
uncertainty by analyzing novel transaction-level data from an online exchange 
(MNExchange.org) combined with other archival public records on county-level repurposing and 
disposal statistics. We find that regional repurposing policies and alternatives have a 
complementary effect on sellers’ commitment towards OMWEs, resulting in increased OMWE 
exchanges. However, regional disposal policies and alternatives have a substitution effect on 
sellers’ commitment, resulting in reduced exchange success. Further, greater product and 
transaction information reduces the buyer’s uncertainty and increases exchange success. Our 
analysis also shows that higher familiarity between the buyer-seller pair and familiarity with the 
OMWE system increases the likelihood of exchange success. This study lays the foundation for 
understanding OMWEs and has important implications for developing policies and operations to 
increase online transactions of by-products, materials and wastes.  
 
Keywords: socially responsible operations, materials and waste exchange, sustainability, online 
markets, closed loop supply chains 
 
3.1 Introduction 
“One man’s trash is another man’s treasure” –  
 McGraw-Hill Dictionary of American Idioms and Phrasal Verbs 
Increasingly companies search for ways to become more environmentally sustainable.  
As a first step towards this goal, many companies develop channels for repurposing their 
industrial waste. Repurposing (i.e. reuse/recycling) industrial waste helps mitigate its potential 
negative impact to the environment by avoiding disposal via landfill or incineration. In 2010, 
repurposing programs in the U.S. helped divert more than 183 million metric tons of CO2, which 
is equivalent to eliminating emissions from 34 million passenger vehicles (EPA 2011b). While 
                                                     
11 Paper Co-authors: 
Suvrat Dhanorkar*, Karen Donohue+, Kevin Linderman** 
Carlson School of Management, University of Minnesota 
*dhano002@umn.edu, +donoh008@umn.edu, **linde037@umn.edu 
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repurposing rates have increased in recent years, most waste still gets disposed in landfills and 
incinerators. According to 2010 estimates, the United States repurposed less than 50% of its 
waste (EPA 2011b). Most companies accumulate a large amount of waste and surplus materials, 
such as industrial packaging (e.g. boxes, containers), mixed electronics (e.g. lamps, tapes), 
unused raw materials (e.g. wood, rubber) and by-products (e.g. chemicals, leather).  Such items 
account for approximately 70% of total solid waste in the U.S. (EPA 2011).  Unfortunately, these 
items suffer from low repurposing rates due, in part, to a failure to match the generators of the 
waste (sellers) with potential users (buyers).  
Online Material & Waste Exchanges (OMWEs) offer one possible remedy to this 
problem (EPA 2013a). An OMWE provides an online platform for matching sellers of surplus 
materials with buyers.  In these exchanges, the sellers post items for “sale” and buyers contact 
sellers directly to obtain additional information before making a possible exchange (i.e. 
transaction). While this process appears straightforward, many OMWEs including 
MNExchange.Org (Minnesota), ReuseMarketplace.Org (Northeast U.S.), and BCImex.CA 
(Canada) among others12, continue to experience low exchange rates (EPA 1994; MPCA 2011). 
This study seeks to understand the factors that influence exchanges in these unique markets. 
Understanding the factors that influence exchanges can help inform policies to better design and 
manage OMWEs. To understand what influences exchanges, we focus on the dilemmas that 
buyers and sellers face when deciding to exchange surplus material. First the sellers face a 
commitment dilemma to the exchange. Sellers often have access to more convenient disposal 
options, such as landfills and incineration plants. Consequently, even after they have listed an 
item on the exchange, they still face a dilemma of spending the effort to pursue a successful 
exchange, or just dispose the item through landfill or incineration. On the other hand, buyers face 
an uncertainty dilemma about the product and its transaction. From the buyer’s perspective, they 
may find it difficult to assess the quality or usability of the product. Furthermore, in these 
markets, buyers and sellers have fewer, infrequent interactions which make it difficult for buyers 
to judge sellers based on their reputation. While customer ratings and pricing mechanisms (e.g., 
auctions) can reduce uncertainties in some online markets (Pavlou & Gefen 2004), OMWEs 
typically do not have such mechanisms (e.g., our  survey of 25 large scale OMWEs revealed that 
only 2 offered these mechanisms or associated services).  
                                                     
12 We surveyed existing OMWEs in various parts of United States (California, Texas, Minnesota, New York, Maine, 
Pennsylvania, Washington etc.) as well as in Canada (Alberta, British Columbia, Ontario, Quebec etc.) Specifically, we 
examined the online platforms carefully to collect qualitative information on various characteristics such as listing, display, 
pricing, reputation mechanisms etc. In addition, we also had telephonic conversations with five other OMWEs (four in the 
U.S. and one in Canada), which were a part of the Materials Exchange Managers Network, an informal network of 
administrators and policy-makers engaged in OMWE development. A detailed list of OMWEs in U.S. is available with 
EPA: http://www.epa.gov/osw/conserve/tools/exchange.htm. 
 35 
 
The challenge of overcoming the sellers’ commitment dilemma and buyers’ uncertainty 
dilemma represents the ‘last hurdle’ problem in successfully matching sellers and buyers on 
OMWEs. Our research draws from prior theory, and knowledge gained from interactions with our 
industry partners, to identify specific factors that influence exchanges. We hypothesize that the 
sellers’ commitment dilemma is influenced by the level of disposal and repurposing alternatives 
within the seller’s vicinity. Furthermore, we hypothesize that the buyers’ uncertainty dilemma is 
influenced by the type of information provided on the listing, the seller’s size, and the geographic 
proximity between the buyer and seller. Finally, we hypothesize that users’ prior experience with 
the OMWE positively influences exchange outcomes. We test the impact of these factors on the 
likelihood of a successful exchange using a novel data set from MNExchange.Org consisting of 
4300+ material/waste listings and 100,000+ buyer-seller interactions. The analysis shows that 
product and transaction information richness reduces the buyer’s uncertainty and increases 
likelihood of a successful exchange. In addition, regional repurposing practices and alternative 
disposal options impacts the sellers’ commitment which affect the likelihood of an exchanges. 
Finally, the analysis shows that users’ (buyers and sellers) familiarity with the OMWE influences 
the likelihood of an exchange. Specifically, the more a buyer and seller interact with one another 
and the more role-based experience (i.e. familiarity with the OMWE system) they have, the 
higher the likelihood of an exchange. 
The next section of the paper provides a conceptual overview, positions the study in the 
extant literature and develops hypotheses. Section 3 introduces the research context and variables. 
Section 4 reports the empirical results. Section 5 discusses managerial and policy implications 
and section 6 presents future research directions.  
3.2 Conceptual Overview and Theory Development 
3.2.1   OMWEs within Repurposing Supply Chains  
OM scholars increasingly recognize the importance of repurposing supply chains (Linton et al. 
2007; Atasu, Guide, et al. 2008). To compare OMWEs with other types of repurposing supply 
chains, we develop a taxonomy based on two dimensions - Diversity of Materials and Buyer-
Seller Coupling.  Diversity of Materials refers to the range of materials in the repurposing supply 
chain, while Buyer-Seller Coupling refers to the degree of coordination between buyers (waste 
consumers) and sellers (waste producers). Figure 3-1 positions the following repurposing supply 
chains based on this framework: OMWEs, OEM remanufacturing, third-party demanufacturing, 
industrial recycling, and industrial symbiosis.  Some of these repurposing supply chains (e.g. 
OEM remanufacturing, third-party demanufacturing) have been examined under the broader 
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umbrella of closed loop supply chains (Guide & Van Wassenhove 2009), while others have 
received little attention from OM scholars. 
 
Figure 3-1. Repurposing Operations & Supply Chains  
 
 
OEM remanufacturing deals with the disassembly and recovery of valuable components 
from a product, which are later reused or recycled. Scholars have generated important insights for 
inventory management (Toktay et al. 2000), product design (Guide & Wassenhove 2001), and 
strategic marketing (Atasu et al. 2008) of remanufactured products. Most research in this domain 
focuses on managing durable products (Thierry et al. 1995; Toktay et al. 2000; Guide et al. 2006) 
with relatively high value. OEM remanufacturing is a low diversity-tight coupling repurposing 
supply chain since it applies to specific product types with pre-determined contractual 
arrangements between supply chain members. Examples of OEM remanufacturers include Xerox, 
HP, Dell and Kodak. In third-party demanufacturing, third-party providers handle the logistics, 
sorting and demanufacturing processes (Spicer & Johnson 2004). Here, secondary market brokers 
manage product returns across multiple supply chains through centralized returns centers 
(Savaskan et al. 2004; Tibben-Lembke 2004). As a result, this setting comprises more material 
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diversity and moderate coupling compared to OEM remanufacturing. Examples of third-party 
demanufacturers include Total Reclaim and Dataserv USA.  
Other repurposing supply chains, such as industrial recycling and industrial symbiosis, 
have received more attention from scholars in industrial ecology (Linton et al. 2007). Although 
similar to third-party demanufacturers, industrial recyclers often handle more diversity of 
materials such as assorted metals, plastics, wood and paper. They also have looser buyer-seller 
coupling since materials come from a wider variety of sources. Covanta Energy is an example of 
an industrial recycler that has more than 40 mixed materials recycling facilities across United 
States and abroad. The industrial symbiosis perspective views industrial processes as a biological 
ecosystem, which can potentially be designed to thrive on its own by-products (Desrochers 2004; 
Chertow 2007). Industrial symbiosis typically focuses on redirecting multiple waste streams in 
highly coordinated supply chains. The Kalundborg eco-industrial park in Denmark is an example 
of industrial symbiosis. It has co-located facilities that create an industrial symbiosis among waste 
streams consisting of sulfur, sludge, waste water and gas (Chertow 2007). Despite its benefits 
(Linton et al. 2007), this approach requires substantial investment, planning, foresight and a tight 
buyer-seller coupling.  
 In contrast to these other approaches, OMWEs connect multiple products and waste 
streams across multiple buyers and sellers. Buyers and sellers are loosely coupled due to 
relatively low volume and infrequent transactions. Online Materials & Waste Exchanges 
(OMWEs) have received limited attention in the literature. While a few case studies (Tsai & 
Chou 2004; Wei & Huang 2001) provide a description of physical waste exchange programs in 
Asian countries, they do not examine ‘online’ exchanges or study operational factors of such 
exchanges. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first empirical study on OMWEs.  
According to the EPA (2013a), Material & Waste Exchanges “are markets for buying 
and selling reusable and recyclable commodities. Some are physical warehouses that advertise 
available commodities through printed catalogs, while others are simply Web sites that connect 
buyers and sellers.” Such exchanges vary in their geographic reach as well as the diversity of 
materials being exchanged. In light of the recent technologies advances, most exchanges in the 
U.S. and Europe now have a major online component. Often, OMWEs handle specific types of 
products such as plastics or wood. For example, the California Plastics Exchange 
(CAplasticsmarket.com) acts as an online intermediary to match sellers, buyers and recyclers of 
industrial plastics. CRUMB Rubber (Crumb.rubber.com) located in Ontario, Canada offers 
another example of an exchange for granulated rubber products. Mixed materials and waste 
exchanges such as MNexchange.org (Minnesota), ReuseMarketplace.Org (Northeast U.S.), and 
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BCImex.CA (Canada) can host hundreds of listings for industrial materials, by-products and 
wastes.  
 OMWEs share some similarities with B2B online markets (for detailed discussions on 
B2B markets, see Pavlou (2002) and Koch & Schultze (2011)). Typically, online markets 
aggregate buyer demand or seller offerings, build trust, facilitate transactions, and match supply 
with demand (Bailey & Bakos 1997). Online markets lower the buyer’s search costs in obtaining 
product and seller information (Bakos 1991). A recent stream of research studies the online 
exchange of used goods (Ghose 2009; Subramanian & Subramanyam 2012; Dimoka et al. 2012), 
which has similarities with OMWE transactions. These papers highlight the problem of buyer 
uncertainty in the used goods online market. Recent research on e-commerce in supply chains 
(Balakrishnan & Geunes 2004; Johnson & Whang 2002) also relates to OMWEs. This research 
shows the importance of accurate information (Lee & Whang 2001) and user interface (Boyer & 
Olson 2002) to facilitate transactions. 
 In comparison to conventional online markets (Overby & Jap 2009), buyers in OMWEs 
face higher uncertainty due to limited information about product characteristics and transaction 
outcomes. Uncertainty creates agency problems (Dimoka et al. 2012) and increases transaction 
costs (Teo & Yu 2005). Consequently, reducing uncertainty has been the focus of many studies 
on online markets (Pavlou & Gefen 2004; Pavlou et al. 2007). Studies have also considered how 
transactional characteristics (Jarvenpaa et al. 1999) influence online exchanges. Research also 
shows how prior experience between buyers and sellers influences exchanges (Gefen 2000). 
These literature streams help inform our theoretical arguments about OMWEs. 
3.2.2 Theory & Hypotheses Development 
This study investigates the factors that lead to successful exchanges (i.e. transactions between 
buyers and sellers) in OMWEs. On the seller side, the ‘last hurdle’ problem arises when sellers 
choose other disposal options over OMWEs. This relates to the seller’s lack of commitment to the 
exchange. On the buyer side, the ‘last hurdle’ problem arises when buyers do not make the 
purchase through the exchange despite their interest in the item listed. This relates to the buyer’s 
uncertainty about the product and transaction attributes. Finally, the buyers’ and sellers’ prior 
experience with the online exchange may also affect transactions. Drawing on Transaction Cost 
Economics (TCE) and other literature streams, we develop hypotheses that relate the sellers’ 
uncertainty, buyers’ commitment and user experience with OMWEs to a transaction success. We 
also draw on discussions (see Appendix) with MNExchange.org staff and OMWE users to further 
inform the hypotheses.  
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The Seller’s ‘Commitment’ Dilemma  
The sellers transaction decision in OMWE is influenced by multiple factors other than price and 
product attributes (Schmidt et al. 2007). For example, sellers face the transaction costs of 
searching for buyers and engaging in contractual negotiations (Dahlman 1979). Sellers also bear 
the economic cost of carrying materials/wastes until they are exchanged with potential buyers. As 
a result, sellers may avoid engaging in an online exchange when the transaction costs (e.g. 
searching, contracting) and carrying costs outweigh the economic, reputational and environmental 
benefits (Coase 1937). Here, we argue that sellers’ transaction costs (and commitment to 
OMWEs) may be influenced by (i) access to other alternatives and (ii) regional repurposing and 
disposal policies.  
Access to Other Alternatives 
Previous studies have argued that transaction costs depend on relative access to different 
alternatives (Bajari & Tadelis 2001; Hennart 1988). Research in logistics shows that a user’s 
decision to adopt a green option depends on their geographic location, access to other alternatives 
and the transaction costs incurred (Burns & Golob 1976). Geographic and location factors affect 
the economic, social and environmental benefits of adopting environmental practices (Schmidt et 
al. 2007; Barrett & Lawlor 1997). In a related vein, the literature on supply chain management 
suggests that the seller’s commitment to a contract depends on their relative access to other 
supply channels (Klein et al. 1990; Tsay & Agrawal 2000; 2004). Applying this logic, increased 
access to alternatives (i.e. substitutes) can reduce the transaction costs of using these alternatives. 
For example, increased access to rubber disposal facilities in the region may reduce a tire 
manufacturing facility’s inclination to use OMWEs. This logic suggests that increased access to 
other disposal alternatives may reduce the seller’s commitment to OMWEs, decreasing the 
likelihood of an exchange.  
 While disposal alternatives act as clear substitutes for OMWEs, repurposing alternatives 
could conceivably act as either substitutes or complements. Viewing them as substitutes, more 
repurposing alternatives could increase competition for the seller’s “goods” and hence reduce 
seller commitment to OMWEs. In other words, increasing the number of alternatives within the 
vicinity may reduce the seller’s commitment to OMWE exchanges. On the other hand, a TCE-
based analysis (Madhok 2002) suggests that positive spillover effects of other repurposing 
alternatives could generate complementary benefits (Porter 2000) for sellers on OMWEs. In line 
with the concept of industry clusters (Porter 2000), an “informally linked geographic 
concentration of organizations” can provide efficiency and coordination benefits. Applying this 
logic to our context, more repurposing facilities in the sellers’ region may give rise to a 
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“repurposing cluster”, which could reduce the overall transaction and coordination costs for 
sellers in OMWEs. In addition, many buyers in OMWEs are repurposing facilities (e.g. industrial 
recyclers and refurbishing centers) “who use the OMWE as a platform to source their operations” 
(MPCA Officer 2014). As a result, more repurposing facilities in the sellers’ region could help 
sellers on OMWEs to more efficiently identify buyers for their materials and wastes. In summary, 
while both complementary and substitutive effects of repurposing alternative may be at play, we 
expect the complementary effect (as predicted by TCE and the concept of clusters) will be 
stronger. Therefore we predict that sellers’ increased access to other repurposing alternatives 
(excluding OMWEs) has a positive spillover effect on OMWEs and increases the likelihood of 
exchanges. Hence, we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): The Sellers’ Access to other (a) disposal alternatives is negatively associated 
with the likelihood of a successful exchange while (b) repurposing alternatives is positively 
associated with the likelihood of a successful exchange.  
Regional Repurposing and Disposal Policies 
While H1 considers access to disposal and repurposing alternatives, the next hypothesis examines 
the relative effect of disposal versus repurposing policies within a seller’s region (i.e. county). 
Counties within each state have the authority to develop policies and infrastructure to promote 
repurposing alternatives over disposal alternatives. Repurposing policies “…reflect the significant 
[state- and county-level] investment in the recycling system, as well as strong material 
markets…” (MPCA 2010). A Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (MPCA) employee confirmed 
that “county-level initiatives are important, … which is why we [MPCA] work on developing 
regional recycling markets…” (MPCA Officer 2014).  
 Discussions with the exchange staff revealed that local (i.e. county-level) repurposing 
and disposal policies influence the seller’s commitment to the exchange. Regional policies can 
alter the institutional environments in which seller organizations operate (Sharma 1995), which 
can make the repurposing alternatives more (or less) favorable. For example, favorable policies 
can reduce the transaction costs (Tadelis & Williamson 2010) of repurposing by creating an 
environment for peripheral repurposing business (e.g. material & waste transportation) to develop 
(Porter 2000). Furthermore, supportive repurposing policies in a region can foster pro-
environmental beliefs and attitudes which affects the sellers’ use of the OMWE (Henriques & 
Sadorsky 1996; Schwab et al. 2012). Research shows that companies undertake pro-
environmental actions when embedded in regions that expect higher environmental compliance 
(Christmann 2004). According to TCE, such adherence to regional policies lowers the sellers’ 
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overall transaction costs (Nee 1998; Roberts & Greenwood 1997) of conducting business. The 
positive spillover effect can lead to an increase in sellers’ commitment to repurposing alternatives 
like the OMWE. As a result, sellers in regions with supportive repurposing (relative to disposal) 
policies may show more commitment to OMWE transactions, leading to higher likelihood of 
OMWE exchanges. Hence: 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): The Repurposing to Disposal Ratio in the Seller’s County is positively 
associated with the likelihood of a successful exchange. 
The Buyer’s ‘Uncertainty’ Dilemma  
The literature on online markets recognizes the problems that arise from product uncertainty and 
transaction uncertainty (Pavlou et al. 2007; Dimoka et al. 2012; Pavlou & Gefen 2004). In online 
markets, product uncertainty comes from hidden or asymmetric information, which prevents the 
buyer from accurately evaluating product characteristics; transaction uncertainty comes from 
concerns about hidden actions and contractual shirking by the seller (Arrow 1984). These 
problems become further amplified in online markets for secondary/used materials (Ghose 2009) 
such as OMWEs. As a result, reducing product and transaction uncertainty may improve 
exchange success (Pavlou et al. 2007).  
Product Uncertainty  
Product uncertainty is defined as “the buyer’s difficulty in evaluating the product and predicting 
how it will perform in the future” (Dimoka et al. 2012). Products listed on the online waste 
exchange tend to be non-standardized and non-branded, which increases product uncertainty. 
Also, used or secondary products such as those sold in OMWEs have higher product 
heterogeneity due to variations in quality (Ghose 2009). As a result, buyers have more difficulty 
assessing product quality in OWMEs. Some conventional online markets such as eBay and 
Amazon reduce uncertainty by providing reliable pricing signals either through buyer bids or 
seller-provided prices (Smith et al. 2001; Brynjolfsson 2002). However, waste exchanges 
typically do not provide this type of information. For example, in our study setting, less than 5% 
of sellers provided an initial “asking price”. Given these factors, buyers in online waste 
exchanges have higher product uncertainty.  
 Product uncertainty increases the search costs (through higher evaluation challenges), 
which may also lead buyers to exit the market (Teo & Yu 2005). However, information can 
reduce product uncertainty by improving “product diagnosticity” (Dimoka et al. 2012). The 
director of a software provider for OMWEs noted that “the way [listing] information is presented 
and the [online] content influences users’ decision….whether they should go ahead…is it worth 
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the effort?...” (Director at iWasteNot Systems 2014). In OMWEs, textual description and visual 
content (e.g. picture) together provide buyers with a “first cut” of information about the item 
(MNExchange.Org Staff 2013). As a result, we expect that more product information will reduce 
buyer’s uncertainty, and consequently increase the likelihood of exchange. Hence: 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Reduced Product Uncertainty through higher (a) Textual information length 
and (b) Visual information content is positively associated with the likelihood of a successful 
exchange.  
Transaction Uncertainty  
Transaction uncertainty reflects the buyer’s difficulty in predicting the outcome of the transaction 
(Dimoka et al. 2012). High transaction uncertainty may limit the buyers’ ability to predict seller 
behavior and the transaction outcome (Koopmans 1957; Sutcliffe & Zaheer 1998). For example, 
“…the buyer might think…Hey, I don’t know this person [i.e. seller] well enough…will this 
work out?” (MNExchange.Org Staff 2013). Transaction uncertainty may be higher in OMWEs, 
compared with other conventional C2C or B2C markets like Amazon or eBay, due to the lower 
trade volumes and infrequent transactions in OMWEs. For example, in our study only 2% of the 
users on MNExchange.Org completed more than one successful exchange (either buying or 
selling) between 2000 and 2008. Consequently, even reputation mechanisms and seller ratings, 
which lower transaction uncertainty in conventional online markets (Subramanian & 
Subramanyam 2012), have less applicability in OMWEs due to smaller trade volumes and 
infrequent exchanges. Given the high uncertainty in OMWEs, the transaction costs might 
outweigh the benefits of making an online waste exchange (Teo & Yu 2005). Hence, reducing 
transaction uncertainty becomes critical.  
 In the OMWE context, the seller’s size and geographical proximity to the buyer may 
influence the level of transaction uncertainty. For example, a larger seller may provide a buyer 
with lower transaction uncertainty due to their familiarity and reputation. This is consistent with 
Doney and Cannon (1997), who argue that buyers have more trust in larger sellers since they are 
less likely to renege on commitments due to the higher risks to their reputation. In addition, 
information accuracy increases with closer geographical proximity between transacting parties 
(Pavlou & Gefen 2004), which lowers transaction costs. Greater buyer-seller proximity also has a 
direct benefit of lower transportation costs and convenience. Economists have confirmed that 
geographical proximity between buyers and sellers not only decreases transportation costs and 
tariffs but also reduces “informational frictions” (i.e. transaction uncertainty) in search, 
negotiation and monitoring (Anderson & Van Wincoop 2004; Hortaçsu et al. 2009). Discussions 
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with MNExchange.Org staff confirmed that buyers are reluctant to engage with “far-away 
sellers” due to their inability to assess material quality a priori and settle potential quality issues 
post hoc. Overall, we expect seller size and geographical proximity to have a positive impact on 
the likelihood of an exchange. Hence:  
Hypothesis 4 (H4): Reduced Transaction Uncertainty through greater (a) Seller size and (b) 
Geographical proximity between the buyer-seller pair is positively associated with likelihood of a 
successful exchange.  
Buyer & Seller Prior Experience  
Reputation and pricing mechanisms play an important role in building efficient online markets 
(Bakos 1991; Gefen 2002; Gefen et al. 2003; Luo 2002). In the context of remanufactured 
products, Subramanian and Subramanyam (2012) show that reputation signals and warranties 
helped promote efficient markets. But, OMWEs have low transaction volumes and few repeat 
sales, consequently rating (i.e. feedback) mechanisms do not effectively provide aggregate seller 
reputation information (Dellarocas 2003). This may explain why only one OMWE out of the 25 
we surveyed allowed buyers to rate their transaction experiences. Pricing mechanisms and 
warranties are also usually not available on OMWEs since the transacted items are low valued, 
non-standardized and non-branded. For example, less than 1% of items in MNExchange.Org have 
an asking price with the majority listed as either “negotiable” of “free”. The quoted prices rarely 
reflect the final exchange amount since bargaining is common in these markets. As a result, in 
OMWEs, “…a lack of credible [seller and pricing related] information and problems with 
bargaining are often the reasons for failed matches…” (MNExchange.Org Staff 2013). Given this 
lack of reputation and pricing mechanisms, OMWE users may be forced to rely on their past 
experiences to overcome transactional challenges.  
Past Buyer-Seller Familiarity 
Research shows that prior experience influences actions (Ouellette & Wood 1998). When faced 
with uncertainty, decision makers often rely on experience to inform their decisions. For example, 
buyers may store relevant past experiences and evoke previously established decision routines to 
make decisions (Howard & Sheth 1969). In other words, decision-making tasks can be simplified 
when faced with familiar situations or when interacting with familiar buyers/sellers. Recently, 
Bolton et al. (2004) found that successful transactions often depend on the level of experience 
with the transacting “partner”. Previous interactions with the same buyer/seller increases 
perceived trust which mitigates uncertainty, fears of opportunism and online information privacy 
concerns (Pavlou et al. 2007). Similarly, in the OMWE context, previous experience between two 
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transacting parties (i.e. buyer-seller pairs) may engender trust and reduce transactional difficulties 
(Pavlou 2002), thus increasing the likelihood of an exchange. This suggests the following 
hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 5 (H5): Past familiarity between the buyer-seller pair is positively associated with the 
likelihood of a successful exchange.  
Past Role-based Experience 
In OMWEs, buyers and sellers may not have clear information about the other party’s intentions 
and behavior. Although each new transaction presents different challenges, users may benefit 
from their prior experience of having been “in the other’s shoes”. Early research in social 
psychology has documented the influence of role-playing on opinions and perceptions (Janis & 
King 1954). Decision-makers learn from experience gained through other roles, which can alter 
their beliefs and attitudes (Elms 1967). Experience gained through other roles (i.e. buyers having 
transacted as sellers and vice versa) may also increase familiarity with the online system, which 
can improve transaction decisions (Gefen et al. 2003). In OMWEs, being in the role of the 
opposite transacting party can improve the users’ understanding of the OMWE system. This 
understanding may benefit buyers and sellers. Having previously been a buyer can improve 
sellers’ understanding of factors that can alleviate buyer uncertainty, resulting in positive actions 
(e.g. improved information provision) that increase the likelihood of exchange. Similarly, having 
previously been a seller can reduce the buyers’ search and negotiation costs in future exchanges. 
Hence: 
Hypothesis 6 (H6): Past role-based experience in the form of (a) Buyer’s experience as Seller or 
(b) Seller’s experience as Buyer is positively associated with the likelihood of a successful 
exchange  
3.3 Research Context & Data 
The primary data for this study comes from transactions on the MNExchange.Org (henceforth 
also referred to as “the exchange”). Although OMWEs may differ in terms of their size, 
geographic reach and material diversity, the basic characteristics of most OMWEs in U.S. and 
Canada are fairly similar. MNExchange.Org provides a useful context for studying OMWEs in 
several respects. First, the exchange has been operational since 1999, making it relatively mature. 
By 2008, MNExchange.Org had facilitated transactions exceeding 25 million pounds of materials 
and wastes, saving more than $6 million for local businesses. As of 2008, the exchange had more 
than 10,000 registered members representing approximately 7000 industrial and commercial 
facilities. The scale and longevity of MNExchange.Org make it an appropriate empirical setting 
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for our study. Second, its operations (e.g. functionality, web interface, policies for listings, 
registration) are similar to many other mixed exchanges across the United States and Europe, 
which improves applicability of our findings. Third, OMWEs of low valued products tends to be 
localized, hence studying regional exchanges similar to MNExchange.Org is critical to 
understanding how to increase repurposing.  
MNExchange.Org hosts a web interface that allows registered companies to list and 
browse product listings. The Appendix provides recent snapshots of the web interface. At any 
given time, the online exchange may host hundreds of listings by different waste categories. First-
time users setup individual accounts by providing information about their organization, size, 
activities, location, and contact details. When a user submits a listing, the exchange displays item-
specific information such as the quoted price, product description, frequency (whether one-time 
or recurring) and location (by county and zip code). For example, a construction company (seller) 
might list its surplus storm water concrete pipes (Appendix) on MNExchange.Org with 
accompanying product and transaction information. Sellers are not allowed to list multiple items 
(pipes, equipment, windows etc.) together; each item (material, by-product or waste) is listed 
separately, although the quantities for each listing might vary (e.g. 10 concrete pipes). This 
information allows potential buyers to browse the listings and sort on specific criteria. Interested 
registered buyer(s) can then contact the seller directly (through seller-provided contact details) to 
get more information about the product, price, logistics etc. before negotiating an exchange. The 
terms of exchange are mutually decided offline by the transacting parties. Although 
MNExchange.Org provides an inexpensive channel for producers and consumers of industrial 
materials and waste, it does not offer any price or product guarantees. Also, repeat exchanges for 
the same buyer-seller pair are infrequent (merely 150 repeat exchanges between 2000 and 2008).  
 In traditional online markets, prices signal product value and allow comparisons with 
substitutes (Brynjolfsson & Smith 2000; Brynjolfsson 2002). OMWEs typically have non-
standardized and non-branded products which make price comparisons difficult. In these markets, 
sellers often do not provide price quotes. Out of 4330 total listings in our data, only 20 items had 
an asking price; all others were either listed as “negotiable” or “free”. Approximately 45% of the 
listings are items being offered for free. In such cases, the incentive for the seller may come from 
enhanced environmental legitimacy or reduced disposal costs. Additional discussions with other 
OMWEs in U.S. and Canada (see Appendix) confirmed these trends observed in 
MNExchange.Org.  
The available archival data spans 1999-2010 and consists of product listings, buyer 
requests for seller information, and if an exchange occurred between the buyer and seller.  Our 
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analysis is based on data between 2000 and 2008 since this period was deemed the most 
representative of normal exchange activity.  The excluded years had little activity due to external 
factors.  In particular, 1999 was the first operating year of the exchange and the 2009-2010 phase 
was influenced by effects of the economic crisis. This reduced data set represents approximately 
4500 listings. To test our hypotheses, we matched other county-level data from Minnesota state 
public records and Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (MPCA) reports on county-level 
statistics. Since we rely on multiple secondary sources, missing data is a potential concern.  
Approximately 460 out of the 4500 listings had missing information for at least one measure, 
mostly due to recording errors (for user size, county, organization type etc.). We resolved 215 of 
these cases through discussions with MNExchange.Org and other secondary data sources 
(Hoover’s and ORBIS), and dropped listings where information was missing on more than two 
control or independent variables. For the remaining cases, we used the mean imputation method 
for handling missing data. Using more advanced multiple imputation techniques (White et al. 
2013) did not affect findings. The final sample resulted in 4330 listings and 100,625 buyer-seller 
interactions, with descriptive statistics provided in Table 3-1. Table 3-2 and Table 3-3 provide a 
description of variables and summary statistics. 
 
Table 3-1. Descriptive Statistics by Material Types 
Serial TYPE OF LISTING # OF ITEMS EXCHANGED TOTAL_HITS HAZARDOUS RECURRING 
No. (Item Classification) (N) (Percent of Listed) (Average) (Percent) (Percent) 
    ALL ALL FREE ALL FREE ALL FREE ALL FREE 
1 Boxes & packaging 244 13.1% 17.2% 22.4 33.0 27.9% 17.2% 31.6% 38.8% 
2 Chemicals & cleaners 190 14.7% 13.0% 15.0 16.1 38.9% 44.8% 25.8% 23.4% 
3 Construction materials 191 8.9% 11.0% 41.3 56.2 0.5% 1.1% 45.0% 40.7% 
4 Containers & pallets 170 18.8% 19.1% 44.2 42.3 0.6% 0.9% 64.1% 60.0% 
5 Electronics 552 22.1% 25.8% 19.9 19.3 1.1% 1.2% 27.0% 22.0% 
6 
Equipment & 
machinery 
166 22.3% 26.4% 23.1 24.3 1.2% 2.2% 30.7% 24.2% 
7 Office Furniture 782 19.7% 22.2% 31.4 37.9 0.3% 0.0% 21.7% 24.3% 
8 Office Supplies 405 26.9% 26.0% 20.6 25.6 1.2% 0.4% 11.1% 13.8% 
9 Paints & stains 103 18.4% 10.5% 27.3 30.1 16.5% 19.3% 23.3% 14.0% 
10 Paper products 31 9.7% 16.7% 22.8 27.5 0.0% 0.0% 38.7% 27.8% 
11 Plastics & rubber 627 19.9% 26.3% 17.8 29.1 1.6% 1.1% 14.9% 14.2% 
12 Textiles & leather 284 24.6% 25.5% 16.2 21.1 1.4% 1.9% 9.9% 9.8% 
13 Wood Products 133 30.1% 34.2% 41.4 53.4 0.0% 0.0% 31.6% 32.9% 
14 Other Miscellaneous 452 18.7% 20.6% 23.4 28.4 1.1% 2.2% 51.8% 36.5% 
  Total/Average 4330 20.3% 22.3% 26.2 31.7 6.6% 6.6% 30.5% 27.3% 
N(All)=4330; N(Free)=2334 
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Table 3-2. Descriptions and Summary Statistics (Primary Variables) 
Variable Level Effect Variable Description Mean S. D 
Exchange Listing 
(DV) 
Listing == 
Binary Variable indicating whether at least one 
successful exchange occurred for the listed item 
0.202 0.401 
Exchange 
Interaction (DV) 
Interaction == 
Binary Variable indicating whether the buyer-seller 
interaction resulted in a successful exchange. Captures 
outcome of each interaction between each buyer-seller 
pair 
0.010 0.090 
Seller's Access 
to Disposal (H1a) 
Listing (-) 
Count variable for disposal sites operating in the 
seller’s county when item was listed. Obtained from 
Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (MPCA) for each 
county-year. Variable was not logged since permitted 
landfills are too few per county (Mean<1). 
0.647 0.477 
Seller's Access 
to Repurposing 
(H1b) 
Listing (-) 
Logarithm of the number of other repurposing sites in 
the seller’s county when item was listed. This data was 
obtained from the MPCA for the year 2009, which was 
then mapped on to years 2000-2008.Annual data was 
unavailable. This approach was considered appropriate 
since "…the number of permitted recyclers per county 
is quite stable across time" (MPCA Officer, 2014). 
This variable excludes other OMWEs 
3.277 0.875 
Repurposing/Disp
osal in Seller's 
County (H2) 
Listing (+) 
The total tons of materials/waste collected for some 
form of Repurposing (either recycling or reuse through 
different channels) divided by the total tons of 
materials/waste Disposed (landfill, incineration or 
uncollected items). Includes all types of solid 
materials/waste. This rate captures overall repurposing 
versus disposal policies within counties since counties 
spend considerable resources on developing 
repurposing markets and infrastructure. Yearly data 
was obtained from MPCA 
0.677 0.158 
Textual 
Information 
Length (H3a) 
Listing (+) 
Log of Number of Characters in textual information 
provided by sellers for the listed item. 
3.921 0.942 
Visual 
Information 
Content (H3b) 
Listing (+) 
Binary variable indicating if the Seller provided visual 
information content (e.g. picture, user manual etc.) 
along with listing.  
0.108 0.310 
Seller Size (H4a) Listing (+) 
Ordinal Variable for Size of the seller organization. 
Data available was Categorical based on # of 
employees: Small (<500); Medium (501 - 3000); Large 
(>3000) Companies. 
0.298 0.620 
Geographical  
Distance (H4b) 
Interaction (-) 
Log of distance between each buyer-seller pair was 
taken as a proxy for geographical proximity. The 
distances between zip-codes of buyers and sellers were 
used. Exact addresses were not used due to 
confidentiality issues. 
3.124 1.555 
Past Buyer-Seller 
Familiarity (H5) 
Interaction (+) 
Binary variable indicating whether the specific buyer-
seller pair had a previous interaction (either successful 
or unsuccessful) on MNExchange.Org any time before 
the current interaction. 
0.399 0.489 
Buyer's 
Experience 
as Seller (H6a) 
Interaction (+) 
Binary variable indicating whether the specific buyer 
had been a seller on MNExchange.Org at any given 
point in time before the current interaction. 
0.133 0.340 
Seller's 
Experience 
as Buyer (H6b) 
Interaction (+) 
Binary variable indicating whether the specific seller 
had been a buyer on MNExchange.Org at any given 
point in time before the current interaction. 
0.543 0.498 
N (Listings) = 4330; N (Interactions) = 100625; Means and Standard Deviations are at analysis level as indicated. Effect 
gives the hypothesized direction 
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Table 3-3. Descriptions and Summary Statistics (Control Variables) 
Variable Name Variable Description Mean S. D 
Buyer Size 
Ordinal Variable for Size of the buyer organization. Data available was 
Categorical based on # of employees:  
Small (<500); Medium (501 - 3000); Large (>3000) Companies 
0.12 0.41 
Free Listing 
Binary Variable representing whether item was offered for 'free' by the 
seller. Free items were more likely to be exchanged. 
0.52 0.50 
Hazardous 
Binary variable indicating if the item posed any safety hazard. This was 
controlled for because such materials were less likely to get exchanged 
due to risks and higher transportation costs. 
0.04 0.20 
Recurring 
Binary variable indicating if the item was being offered by the seller on a 
recurring basis (i.e. weekly/ monthly etc). Such materials might generate 
interest from specific buyers looking for long-term exchanges. 
0.27 0.44 
Total Hits on 
Listing 
Log of total number of buyer web hits on the listed item. Controls for the 
overall interest in the listing i.e. potential demand. The variable was 
standardized to avoid multi-collinearity. 
2.46 1.26 
Total Hits on 
Listing2 
Squared logarithm of total buyer hits on the listed item. Interviews and 
exploratory analysis showed that successfully exchanged items tended to 
have either low hits (indicating fast exchange) or high hits (indicating 
high potential interest). This suggested a curvilinear relationship. 
Variable standardized to avoid multi-collinearity. 
7.65 6.35 
Time Listed 
The time for which item was listed on the OMWE before being deleted 
by user or archived by MnExchange.Org. This controlled for the seller's 
inclination to wait for a buyer request and the availability of the item for 
purchase. Data available was Categorical (0-3, 3-6, 6-12, >12 months). 
2.02 1.19 
MNExchange.Org Users 
in Seller's County 
Log of the number of registered MNExchange.Org users in seller's 
county. This accounts for diffusion of OMWEs, hence capturing seller’s 
self-selection into OMWEs. 
6.45 1.03 
MNExchange.Org Users 
in Buyer's County 
Log of the number of registered MNExchange.Org users in buyer's 
county. This accounts for diffusion of OMWEs, hence capturing buyer’s 
self-selection into OMWEs. 
5.79 1.57 
Seller's Access 
to Other OMWEs 
Binary Variable indicating whether other OMWEs were operating in the 
seller’s county and immediate bordering counties when item was listed 
on MNExchange.Org. This data was obtained from MPCA & EPA. 
0.43 0.50 
Buyer's Access 
to Other OMWEs 
Binary Variable indicating whether other OMWEs were operating in the 
buyer’s county and immediate bordering counties when item was listed 
on MNExchange.Org. This data was obtained from MPCA & EPA. 
0.40 0.49 
Item Category 
Dummies 
14 Material and Waste categories were controlled for using dummy 
variables. The detailed list and summary statistics are provided in Table 
2. This classification is used by MnExchange.Org since it captures 
differences in repurposing policies and regulations. 
NA NA 
Year Dummies 
Year dummies were included to control for differences in yearly (2000-
2008) economic conditions and other factors. 
NA NA 
 
N (Listings) = 4330; N (Interactions) = 100625 
 
3.4 Analysis & Results 
3.4.1 Listing & Interaction Level Analysis 
The analysis takes place at two levels – listing level and interaction level. The analysis at the 
listing level tests the seller dilemmas and the buyer dilemmas (H1a, H1b, H2, H3a, H3b and 
H4a). The analysis at this level uses a binary dependent variable (Exchange_Listing) indicating 
whether each listed item was exchanged. The unit of analysis here is each listed item. Each listing 
can have multiple interested buyers (up to 500 in our dataset) who access the listing and seller 
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information, thereby indicating an interest in the product. Analysis on buyer-seller pairs is 
therefore conducted at this interaction level, where we use information related to the buyer-seller 
dyads. We use this dyadic data to test the effects of experience (H5, H6a and H6b) since past 
experience is likely to have an effect on the way users interact with the opposite transacting party. 
Additionally, we use the interaction level of analysis to test the effect of geographic distance 
between buyer-seller pairs (H4b). At the interaction level, the binary dependent variable 
(Exchange_Interaction) indicates whether the buyer-seller interaction resulted in a successful 
exchange.  This study views an exchange (either as listing of interaction level) as the occurrence 
of a physical transaction between buyers and sellers (irrespective of the quantity). We do not 
consider the actual quantity exchanged since this data is not always available or accurate. The two 
levels of analysis allow us to conduct tests of item-specific, seller-specific and interaction-
specific attributes. The hypotheses related to sellers (H1, H2 and H4a) and product (H3) requires 
testing at the listing level, while the hypotheses which rely on dyadic attributes (H4b, H5 and H6) 
require testing at the interaction level. The analysis uses logistic regression models with clustered 
standard errors. At the interaction level, we also present results using panel logistic regression 
models with fixed effects (Greene 2003), and bias corrected models (Firth 1993). Table 2 
provides detailed explanations of all dependent and independent variables. We included controls 
in our logistic regression models to account for a variety of buyer, seller, product and regional 
characteristics. Table 3 provides a description of all the control variables. The analysis uses the 
following econometric models at listing (Equation 1) and interaction level (Equation 2): 
P(Exchange Listingit = 1|Xit) = β0 + βCLXCL + β1Seller’s Access to Disposalt + β2Seller’s Access  
    to Repurposingt + β3Repurposing/Disposal in Seller’s Countyt +  
    β4Textual Information Lengthi + β5Visual Information Contenti + 
    β6Seller Sizei    …(1) 
 
P(Exchange Interactionijt = 1|Xijt) = γ0 + γ CIXCI + γ 1Geographical Distancej + γ 2Past Buyer- 
    Seller Familiarityjt + γ3Buyer’s Experience as Sellerjt +   
    γ4Seller’s Experience as Buyerjt  …(2) 
 
The indices represent each listing i, interaction j and year t. XCLand XCI are vectors of controls at 
the listing and interaction levels respectively, while β and γ are respective coefficients at the 
listing and interaction levels. For the independent variables, subscripts (i, j and t) indicate the 
dimensions across which these variables vary i.e. whether the variance is listing- (i), interaction- 
(j) or time- (t) specific.  
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Table 3-4. Listing Level Analysis  
  Base Seller's Buyer's  Pooled  Heckman Odds 
  Model Commitment Uncertainty Logit Model Ratios 
Variables (Hypotheses Tested) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)   
Total Hits on Listing -0.73** -0.75** -0.73* -0.75** -0.75** 0.47 
  (0.37) (0.37) (0.38) (0.37) (0.37)   
Total Hits on Listing2 0.12** 0.12** 0.12** 0.12** 0.12** 1.13 
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)   
Time Listed 0.25*** 0.28*** 0.26*** 0.28*** 0.28*** 1.32 
  (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07)   
Hazardous  -0.33 -0.36 -0.38* -0.40* -0.41** 0.76 
  (0.25) (0.23) (0.22) (0.20) (0.20)   
Recurring -0.43*** -0.43*** -0.42*** -0.42*** -0.42*** 0.65 
  (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12)   
Free Listing 0.71*** 0.71*** 0.69*** 0.70*** 0.69*** 1.99 
  (0.25) (0.26) (0.25) (0.26) (0.26)   
MNExchange.Org Users in Seller's County    0.05   0.04 0.05 1.04 
    (0.05)   (0.05) (0.05)   
Seller's Access to other OMWEs   -0.01   0.02 0.04 1.02 
    (0.16)   (0.13) (0.12)   
Seller's Access to Disposal (H1a)   -0.31***   -0.33*** -0.34*** 0.72 
    (0.12)   (0.11) (0.11)   
Seller's Access to Repurposing (H1b)   0.26***   0.23*** 0.23*** 1.25 
    (0.06)   (0.07) (0.07)   
Repurposing/Disposal in Seller's County(H2)   0.45*   0.49** 0.48** 1.63 
    (0.25)   (0.22) (0.22)   
Textual Information Length (H3a)     0.04* 0.05** 0.05*** 1.04 
      (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)   
Visual Information Content (H3b)     0.12* 0.13* 0.14** 1.13 
      (0.07) (0.07) (0.06)   
Seller Size (H4a)     0.32** 0.27** 0.20 1.31 
      (0.14) (0.13) (0.12)   
Observations 4330 4330 4330 4330 4330   
Log Likelihood -1947.56 -1928.82 -1937.79 -1921.36 -1916.73   
Akaike Information Criterion 3905.12 3867.14 3885.51 3852.72 3843.46   
Bayesian Information Criterion 3936.98 3899.51 3917.44 3884.59 3875.33   
Dependent Variable=Exchange Listing; Cluster Robust Standard Errors; *p<.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01; Material Codes included 
for 14 Categories; Year dummies for years 2000-2008; Controls for 6 Seller Types (Commercial, Education, Manufacturing, 
Government, Non-Profit and Other); Coefficient on inverse Mills ratio for the Heckman models was 1.81 [SE=0.80]; Odds Ratios 
given for full model 
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Table 3-5. Interaction Level Analysis  
  Base Pooled Fixed Bias Heckman Odds  
  Model Logit Effects Corrected Model Ratios 
Variables (Hypotheses Tested) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  
Total Hits on Listing -1.87*** -1.83*** 0.00 -1.82*** -1.85*** 0.16 
  (0.24) (0.22) (.) (0.07) (0.22)   
Total Hits on Listing2 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.00 0.16*** 0.16*** 1.17 
  (0.03) (0.03) (.) (0.01) (0.03)   
Time Listed 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.00 0.22*** 0.22*** 1.24 
  (0.08) (0.08) (.) (0.04) (0.08)   
Hazardous  -0.29 -0.30 0.00 -0.29 -0.30 0.73 
  (0.27) (0.28) (.) (0.22) (0.27)   
Recurring -0.21* -0.22 0.00 -0.22** -0.20 0.84 
  (0.12) (0.14) (.) (0.09) (0.13)   
Free Listing 0.65*** 0.66*** 0.00 0.66*** 0.65*** 1.93 
  (0.18) (0.18) (.) (0.09) (0.18)   
OMWE Users in Seller's County  0.04 0.02 -0.10 0.04 0.02 1.02 
  (0.07) (0.08) (0.11) (0.05) (0.08)   
OMWE Users in Buyer's County  0.04** 0.03* -0.02 0.04 0.03* 1.03 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)   
Seller's Access to Disposal -0.33*** -0.32*** -0.53 -0.31*** -0.33*** 0.72 
  (0.10) (0.09) (0.52) (0.12) (0.10)   
Seller's Access to Repurposing 0.22*** 0.19** 0.00 0.19*** 0.17** 1.20 
  (0.08) (0.08) (.) (0.07) (0.07)   
Seller's Access to other OMWEs  0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.03 1.00 
  (0.18) (0.18) (.) (0.12) (0.16)   
Buyer's Access to other OMWEs  0.22* 0.16 0.14* 0.16** 0.17 1.07 
  (0.13) (0.12) (0.08) (0.07) (0.13)   
Repurposing/Disposal in Seller's County  0.40*** 0.43*** -0.91 0.49** 0.43*** 1.49 
  (0.09) (0.09) (3.52) (0.22) (0.09)   
Textual Information Length  0.11** 0.12*** 0.00 0.12*** 0.12*** 1.11 
  (0.05) (0.04) (.) (0.04) (0.04)   
Visual Information Content  0.13* 0.13* 0.12 0.13 0.14* 1.13 
  (0.07) (0.07) (0.23) (0.11) (0.08)   
Seller Size  0.29** 0.27** 0.00 0.27*** 0.27** 1.33 
  (0.12) (0.12) (.) (0.06) (0.12)   
Buyer Size  -0.34*** -0.38*** -0.26** -0.37*** -0.37*** 0.71 
  (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10)   
Geographical Distance (H4b)   -0.06*** -0.06** -0.05*** -0.07*** 1.94 
    (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)   
Past Buyer-Seller Familiarity (H5)   0.36*** 0.48*** 0.36*** 0.37*** 1.43 
    (0.13) (0.09) (0.07) (0.14)   
Buyer's Experience as Seller (H6a)   0.48*** 0.18 0.49*** 0.28*** 1.62 
    (0.08) (0.12) (0.08) (0.08)   
Seller's Experience as Buyer (H6b)   -0.01 -0.13 -0.00 -0.19* 0.99 
    (0.14) (0.33) (0.08) (0.11)   
Observations 100625 100625 21758 100625 100625   
Log Likelihood -4911.33 -4871.74 -2442.21 -4751.11 -4882.72   
Akaike Information Criterion 9834.66 9755.47 4930.12 9628.01 9777.44   
Bayesian Information Criterion 9891.77 9812.58 5114.14 10112.73 9834.55   
Dependent Variable=Exchange Interaction; Cluster Robust Standard Errors; *p<.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01; Material Codes 
included for 14 Categories; Year dummies for years 2000-2008; Controls for 6 Buyer and Seller Types included (Commercial, 
Education, Manufacturing, Government, Non-Profit and Other); Seller- and Item- specific coefficients not estimated (as 
expected) from Fixed Effects model due to lack of within variance; Bias Corrected model is based on Firth (1993); Coefficient 
on inverse Mills ratio for the Heckman model was 0.06 [SE=0.44]; Odds Ratios given for Pooled model 
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3.4.2 Listing Level Results [H1a, H1b, H2, H3a, H3b and H4a] 
Table 3-4 summarizes the results for the listing level of analysis for seller’s dilemma. As 
predicted, Seller’s Access to Disposal is negatively associated (β=-0.33, p<0.01, Odds 
Ratio=0.72) with the likelihood of exchange. This translates into an approximately 0.72 times 
reduction in the odds of exchange when there is at least one disposal alternative in the seller’s 
county. Also, Seller’s Access to Repurposing is positively associated (β=0.23, p<0.01, Odds 
Ratio=1.25) with the likelihood of exchange. This translates into an approximately 1.25 times rise 
in the odds of exchange for one standard deviation (S.D) change in Seller’s Access to 
Repurposing i.e. when three additional repurposing alternatives were located in the seller’s 
county. Overall, the analysis supports H1a and H1b. Further, Repurposing/Disposal in Seller’s 
County is positively associated (β=0.49, p<0.05, Odds Ratio=1.63) with likelihood of exchange, 
which supports H2. This translates into an approximately 1.63 times rise in the odds of exchange 
for a one S.D. change in the ratio i.e. approximately 15% rise in the Repurposing/Disposal in 
Seller’s County. Table 4 also provides results at the listing level for the buyer’s dilemma. Textual 
Information Length (β=0.05, p<0.05, Odds Ratio=1.04) and Visual Information Content (β=0.13, 
p<0.10, Odds Ratio=1.13) significantly relate to the likelihood of exchange, which supports H3a 
and H3b. Translating this effect, an increase in the length of description by one S.D. (3-4 
characters) leads to 1.04 times higher odds of exchange. Similarly, providing a visual illustration 
leads to 1.13 times higher the odds of exchange. Therefore, accounting for other factors, product 
information does influence buyer’s decision. Finally, Seller Size significantly increases the 
likelihood of an exchange (β = 0.27, p<0.05, Average Odds Ratio=1.31), supporting H4a. Thus, 
increase in seller size (small to medium; medium to large) leads to 1.31 times higher odds of 
exchange.  
3.4.3 Interaction Level Results [H4b, H5, H6a and H6b] 
Table 3-5 summarizes the results for the interaction level of analysis. Geographical Distance 
decreases the likelihood of exchange (β = -0.06, p<0.01, Odds Ratio=0.91). This translates into a 
0.91 times drop in the odds of exchange for a one S.D. (5-mile) increase in geographic distance 
between buyer and seller. The effect of Geographical Distance also holds across alternative 
models at the interaction level, which we discuss later. This result indicates that greater 
geographic separation between buyers and sellers leads to higher transaction uncertainty, higher 
transportation costs and lower exchange likelihood. Overall, the analysis supports H4b.  
Next, we interpret the effect of user prior experience with the exchange. Past Buyer-
Seller Familiarity has a positive effect on the likelihood of an exchange (β = 0.36, p<0.01; Odds 
Ratio=1.43). Hence, buyers and sellers with more familiarity with the each other have higher 
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likelihood of successful exchanges; having interacted earlier leads to 1.43 times higher odds of 
exchange. Overall, the analysis supports H5. Further, Buyer’s Experience as Seller has a positive 
association with the likelihood of exchange (β = 0.48, p<0.01, Odds Ratio=1.62). Thus, buyer’s 
previous experience as a seller results in 1.62 times higher odds of exchange. This result does not 
hold for sellers i.e. Seller’s Experience as Buyer does not have a significant association with 
exchange likelihood. H6a is supported but H6b is not. In our discussions, the exchange staff also 
noted that a buyer who has previously been a seller is better able to distinguish between the 
quality and fit of products. The mixed results for H6 suggest that sellers might not derive a 
similar benefit from having previously been a buyer.  
3.4.4 Robustness Analyses 
Panel Models at the Interaction Level: The interaction level data consists of multiple buyer-
seller interactions nested under each listed item, which results in an unbalanced panel. We 
therefore ran additional panel models (Greene 2003) at the interaction level. Table 5 (Column 3) 
reports the results from these models. The results from panel random effects model (not shown) 
were almost identical to the pooled logit model with robust standard errors (Column 2). This 
provides additional support for H4b, H5 and H6a. However, a Hausman test (χ2=165.16, p<0.001) 
indicated that the estimates obtained from random effects may be inconsistent, thus a fixed effects 
model might be more appropriate (Greene 2003; Andress et al. 2012). The results from panel 
fixed effects model (Table 5, Column 3) do not support H6, but H4b and H5 are supported. Since 
fixed effects modeling is a within-group estimation technique which uses mean differencing, 
time-invariant item- and seller-specific coefficients are automatically dropped during the 
estimation process (Cameron & Trivedi 2009), leading to multiple lost observations. This could 
have affected our results.  
Accounting for User Self-Selection: In our study, we focus only on actual users (i.e. sellers that 
list and buyers that interact with sellers) and exclude dormant registrants. However, this approach 
could introduce self-selection bias since certain types of registrants may be more/less likely to 
“use” MNExchange.Org. To account for this potential problem, we conduct the Heckman (1979) 
correction approach. This approach consists of first calculating the inverse Mills ratio from a 
probit model using “Usage of MNExchange.Org” as the binary dependent variable (N=All 
registered organizations). The inverse Mills ratio is then used as a control variable in the final 
second-stage models (equations 1 and 2) to provide consistent and unbiased estimates (Greene 
2003) for the hypothesized effects. This approach (Table 4, Column 5; Table 5, Column 5) did 
not affect our results, suggesting that self-selection does not introduce significant bias. Although 
we account for selection based on “usage” with the above approach, our data does not allow us to 
 54 
 
control for the potential self-selection based on “registration” with MNExchange.Org. In other 
words, we lack information on companies that never registered with MNExchange.Org. Hence, 
our conclusions are limited to registered companies, which is in line with the approach followed 
by most studies on online markets (Brynjolfsson & Smith 2000; Overby & Jap 2009). 
Accounting for Rare Outcomes at Interaction Level: Estimation of exchange likelihoods at the 
interaction level could lead to potential problems since the number of positive outcomes 
(Exchange_Interaction=1) is very rare (see Table 2). In our setting, merely 1% of buyer-seller 
interactions lead to successful exchanges. This rare event problem can be handled by the general 
estimation bias correction method proposed by Firth (1993), which uses a penalized maximum 
likelihood approach in logistic regression when separating outcomes (i.e. successes from failures) 
becomes problematic. The results from this model (Table 5, Column 4) are consistent with our 
previous findings. We also use an alternate robustness check to re-estimate corrected odds ratios 
(not shown) using “prior corrected” odds approach proposed by King and Zeng (2002). This 
approach did not significantly change the odds ratios, which gives provides further robustness.  
Endogeneity in Estimating the Effect of Repurposing/Disposal Ratio: Although OMWE 
presence is on the rise, the transactions undertaken through OMWEs account for a small 
percentage (less than 5%) compared to the overall repurposing in the county. Hence, the reverse 
causal effect of successful OMWE exchanges on Repurposing/Disposal Ratio in Seller’s County 
is likely to be inconsequential. Yet, we cannot completely reject the possibility that 
Repurposing/Disposal in Seller’s County is endogenous since it could simultaneously affect and 
be affected by the likelihood of exchange. To control for this possible effect, we ran a 2-stage 
least squares (2SLS) model, where Repurposing/Disposal in Seller’s County was first estimated 
using annual county-level Fertility Rate in Seller’s County as the instrumental variable. Fertility 
Rate in Seller’s County is correlated with Repurposing/Disposal in Seller’s County but is unlikely 
to have any relationship with the structural error terms (or the outcome variable 
“Exchange_Listing”), thereby satisfying the criteria for a good instrument (Wooldridge 2002). 
This model (results included in the Appendix) actually strengthened the impact of 
Repurposing/Disposal in Seller’s County on likelihood of an exchange. We also conducted 
analysis using Infant Mortality Rate in Seller’s County as the instrumental variable, which gave 
similar results. 
Operationalization of Past Familiarity and Experience: As indicated in Table 3-2, our user 
experience variables (Past Buyer-Seller Familiarity, Buyer’s Experience as Seller and Seller’s 
Experience as Buyer) are not based on a specific time window. Specifically, Past Buyer-Seller 
Familiarity was coded 1 if buyers and sellers had interacted previously (anytime); 0 otherwise. 
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Similarly, for Buyer’s Experience as Seller and Seller’s Experience as Buyer, we coded ‘1’ if 
buyers/sellers had previously (anytime) played the opposite party’s role; 0 otherwise. Here, we 
re-operationalize these variables based on a retrospective two-year time window i.e. only buyer-
seller interactions occurring over the last 2 years are considered to measure “experience”. This 
approach (Appendix) does not qualitatively change our findings, although the coefficient values 
were affected to some extent. Further, our analysis was conducted assuming each interaction is 
independent. Hence, if the same (or different) buyer-seller pair interacted more than once, each 
interaction would be assumed to be independent of the previous. As an alternative approach, we 
only retained the ‘final’ interactions for each buyer-seller pair in circumstances where a buyer-
seller pair had multiple interactions for the same item listing. This approach (Appendix) did not 
affect our results significantly.  
3.5 Discussion  
About 65% of all waste generated in the United States ends up in landfills or incinerators (EPA, 
2011). To address this problem, we focus on the exchanges of low-valued, non-standardized and 
non-branded products between industrial and commercial facilities. Online Material and Waste 
Exchanges (OMWEs) facilitate repurposing such industrial materials and wastes. The ‘last 
hurdle’ problem in OMWEs relates factors that influence the seller’s commitment and buyer’s 
uncertainty to engage in a successful exchanges. Drawing on MNExchange.Org and other 
secondary sources, we develop a unique dataset to examine the ‘last hurdle’ problem in OMWEs. 
To our knowledge, this is the first empirical study to examine the factors that influence 
transactions in OMWEs. Broadly, our research contributes to the growing body of literature on 
repurposing (Toktay et al. 2000; Linton et al. 2007; Atasu et al. 2008; Guide & Van Wassenhove 
2009; Gui et al. 2013), waste management (Wei & Huang 2001; Tsai & Chou 2004) and online 
markets (Boyer & Olson 2002; Johnson & Whang 2002; Balakrishnan & Geunes 2004; Pavlou et 
al. 2007; Dimoka et al. 2012; Subramanian & Subramanyam 2012). Below, we discuss how our 
findings can help inform OMWE policies.  
3.5.1 Developing Regional Repurposing Markets and Policies 
On the seller side, we show that access to alternatives affects seller commitment to OMWEs. 
Interestingly, we find that although disposal alternatives reduce online transactions, repurposing 
alternatives increase transactions. This is an important finding for environmental policy. 
Currently, state and regional environmental control agencies (e.g. EPA, MPCA) dedicate 
resources to develop local repurposing markets i.e. networks of buyers, sellers and recyclers at 
the county-level (MPCA Officer 2014). Our findings suggest that the presence of such local 
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networks and access to repurposing options might have a complementary effect on OMWEs. 
Building on Porter’s (1998) idea, regional “repurposing cluster” could help reduce the transaction 
and coordination costs in OMWEs. On the other hand, OMWEs can act as an informational 
medium which binds these networks more cohesively. Furthermore, stronger regional markets 
can successfully overcome the problem of geographical buyer-seller separation and lower 
transaction uncertainty. In summary, OMWEs could offer complementary benefits to other 
existing repurposing supply chains such as OEM remanufacturing, third-party demanufacturing 
and industrial recycling. 
Along similar lines, we find that regional repurposing and disposal rates influence 
exchanges. Regional repurposing rates enhance exchanges, while disposal rates reduce 
exchanges. Many states today spend millions of dollars developing repurposing programs. For 
example, in Minnesota, the Select Committee on Recycling and the Environment (SCORE) Act 
has led to increased funding for recycling programs, waste reduction, management of hazardous 
wastes, and problem materials. In 2012, Minnesota counties spent nearly $61 million in state and 
local funds for SCORE-related programs (MPCA 2012). Our findings suggest that such policies 
have significant spillover effects (through better repurposing infrastructure and policies) on the 
success of online markets for used and surplus materials, by-products and wastes. This research 
contributes to the understanding of how regional factors affect repurposing operations through 
OMWEs, which can help inform environmental policy (Atasu et al. 2008; Gui et al. 2013) for the 
future.  
3.5.2 Developing OMWE platforms   
On the buyer side, we show that product and transaction information richness positively affects 
exchanges. This finding is in line with past literature on online markets (Pavlou & Gefen 2004; 
Pavlou et al. 2007; Overby & Jap 2009). The next step for OMWEs is to improve online 
platforms by increasing transparency and information richness. As already mentioned, reputation 
mechanisms are not widely used in OMWEs today. Infrequent listings by each seller in OMWEs 
translates into few opportunities for a given supplier to be rated and also for the supplier to be 
effected by the reputation implied by the rating. A potential alternative being explored by 
MNExchange.Org to improve information credibility and reduce uncertainty is manual 
verification of each item description before it is listed online. Such a verification process, while 
costly, could ensure the listing has a threshold level of information to reduce product uncertainty. 
As OMWEs grow in scale, this verification process could be replaced by automated feedback 
mechanisms.  
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This study also has implications for understanding user behavior in the absence of online 
reputation mechanisms (Bolton et al. 2004; Pavlou & Gefen 2004). The results show that 
previous experience (i.e. familiarity) between the buyer and seller increases the likelihood of an 
exchange. The analysis also shows that the buyers’ previous experience as a seller further 
increases exchanges. Users rely extensively on past experiences to make decisions; consequently 
exchanges should encourage long-term relationships between buyers and sellers. This topic of 
relationship-building is currently being addressed by many OMWEs. A potential solution being 
proposed is that certain types of items and transactions might necessitate “personal intervention” 
by the OMWE staff/experts to facilitate contracting and develop long-term relationships (Director 
at iWasteNot Systems 2014). Interestingly, our analysis shows that recurring items (which need 
long-term contracting) have a lower likelihood of being exchanged. This validates concerns 
expressed by OMWE staff at MNExchange.Org that exchanges of recurring items have higher 
initial transaction costs. To develop long-term buyer-seller contracts, OMWEs should consider 
some form of personal intervention that reduces uncertainty and builds trust. Potentially, this 
could lead to a self-sustaining industrial symbiosis between multiple collocated OMWE users, 
with OMWEs serving as the supporting platform. 
3.6 Limitations  
One limitation of this study is our choice of waste exchange. MnExchange.Org is a mixed waste 
exchange that consists of products with different levels of reusability. To account for this we 
controlled for the 14 material classes and conducted additional post hoc analysis based on various 
product attributes. However, there may be significant variance in the quality and usability of 
items within these 14 categories which our models do not capture. Also it is possible that product 
specific legislations and policies affect exchange success on OMWEs. For example, various states 
have now passed electronics recycling acts that might affect how electronics are traded through 
OMWEs. Future research is needed to examine exchanges of specific products (e.g. packaging 
materials, rubber, electronics etc.) to verify the generalizability of our results. Also, OMWEs can 
undergo technological and policy changes that may not have been captured entirely by our 
models. For example, although we control for year effects, intermittent changes to the online 
interface are not captured by our models. Also, our inferences are limited to the registered 
organizations in our sample, and may not extend to the general population of firms.  
Although we used the best measures available from the data source, some of our 
independent measures have limitations, as is the case with most studies that rely on secondary 
data. For example, Textual Information Length is measured as the total number of characters in 
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the description. However, one could argue that a lengthy description may not necessarily provide 
a richer explanation of the product details. Furthermore, the quality of Visual Information Content 
may also vary across items. Our data on Access to disposal and repurposing alternatives comes 
from a separate secondary source (e.g. Minnesota Pollution Control Agency), which may have 
limitations. For example, the county-level statistics on repurposing and disposal comes from 
annual survey responses, which could be prone to reporting errors (Bertrand & Mullainathan 
2001). At the interaction level, it is possible that some interactions represented serious buyers, 
whereas others might represent curious users simply surfing the database. Unfortunately, we 
cannot capture buyers’ true intention which could potentially lead to biases in evaluation of 
transaction frequency. Finally, this study looks at the ‘last hurdle’ (i.e. actual exchange) problem 
since this is the most pertinent metric for evaluating OMWEs. Yet, we do not focus on many 
other crucial metrics such as final usage of exchanged items, user membership, hits on listings 
etc. While this paper lays the foundation for additional research on Online Materials & Waste 
Exchanges (OMWEs), we hope some of the limitations and open questions trigger more research 
in this area.  
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Chapter 4  
ESSAY 3 - The Role of Online Intermediaries in Coordinating Industrial 
Surplus Chains: Operational Policy Change and Adverse Outcomes13 
Summary 
Online Material & Waste Exchanges (OMWEs) are internet-based B2B markets that coordinate 
transactions of surplus materials, by-products and waste across industrial facilities. Collectively, 
OMWEs possess the potential to repurpose millions of lbs. of industrial materials and save 
billions of dollars in disposal fees and inventory costs. Many OMWEs have traditionally relied (at 
least partly) on human intermediaries to match producers and consumers, facilitate negotiations 
and coordinate transactions. Today, most OMWEs have transitioned into decentralized online 
platforms, which parallels the “move-to-the-market” or “disintermediation” trends observed in 
many industrial sectors. In this paper, we question such sole reliance on internet-based 
technologies. Using a quasi-experimental design afforded by a unique empirical setting 
(MNExchange.Org), we examine the effects of an operational policy change which eliminated 
human intermediaries. We show that elimination of this form of intermediary had dire 
consequences on the market efficiency as measured by (i) likelihood of successful transactions 
and (i) time to a successful transaction. Although the overall effect was significant, we also find 
more nuanced effects for certain types of items. Specifically, process-use (relative to end-use), 
negotiable (relative to free) and one-time (relative to recurring) items faced significantly greater 
transactional challenges. We discuss the implications of these findings for supply chain 
intermediaries and internet-based marketplaces.  
 
Keywords: Surplus Chains, Materials & Waste Exchanges, Quasi-Experiment, B2B Online 
Markets, Intermediaries  
4.1 Introduction  
“Technology [is] our planet’s last best hope”  (The Guardian Environmental Network 2013). 
“Technology cannot solve all environmental problems” (European Environmental Agency 2014). 
 Industrial facilities abound with surplus materials, by-products and waste. For example, 
U.S. companies cumulatively generate more than 7.5 billion tons of by-products and waste 
annually14. The annual overstock of unused materials and inventory in U.S. companies exceeds 
$350 billion15 and large portion of this eventually reaches obsolescence16. This problem calls for 
                                                     
13 Paper Co-authors: 
Suvrat Dhanorkar*, Karen Donohue+, Kevin Linderman** 
Carlson School of Management, University of Minnesota 
*dhano002@umn.edu, +donoh008@umn.edu, **linde037@umn.edu 
14 http://www.epa.gov/osw/nonhaz/industrial/  
15 http://www.dmnews.com/e-surplus-market-to-boom/article/63516/  
16 http://www.enxmag.com/twii/feature-articles/2013/06/the-overstock-parts-network-adds-new-life-to-old-
parts/#.VDACj_ldWIM  
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innovative approaches to coordinate supply chains to better facilitate transactions of these 
materials. Although challenging, effective management of industrial “surplus chains” increases 
repurposing of materials, by-products and wastes, which may have otherwise ended up being 
disposed. Recently, Material & Waste Exchanges have emerged across the U.S. and Europe as a 
means to facilitate exchanges of industrial surplus materials, by-products and waste. According to 
the EPA (2013a), “Materials and Waste Exchanges are [B2B] markets for buying and selling 
reusable and recyclable commodities. Some are physical warehouses that advertise available 
commodities through printed catalogs, while others are simply web sites that connect buyers and 
sellers”. While few Material & Waste Exchanges still operate as physical warehouses, most  have 
transitioned to internet-based platforms (i.e. OMWEs) that connect industrial buyers and sellers 
(see Figure 1). If managed well, OMWEs can enable efficient transfer of surplus materials, by-
products and waste across industrial facilities, thereby generating substantial environmental and 
economic benefits.  
More than 100 OMWEs operate in the U.S. today17 (EPA 2013a). Collectively, OMWEs 
possess the potential to repurpose millions of lbs. of industrial materials and save billions of 
dollars in disposal fees and inventory costs. Large-scale OMWEs (e.g. MNexchange.org, 
Reusemarketplace.org) typically host hundreds of industrial materials, by-products and wastes. A 
major challenge in these exchanges is efficient matching of buyers and sellers. Traditionally, 
many OMWEs relied, at least partly, on expert human intermediaries (henceforth also referred to 
as intermediaries) to match producers with consumers, facilitate negotiations and coordinate 
transactions. Today, most OMWEs have almost completely transitioned to pure internet-based 
online platforms, allowing sellers to directly post listings and buyers to directly negotiate 
transactions. As a result, the role of human intermediaries has almost entirely been substituted by 
pure online platforms. For most OMWEs, the move towards internet-based platforms is driven by 
resource constraints18. The shift towards pure internet-based platforms also parallels the “move-
to-the-market” or “disintermediation” trends observed in many other sectors, where traditional 
brick-and-mortar business models are either being complemented (Gallino & Moreno 2014) or 
entirely substituted (Brynjolfsson & Mcafee 2012) by internet-based platforms. Internet-based 
platforms are expected to improve scalability and lower coordination costs (Malone et al. 1987; 
Bakos 1991; 1998), potentially providing a more efficient matching between buyers and sellers. 
                                                     
17 The number of operating OMWEs is far greater (conservative estimates indicate at least 200) when local/county-level 
exchanges are included. OMWEs are common in other regions such as Canada (British Columbia IMEX), U.K. (Eastex), 
Singapore (Waste is Not Waste) and India (CII Waste Exchange). 
18 Most Material & Waste Exchanges are managed by state environmental agencies and are offered as a free service. 
Although some exchanges charge a nominal fee to cover basic costs of hosting the platform, almost no Material & Waste 
Exchange has a profit-driven business model. As a result, resource constraints often lead exchanges to reallocate expert 
human intermediaries to other tasks related to environmental enforcement, recycling market development etc.   
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Evidently, a complete reliance on pure internet-based platforms is seen as the next “logical step”, 
which can allow OMWEs to “…operate with less than one FTE” (2005 Annual Report of large-
scale OMWEs in U.S.). This study challenges this sole reliance of OMWEs on internet-based 
platforms, by highlighting the advantages of using the expertise of human intermediaries. We 
examine the downside of eliminating human intermediaries on transactions in OMWE.  
 As an empirical setting, we use a large-scale state-level OMWE – MNExchange.Org – 
located in Minnesota, U.S. Taking advantage of a unique quasi-experiment (Shadish et al. 2002), 
we study the effects of an operational policy change that eliminated the human intermediaries in 
MNExchange.Org. Using longitudinal data spanning nine years and more than 4000 item listings, 
we show that the policy change had significant implications for MNExchange.Org. In particular, 
the operational policy change had substantial adverse effects on two metrics of transaction 
success: (i) likelihood of transaction and (ii) time to successful transactions. Furthermore, we 
show greater adverse effects on specific categories of items. Transactions of process-use items 
(e.g. plastics, rubber, wood, leather and equipment) suffered much more compared to transactions 
of end-use items (e.g. electronics, furniture, paper and supplies). Along similar lines, we find a 
significantly greater decline in transactions of negotiable (i.e. non-free) items compared to free 
items; a significant decline in transactions of one-time items compared to recurring items. 
Similarly, the time to a successful transaction increased for process-use (compared to end-use), 
negotiable (compared to free) and one-time (compared to recurring) items. Further investigation 
into the mechanisms reveals shifts in seller and buyers behaviors. The analyses highlight the 
negative consequences of relying solely on internet-based technologies, while highlighting the 
importance of human intermediaries to facilitate exchanges.    
Our study provides important insights into the design of OMWEs, which have been 
widely recognized by environmental agencies as a “unique tool” to overcome the waste problem 
and generate savings (EPA 1978; EPA 1994; EPA 2013a; MPCA 2011). Undoubtedly, unpacking 
the potential of OMWEs can generate immense environmental and economic benefits. In this 
paper, we present a practical problem of coordination (Cachon 2003) in industrial surplus chains 
and illustrate the effectiveness and limitations of an internet-based solution - OMWEs. Our study 
also questions the “move to the market” (Malone et al. 1987) hypothesis which argues in favor of 
internet-based technologies “substituting” (Brynjolfsson & Mcafee 2012) for human 
intermediaries. Recently, the “flat world” hypothesis has been questioned by scholars based on 
the increasing presence of supply chain intermediaries (Belavina & Girotra 2012). Using 
OMWEs as an empirical setting, our study shows that sole reliance on internet-based technologies 
may have shortcomings in coordinating surplus chains. Furthermore, we show that human 
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intermediaries provide greater transactional advantages for process-use, negotiable and one-time 
items, and eliminating such intermediaries can result in a market favoring low-cost, end-use items 
offered on a recurring basis. This provides practical implications for the management and design 
of B2B marketplaces serving waste and surplus markets. 
Figure 4-1. Conceptual Model for OMWEs 
 
Snapshots for MNExchange.Org 
 
4.2 Literature Review  
This study builds on literature from three separate domains related to environmental supply 
chains, online marketplaces and supply chain coordination. A review of the related literature 
follows.  
Environmental supply chains have received increasing attention from OM scholars 
(Atasu, Guide, et al. 2008). Researchers in this area have addressed various problems related to 
OEM remanufacturing including disassembly and recovery (Guide & Wassenhove 2001), 
production planning (Guide 2000), inventory management (Toktay et al. 2000) and marketing 
(Atasu, Sarvary, et al. 2008). Recent research has also begun to examine the benefits of third-
party de-manufacturing (Savaskan et al. 2004; Tibben-Lembke 2004) which consist of the 
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logistics, sorting and materials recovery processes performed by third-party providers (Spicer & 
Johnson 2004). Finally, researchers (Desrochers 2004; Chertow 2007; Lee 2012) have also 
examined the industrial symbiosis perspective which views the industrial processes as a 
biological ecosystem that can survive on its own by-products. Broadly, this study shares the spirit 
of these papers by “integrating issues at the interface of environmental sustainability and supply 
chains” (Linton et al. 2007). Yet, this paper makes a unique contribution to this literature by 
examining an online market-based approach for addressing environmental challenges. In doing 
so, our paper extends the exploratory work of Dhanorkar et al. (2014), which identified buyer- 
and seller-side factors that lead to transaction success on OMWEs. In this paper, we focus on a 
specific operational problem in the design of OMWEs.  
The literature on online markets is also relevant to our study. OMWEs are online B2B 
markets that facilitate transactions of reusable and recyclable materials. Online marketplaces have 
long been a subject of attention for IS scholars (Bakos 1991; Bakos 1998). Information 
asymmetry has been recognized as one of the most important obstacles in achieving efficient 
online transactions (Lee & Whang 2001). This paper borrows from the IS literature and builds on 
previous research on information asymmetry in online marketplaces. More recently, scholars 
have highlighted the informational challenges in transacting used goods. For example, Ghose 
(2009) shows that despite the presence of reputation mechanisms, online transactions of used 
goods are prone to adverse selection. Similarly, Dimoka et al. (2012) showed that used goods 
have more product-related uncertainty, which subsequently affects sellers’ price premiums. In 
general, these studies highlight challenges in achieving higher social welfare (Bapna et al. 2008) 
through online transactions, especially in the context of used products with high uncertainty. 
Recently, Overby and Jap (2009) showed that online channels are better for transacting products 
with low uncertainty, while physical channels work better for products with high uncertainty. 
Although these papers (Ghose 2009; Overby & Jap 2009; Dimoka et al. 2012) are relevant to our 
context, they primarily focus on B2C marketplaces for commodity products. Poundarikapuram 
and Veeramani (2004) develop a distributed decision-making framework for users in an e-
marketplace to collaboratively arrive at a global Pareto-optimal solution, while maintaining the 
information privacy of supply chain partners. Yet, much of the research on e-commerce focuses 
on B2B transactions of primary products – raw materials and finished goods. In contrast, our 
study focuses on challenges in facilitating B2B transactions of industrial surplus materials, by-
products and waste. Our study is also very relevant to previous work on e-commerce. For 
example, companies experience various challenges driven by information asymmetry in e-
commerce transactions (Balakrishnan & Geunes 2004). Transactions on OMWEs are often more 
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challenging due to a lack of seller reputation mechanisms,19 which results in high information 
asymmetry. 
A large body of research exists on the topic of supply chain coordination through 
contractual arrangements (Cachon 2003). Intermediaries offer one approach to better coordinate 
supply chains. Earlier research has highlighted the advantages and disadvantages of supply chain 
intermediaries in B2B transactions (Wu 2004). With the advent of internet-based technologies, 
the “disintermediation” (i.e. the elimination of human intermediaries) hypothesis has been 
strongly argued over the past few decades (Benjamin & Wigand 1995). While disintermediation 
was first used with reference to financial services (Wu 2004), it more broadly predicted that 
significant efficiencies can be achieved in buyer-seller interactions by cutting out the middlemen 
and replacing them with internet-based/digital platforms (Hoffman 1995; Malone et al. 1987). 
Yet, research has also highlighted the usefulness of intermediaries (Sarkar et al. 1995) despite the 
rapid growth in e-commerce. For example, Belavina and Girotra (2012) showed that large-scale 
human-supported intermediaries (e.g. Li & Fung Ltd., Olam International) continue to exist in the 
traditional supply chain context. Often supply chain intermediaries provide transactional 
(reducing search and bargaining costs) and informational (enabling trust and reducing adverse 
selection) benefits, which justify their presence in B2B transactions (Wu 2004). Consequently, 
some researchers (Bakos 1998; Bailey & Bakos 1997) have proposed that intermediation and` 
disintermediation are both potential solutions, albeit under different contextual settings. On a 
related note, Kleindorfer and Wu (2003) integrate concepts from B2B market and supply chain 
contracting to show the conditions under which online spot markets versus contractual 
arrangements are more appropriate. Our paper contributes to this debate by testing the 
effectiveness of a “disintermediation” (i.e. elimination of human intermediaries) strategy in a 
unique OMWE quasi-experimental setting. Furthermore, we show how specific product 
categories may necessitate the presence of human intermediaries to overcome transactional 
challenges in online markets. 
4.3 Quasi-Experimental Setting  
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) identifies OMWEs as a way to exchange industrial 
materials and avoid disposal (EPA 2013a). Today, almost every state in the U.S. has an OMWE. 
For example, The Reuse Marketplace in New England is an example of an OMWE supported by 
state agencies and private businesses. It is administered by Northeast Recycling Council, a 
                                                     
19 Seller reputation mechanisms are effective when sellers participate frequently and the volume of transactions 
is adequately high (Heski & Tadelis 2008). Both these conditions are often not satisfied in OMWEs. As a result, 
no OMWEs currently offer seller reputation/ feedback mechanisms.  
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regional nonprofit dedicated to an environmentally sustainable economy through reuse, recycling, 
and green purchasing. The Resource Exchange Network for Eliminating Waste (RENEW) in 
Texas was established by the Texas legislature in 1987. This exchange covers Arkansas, New 
Mexico, Oklahoma, Louisiana, and Texas. The Minnesota Materials Exchange Program 
(MNExchange.Org) is a grant-funded exchange that connects industrial and commercial facilities 
across Minnesota. It is hosted by the Minnesota Technical Assistance Program. While the format 
of each OMWE may vary slightly, there are several commonalities. In a typical OMWE, sellers 
list items they no longer need while potential buyers browse listings and request exchanges. The 
overwhelming majority of OMWEs are offered as free services open to industrial facilities. 
Sellers on the exchange list the items available for sale, typically with a brief description and 
visual illustration of the product. Contact information is made available to allow interested buyers 
to connect with the seller. OMWEs do not offer an online payment option; pricing (product and 
transportation) is negotiated by buyers and sellers offline.  
The empirical setting for this study is the Minnesota Materials Exchange - 
MNExchange.Org (henceforth also referred to as “the exchange”). This exchange provides a 
useful empirical context for the following reasons. First, MNExchange.Org has been operational 
since 1999 and has thousands of registered users, which makes it a mature exchange. It has 
helped divert more than 25 million lbs. of waste from being disposed in landfills or incinerators, 
and reduced disposal fees and material costs exceeding $6 million. As of 2010, the exchange had 
12,256 registered members representing approximately 8000 industrial and commercial facilities. 
MNExchange.Org is therefore an appropriate empirical context, given its scale and longevity. 
MNExchange.Org operates in a similar manner to many other exchanges across the United States 
and abroad, which improves applicability of our findings. Dhanorkar et al. (2014) also used the 
MNExchange.Org as an empirical setting in their exploratory study to examine buyer-side 
(information, uncertainty) and seller-side (access to alternatives, regional policies) factors that 
influences exchanges on OMWEs. Although our paper overlaps with Dhanorkar et al. (2014) in 
the choice of empirical setting, we examine the problem of OMWE design (specifically 
intermediation) using a quasi-experiment to understand the adverse effects of sole reliance on 
internet-technology on exchange likelihoods and durations. As a result, our conceptual, 
measurement and analysis approach is substantially different. 
MNExchange.Org became operational in 1999 with the intention of matching industrial 
facilities to promote reuse of surplus materials, by-products and waste (Figure 4-2). Between 
1999 and 2004, MNExchange.Org (the web interface) acted as an information portal where 
buyers and sellers could establish contact and negotiate contractual terms offline. During this 
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period, users could also seek help from expert human intermediaries (employees of 
MNExchange.Org), who helped match potential buyers with sellers, facilitated bargaining, and 
coordinated transactions. The human intermediaries did not actively target specific categories of 
materials or users on the market; users sought services from human intermediaries when 
necessary. Internet-based technologies were picking up during this period, with rapid growth in 
internet usage and e-commerce [for details on growth in B2C and B2B platforms, see (Ho et al. 
2007)]. In line with these trends OMWEs had begun transitioning into completely decentralized 
online platforms. Like many other OMWEs, MNExchange.Org revised their operational policy in 
late 2004, which gave emphasis to the online aspects of the exchange while eliminating 
intermediaries. As a result, starting 2005, “…service improvements and database streamlining 
finally allowed operations by less than one FTE” (MNExchange.Org Report, 2008). We examine 
the effect of this operational policy change on two transaction outcomes that drive OMWE 
efficiency. We use the quasi-experimental design (Shadish et al. 2002) in this empirical setting. 
Earlier studies have adopted a similar approach to investigate operational policy changes in the 
online/offline environments (Hann & Terwiesch 2003; Overby & Jap 2009; Gallino & Moreno 
2014). For example, Hann & Terwiesch (2003) examine the effect of an operational policy 
change in a Name-Your-Own-Price online retailer; Overby and Jap (2009) examine the effects of 
adding an online channel to vehicle auctions; Gallino and Moreno (2014) studied the 
implementation of a “buy-online, pickup-in store” alternative in retail operations. We use a 
similar approach to show the effect of an Operational Policy Change that eliminated physical 
human intermediaries in MNExchange.Org. Further, we also compare and contrast the effect of 
the Operational Policy Change on specific categories of items based on usage (process-use vs. 
end-use), asking price (free vs. negotiable) and frequency (one-time vs. recurring). 
Figure 4-2. Quasi-Experimental Setting 
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4.4 Hypotheses Development 
4.4.1 The Role of Human Intermediaries in Coordinating Surplus Chains 
The unpredictable supply of industrial surplus materials, by-products and waste can make buyer-
seller matches especially challenging on OMWEs (Dhanorkar et al. 2014). On the buyer side, 
high variability in supply of materials can be disadvantageous since it adds variability to 
processes (Lee et al. 2004). As a result, buyers may be reluctant to source from OMWEs, partly 
due to the unpredictability of supply. OMWEs need to overcome this problem in order to increase 
transaction rates and allow easier flow of surplus materials across industrial facilities. Human 
intermediaries can play an important role in reducing the unpredictability of the supply on 
OMWEs. In situations with high supply unpredictability, “mixed mode” (that is, a combination of 
online and human intermediaries) platforms (Holland & Lockett 1997) have advantages over 
purely internet-based platforms. Mixed mode platforms offer informational and transactional 
benefits of intermediation (Wu 2004) along with scale benefits of internet-based platforms (Bakos 
1997). Furthermore, expert intermediaries can enhance20 the search and matching function of 
OMWEs to identify dormant buyers (i.e. those not actively searching). This can improve the 
overall market efficiency. Hence, human intermediaries can provide complementary benefits 
(Bailey & Bakos 1997) to OMWE exchanges.  
A second benefit of human intermediaries is that they can help reduce product 
uncertainty. Product uncertainty in online markets is defined as “the buyer’s difficulty in 
evaluating the product and predicting how it will perform in the future” (Dimoka et al. 2012). 
Online exchanges of secondary products (Ghose 2009) have high uncertainty for buyers, which 
can lead to transactional challenges (Dhanorkar et al. 2014). Materials traded on OMWEs can 
have a high degree of quality heterogeneity (Ghose 2009). As a result, product uncertainty can be 
extremely high in OMWEs, which makes evaluations difficult. A related problem that amplifies 
product uncertainty is the buyer’s inability to evaluate the seller. In conventional online markets, 
reputation- and trust-building mechanisms reduce seller reputation concerns (Pavlou et al. 2007). 
However, the infrequent and low-volume nature of OMWE transactions does not allow for 
effective use of reputation- and trust-building mechanisms. Consequently, OMWE’s have high 
levels of product uncertainty. Intermediaries can provide informational benefits in supply chains 
(Wu 2004). In the OMWE context, human intermediaries can help reduce buyer’s concerns about 
quality due to information asymmetries. Essentially, the intermediary may act as a third-party 
                                                     
20 We had a related discussion with an expert intermediary from an exchange in Minnesota (MNExchange.Org). She 
explained a situation where a process-use items item (10 tons of rubber pellets) was in stock with a seller. After waiting two 
weeks for online buyers, the seller contacted the intermediary. The intermediary was able to find a registered buyer who was 
not actively searching on the OMWE (i.e. was dormant) but had a demand for the rubber pellets.    
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assurance that the seller’s product quality meets the buyer’s quality expectations. Intermediaries 
also bring to the table, relational advantages (Belavina & Girotra 2012) through their industry 
networks and process knowledge. In the context of OMWEs, intermediaries have in-depth 
knowledge of company policies towards material sourcing, product reuse and recycling markets. 
In summary, by reducing information gaps and providing relational benefits, intermediaries can 
significantly alleviate buyers’ uncertainty.        
Thirdly, human intermediaries can also help industrial facilities navigate regulatory 
policies. State and regional environmental authorities often regulate the transfer, sale and disposal 
of potentially hazardous materials such as chemicals, rubber, paint etc. As per the federal (EPA 
2012) and state (MPCA 2013) regulations, the producer (i.e. seller) bears significant 
responsibility for the management and/or disposal of hazardous waste/by-products. As a result, 
the seller may be held responsible for any misuse of hazardous materials by the transporter or the 
buyer (MNExchange.Org Staff 2013). This can lead to a moral hazard problem where the costs of 
potential material mishandling will be disproportionately borne by the seller (Logue & Ben-
Shahar 2012). Consequently, sellers may choose alternative disposal options over OMWEs in 
anticipation of a buyer’s potential misuse of exchanged items. In addition, the shipping and 
handling of hazardous waste/by-products is subject to regulations (EPA 2012). Transporters of 
solid waste and industrial materials classified as hazardous typically require special operating 
permits, which increases the transaction costs of an exchange (MPCA 2013). Consequently, there 
are significant concerns about regulatory compliance in OMWEs. However, expert intermediaries 
typically possess in-depth knowledge about regional disposal, reuse and recycling policies. Since 
OMWEs are typically managed by state/regional environmental agencies, intermediaries (as 
employees of the agencies) are up-to-date with environmental rules and regulations. As a result, 
human intermediaries bring greater regulatory legitimacy (Bloomfield & Best 1992) to OMWE 
transactions. Given the above advantages of human intermediaries in OMWE transactions, we 
predict that eliminating human intermediaries will have a negative effect on transaction 
outcomes. 
H1: Eliminating Human Intermediaries will be associated with (a) a decline in the likelihood of 
successful transactions and (b) an increase in the duration to a successful transaction. 
4.4.2 Usage – Process-Use versus End-Use Items 
As predicted in H1, human intermediaries in OMWEs can affect transaction outcomes.  However, 
the usefulness of human intermediaries may depend on the type of item being exchanged. 
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OMWEs broadly categorize items21 as end-use (commodities and consumer durables such as 
electronics, office supplies, furniture etc.) and process-use (raw materials and by-products such as 
wood, rubber, plastics etc.). The three challenges discussed above (supply unpredictability, 
quality uncertainty, and regulatory compliance) may depend on the material exchanged. We argue 
that the elimination of human intermediaries has a more negative impact on process-use item 
transactions compared to end-use item transactions for the following reasons.  
 First, the potential impact of supply unpredictability is relatively low for end-use items 
since they do not typically comprise inputs to buyer-side processes. On the other hand, 
fluctuations in supply of process-use items can lead to higher transactional challenges. The 
unpredictable generation (i.e. supply) of process-use items can create challenges in finding the 
appropriate buyers. Unlike most end-use items which have a general purpose applications, 
process-use items often have only specific applications. For a process-use item to be exchanged 
on an OMWE, it needs to match specifications of an interested buyer who has demand and 
engages in online search on the OMWE. All these reasons make process-use item transactions 
highly difficult in the absence of human intermediaries. Second, any deviations from expected 
process-use item quality can introduce quality defects in the buyer’s products and processes. On 
the other hand, any quality shortcomings in end-use items quality can only affect/limit its end-
usability. Evidently, process-use item quality has greater implications for buyers. It can therefore 
be argued that buyers’ concerns about product uncertainty are relatively higher for process-use 
items than for end-use items. A policy that eliminates intermediaries will therefore have a greater 
negative effect on process-use item transactions. Finally, transactions of process-use items (raw 
materials and by-products such as wood, rubber, plastics etc.) often require greater knowledge 
about regional policies and regulations about disposal, transportation, handling, reuse and 
recycling (MPCA 2013). Typically, OMWE transactions are managed by purchasing/inventory 
departments22 in industrial facilities, which often lack the required knowledge related to 
environmental benefits and costs of industrial exchanges of surplus materials, by-products and 
wastes. Environmental compliance requirements associated with exchanges of process-use items 
can burden facilities with additional transaction costs (Tadelis & Williamson 2010). Elimination 
of intermediaries will therefore have a more dire consequence on process-use item transactions. 
                                                     
21 The classification scheme in this study was developed through many discussions with large-scale OMWEs in Minnesota, 
Alabama, Texas and New York (United States) and British Columbia, Ontario (Canada). In addition, a research assistant 
browsed and studied more than 30 OMWEs across the U.S. to compare the type of items being exchanged. The process-
use and end-use classification was also confirmed during a formal presentation to the Minnesota Pollution Control 
Agency’s Solid Waste and Reuse Markets divisions.  
22 Although uncommon, OMWE transactions are sometimes handled by the waste management/environmental & health 
safety divisions in industrial facilities. In such cases, knowledge about regulatory compliance issues might be internally 
available. Discussions with companies revealed that the intermediaries’ “expert advice” can still be valuable. 
 70 
 
H2: Eliminating Human Intermediaries will be associated with (a) a greater decline in the 
likelihood of successful transactions of process-use items compared to end-use items and (b) a 
greater increase in the duration to a successful transaction of process-use items compared to 
end-use items. 
4.4.3 Price – Free versus Negotiable 
Buyers face significant product-related uncertainty in online markets (Bakos 1991) such as 
OMWEs, since various product attributes (condition, quality etc.) are unobservable. Online 
electronic markets are extremely susceptible to problems related with uncertainty, since 
information asymmetries emerge when buyers and sellers are separated by time and space 
(Dewan & Hsu 2004). In other words, while sellers themselves are aware of the true quality of the 
products, buyers can only rely on seller-provided information to make evaluations of the 
unobserved quality. In such circumstances, buyers expect higher price discounts to overcome 
their uncertainty and engage in transactions. This behavior results in adverse selection (or the 
“lemons market” problem) (Akerlof 1970), which refers to a market equilibrium where lower 
quality (and lower price) products get exchanged as a result of high information asymmetry. The 
result of such user preferences is a downward spiral towards lower price and quality items being 
favored in the market. 
Since quality is difficult to assess in our context, we examine the listings and transactions 
of free (vs. negotiable) items. On OMWEs, sellers often refrain from providing exact prices (in 
MNExchange.Org barely 2% item listings have an associated asking price; the rest are listed as 
either ‘negotiable’ or ‘free’). For items listed as ‘negotiable’, buyers and sellers bargain offline to 
arrive at a price; for ‘free’ items, buyers merely bear the transportation costs while the incentive 
for sellers comes from reduced disposal costs.  On OMWEs, intermediary services can reduce (if 
not entirely eliminate) information asymmetries about product quality (Dewan & Hsu 2004). 
However, in the absence of human intermediaries, information asymmetries between buyers and 
sellers (Koch & Schultze 2011) will lead to higher uncertainty and consequently, greater adverse 
selection. The resulting effect on OMWEs will drive out the negotiable (higher quality and price) 
items in favor of free (lower quality and price) items. This suggests the following hypothesis.  
H3: Eliminating Human Intermediaries will be associated with (a) a greater decline in the 
likelihood of successful transactions of negotiable items compared to free items and (b) a greater 
increase in the duration to a successful transaction of negotiable items compared to free items. 
4.4.4 Frequency – One-time versus Recurring 
Research shows that transaction costs in physical (Tadelis & Williamson 2010) and online 
markets (Bakos 1991) reduces the buyers and sellers incentives to exchange with one another. 
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Transaction costs play an important role in determining outcomes of online interactions. In the 
OMWE setting, transaction costs comprise of search (identifying a transacting partner) and 
bargaining costs (negotiating the contract) incurred by buyers and sellers during a transaction 
(Dahlman 1979; Williamson 1995). As with any other transaction (Kleindorfer & Wu 2003), user 
decisions in OMWEs are likely to be driven by the motivation to minimize transaction costs 
(Dhanorkar et al. 2014). Human intermediaries can enhance search efficiency while also 
improving bargaining through higher information transparency (Wu 2004). As a result, exchanges 
combining both online markets and human intermediaries (Holland & Lockett 1997) helps reduce 
transaction costs.  
 Sellers on MNExchange.Org (and most other OMWEs)23 offer items either on a one-time 
basis or a recurring basis. One-time items, as the label suggests, comprise of items offered by 
sellers for a single transaction with interested buyers. Recurring transactions usually involve the 
possibility of ongoing exchanges on a daily, weekly or monthly basis.24 Although both types of 
transactions can have associated transaction costs, they may vary substantially depending on the 
presence of an intermediary. For example, both parties (buyers and sellers) incur search and 
bargaining costs for each one-time transaction. These costs are incurred, as described by 
Kleindorfer and Wu (2003), in establishing one-time transactions. On the other hand, search costs 
can be virtually eliminated (for subsequent transactions) and bargaining costs can be substantially 
minimized in recurring exchanges since the same parties are engaged in long-term exchanges. 
Since search and bargaining costs can be substantially high for one-time exchanges in the 
absence of human intermediaries in OMWEs, users will avoid transactions of one-time items. On 
the other hand, search and bargaining costs for recurring items will be distributed over multiple 
exchanges (Kleindorfer & Wu 2003), therefore driving down the cost per transaction for buyers 
and sellers. As a result, transactions for recurring items (longer-term arrangements) will be 
favored after the operational policy change. 
H4:  Eliminating Human Intermediaries will be associated with (a) a greater decline in the 
likelihood of successful transactions of one-time items compared to recurring items and (b) a 
greater increase in the duration to a successful transaction of one-time items compared to 
recurring items. 
                                                     
23 We surveyed 20 other OMWEs in other regions such as Canada (British Columbia IMEX), U.K. (Eastex), 
Singapore (Waste is Not Waste) and India (CII Waste Exchange). Most of these have very similar operations. 
24 Information regarding the frequency of recurring transactions is typically provided by the seller. However, 
this may be negotiated as per the availability (supply) and demand for the materials.  
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4.5 Econometric Analysis 
4.5.1 Data 
The available archival data spans 1999-2008 and consists of product listings, buyer views (i.e. 
hits), and product-, seller- and buyer-specific information. We exclude data prior to 2000 since 
the exchange was still evolving at that time. Out of the total 4500 item listings available, we were 
missing information for various measures on approximately 460 listings. Most of the missing 
information was due to recording errors (for user size, county, organization type etc.). We 
resolved 215 of these cases through discussions with MNExchange.Org and other data sources 
(Hoover’s and ORBIS). Finally, we dropped listings where information was missing on more 
than two control or independent variables. Since the listing and exchange dates are extremely 
important in our study, we dropped cases where this information was not accurate or missing. For 
example, some listings only had information about the month but not the exact date; these cases 
were dropped. The final sample consisted of 4055 listings and 869 successful transactions. We 
matched other county-level data from Minnesota state public records and Minnesota Pollution 
Control Agency (MPCA) reports on county-level statistics. Table 4-1 shows the description and 
statistics of all variables. Product classifications (free/negotiable and one-time/recurring) were 
based on listings submitted by sellers in the respective fields. Classification based on use 
(process-use/end-use) was made based on discussions with MNExchange.Org staff (specifically 
the Director, administrators and intermediaries) as well as regulatory experts at the MPCA.  
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Table 4-1. Variable Descriptions & Summary Statistics 
Variable Variable Description Mean Std. Dev 
Exchange  
Binary [Outcome] Variable indicating whether the listed item was 
exchanged successfully  
0.20 0.40 
Time to Exchange 
For successfully completed transactions, this [Outcome] variable captures 
the time (days) since the item was listed by the seller to the time when it 
was exchanged. 
17.50 75.91 
Operational 
Policy  
Change 
This is a binary [0, 1] variable based on the time when policy change was 
initiated. Following the Figure 1, we record policy change as the years after 
2004. The Operational Policy Change led to the elimination of human 
intermediaries.  
0.46 0.49 
Process-Use/ 
End-Use 
This classification was based on discussions with MNExchange.Org and 
Minnesota Pollution Control agency officials. We classify Process-use 
items as following: Equipment & Machinery, Construction Materials, 
Plastics and Rubber, Textiles & Leather, Wood Products. We classify End-
use items as following: Electronics, Office Furniture, Office Supplies, 
Paints & Cleaners, Boxes & Containers, Paper Products. 
0.34 0.47 
Free/Negotiable 
Binary Variable representing whether item listed was offered for 'free' by 
the seller. Apart from the environmental benefits, sellers benefit through 
reduced disposal fees despite ‘free’ exchanges.  
0.52 0.50 
One-Time/ 
Recurring 
Binary variable indicating if the item was being offered by the seller on a 
recurring basis (i.e. weekly/ monthly etc.). For e.g. furniture manufacturer 
(seller) could list wood chips as recurring.  
0.27 0.44 
Total Hits on 
Listing 
Log total number of buyer web hits on the listed item. Captures overall 
interest in the listing i.e. “potential demand”.  
2.46 1.26 
Total Hits on 
Listing2 
Squared logarithm of total buyer hits on the listed item. Interviews and 
exploratory analysis showed that successfully exchanged items tended to 
have either low hits (indicating fast exchange) or high hits (indicating high 
potential interest). This suggested a curvilinear relationship.  
7.65 6.35 
Textual 
Information 
Length  
Sellers provide a textual description along with the item listing. This 
variable is the Logarithm of the number of characters in the textual 
information provided by sellers for the listed item. 
3.92 0.94 
Visual 
Information 
Dummy 
Binary variable indicating if seller provided any visual information content 
(e.g. picture, user manual etc.) along with listing. This can alleviate 
uncertainty  (Dimoka et al. 2012) 
0.10 0.31 
Hazardous 
Binary variable indicating if the item posed any safety hazard. This was 
controlled for because such materials were less likely to get exchanged due 
to risks and higher transportation costs. 
0.04 0.20 
MNExchange.Org 
Diffusion in 
Buyer/Seller 
County 
Log of the number of registered MNExchange.Org users in seller's/buyer’s 
county, accounts for diffusion of OMWEs. This variable was estimated 
based on annual registrations data obtained from MNExchange.Org 
6.45 1.03 
Buyer-Seller  
Familiarity 
Prior Experience between transacting parties can affect transaction 
outcomes. We therefore control for this by including an indicator variable 
that captures whether the buyer and seller had interacted before. We 
assume that any previous interaction occurring at any point in time 
increases familiarity.  
0.39 0.48 
Seller/Buyer  
Size Dummies 
Ordinal Variable for Size of the organization. Data available was 
Categorical based on # of employees: Small (<500); Medium (501 - 3000); 
Large (>3000) Companies 
NA NA 
Buyer/Seller  
Type Dummies 
We include dummy variables for different types of users on 
MNExchange.Org. Users were one of the following: Manufacturing, 
Commercial, Non-Profit, Government, Education and Undeclared 
NA NA 
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4.5.2 Estimation Strategy 
In our context, H1 examines the overall effect of an Operational Policy Change. To estimate the 
effect on likelihood of exchange as predicted by H1a, we use logistic regression models; to 
estimate the effect on time to exchange as predicted by H1b, we use OLS regression models with 
the logarithm of time (days) to an exchange as the dependent variable. All models include various 
buyer and seller dummies, product-level controls and transaction-level controls. 
 Hypotheses H2-H4 examine the effect of the Operational Policy Change on ‘exchange 
likelihood’ and ‘time to exchange’ subject to items from various categories – end-use/process-
use, free/negotiable and recurring/one-time. A common problem with such comparisons is the 
‘omitted variable bias’, which occurs due to unobserved confounding factors that makes each 
category different from the other. Therefore, we use an estimation strategy similar to the 
differences-in-differences (DID) approach in a regression framework. This strategy has been 
extensively used to examine the effects of exogenous shocks on various economic (Card & 
Krueger 1993), and organizational (Dahl 2011) outcomes, as well as to study online markets 
(Forman et al. 2009). In our context, the Operational Policy Change represents an exogenous 
shock to MNExchange.Org and its users, and we are interested in the post-shock transaction 
outcomes compared to the pre-shock transaction outcomes. For H2-H4, we examine the 
‘treatment’ effects of the Operational Policy Change on process-use, negotiable and one-time 
items. As a result, end-use, free and recurring (respectively) items act as our ‘control groups’ in 
the DID model. As a result, The DID estimation strategy amounts to comparing the ‘change’ in 
outcome variables (before versus after) in one category to the ‘change’ in outcome variables in 
the other category. In standard notation, the DID estimator is: 
 Outcomeit = β0 + β1 Treatment Categoryi + β2 Operational Policy Changet + β3   
   (Treatment Category × Operational Policy Change)it + ε  …(1) 
…where Treatment Category is a ‘treatment group’ dummy for categories process-use, negotiable 
or one-time; Operational Policy Change is a ‘treatment time’ dummy. The estimated coefficient 
(β3) on the interaction term gives the DID estimate. Conventional standard errors from DID 
estimation often understate the standard deviations of estimators. As a result, we use clustered 
standard errors (Bertrand et al. 2003). Finally, we conduct additional analyses and robustness 
checks to alleviate any concerns related to causality in our empirical setting. Below, we provide 
details about the estimation strategy for the two outcome variables – (i) likelihood of exchange 
and (ii) time to exchange. 
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4.5.3 Effects of Policy Change on Likelihood of Transactions 
Recall that the main objective of this study is to examine the impact of the change in 
MnExchange.Org’s operating policy. Two important metrics for evaluating the usefulness (i.e. 
efficiency) of the MNExchange.Org are (i) the likelihood of successfully completed transactions 
and (ii) time taken to complete successful transactions. Table 2 shows the results for hypotheses 
H1a, H2a, H3a and H4a related to the effect of operational policy change on likelihood of 
successful transactions. The logit model is: 
Pr(Exchange Success = 1|X) = β0 + βCLXCL + β1Operational Policy Change + β2   
    Operational Policy Change × Process-Use + β3  
    Operational Policy Change ×Negotiable + β4   
    Operational Policy Change × One-Time + β5   
    Process-Use +β6 Negotiable + β7 One-Time   … (2) 
 
...where XCL is the vector of controls, while βs are respective coefficients. We use clustered 
standard errors to avoid problems with heteroskedasticity (Wooldridge 2002) and understated 
standard errors in DID estimation (Bertrand et al. 2003). For H1a, we use a reduced form of 
equation 2 without the DID interaction terms for the item categories, while still retaining the 
dummy variables. 
Table 4-2 shows that the Operational Policy Change has a significant negative effect 
(β=-0.23, p<0.10) on the likelihood of exchange for all items (Column 1). This supports H1a. The 
effect of Operational Policy Change is significant for process-use items (Column 2, β=-0.38, 
p<0.05), which suggests a significant decline in process-use item (versus end-use item) 
transactions following the Operational Policy Change. Overall, the results support H2a. We do 
not find a significant effect of Operational Policy Change for transactions of negotiable (versus 
free) items (Column 3, β=-0.13, p>0.10), although it does seem that the market could be 
eventually converging to free items in the absence of human intermediaries. H3a is not 
statistically supported. Finally, there was a significant effect of Operational Policy Change on 
transactions of one-time (versus recurring) items (Column 4, β=-0.37, p<0.05). We find 
substantial support for H4a; users might be inclined towards recurring transactions indicative of 
preference for “longer-term contracts” (Kleindorfer & Wu 2003). Although the initial 
probabilities could, and do differ across categories (which is expected), the DID estimation 
approach confirms that the “change” in likelihoods of transaction was substantially different 
across the categories following the operational policy change. 
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Table 4-2. Likelihood of Successful Transactions 
    Including All Years of Data Excluding Implementation Year (2004) 
  Hypotheses Full Use Price Frequency Full Use Price Frequency 
Variables   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Operational Policy Change H1a -0.23* -0.14 -0.19 0.04 -0.50*** -0.41 -0.43* -0.26 
    (0.12) (0.21) (0.25) (0.38) (0.14) (0.32) (0.25) (0.35) 
Operational Policy Change H2a   -0.38**       -0.46***     
× Process-Use     (0.17)       (0.17)     
Operational Policy Change H3a     -0.13       -0.19*   
× Negotiable       (0.08)       (0.10)   
Operational Policy Change H4a       -0.37**       -0.35** 
× One-Time         (0.17)       (0.16) 
Process-Use   0.88 0.99 0.89 0.86 0.96 1.16 0.99 0.91 
    (0.61) (0.80) (0.78) (0.79) (0.80) (0.73) (1.08) (1.08) 
Negotiable   -0.44*** -0.42*** -0.41*** -0.45*** -0.41*** -0.41*** -0.32* -0.42*** 
    (0.10) (0.07) (0.11) (0.09) (0.12) (0.10) (0.18) (0.12) 
One-Time   0.25** 0.24 0.24* 0.46*** 0.23** 0.21* 0.22 0.44*** 
    (0.10) (0.16) (0.14) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.15) (0.08) 
Total Hits on Listing   -0.70*** -0.63 -0.69* -0.69* -0.75*** -0.70** -0.75* -0.75* 
    (0.09) (0.42) (0.41) (0.41) (0.10) (0.32) (0.42) (0.42) 
Total Hits on Listing2   0.11*** 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.12*** 0.11 0.12 0.12 
    (0.02) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.02) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) 
Hazardous   -0.36 -0.38 -0.37 -0.37 -0.17 -0.12 -0.17 -0.17 
    (0.26) (0.53) (0.53) (0.52) (0.28) (0.20) (0.61) (0.60) 
Textual Information Length   0.00 -0.00 0.01 -0.00 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 
    (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.06) (0.03) (0.02) 
Visual Information Dummy   -0.12 -0.11 -0.11 -0.12 -0.21 -0.17 -0.21** -0.21** 
    (0.13) (0.09) (0.11) (0.10) (0.15) (0.29) (0.09) (0.09) 
Buyer-Seller Familiarity   0.21** 0.17 0.21 0.20 0.21** 0.14* 0.22 0.21 
    (0.08) (0.20) (0.21) (0.21) (0.09) (0.08) (0.18) (0.18) 
MNExchange.Org Diffusion in Seller County   0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 
    (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.02) (0.02) 
MNExchange.Org Diffusion in Buyer County   0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 
    (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) 
Constant   -1.07 -1.18 -1.12 -1.17 -0.87 -0.95 -0.98 -0.96 
    (0.68) (0.99) (1.06) (1.15) (0.87) (0.89) (1.13) (1.20) 
Observations   4055 3609 4055 4055 3370 2977 3370 3370 
Log Likelihood   -2044.85 -1820.82 -2044.67 -2043.18 -1707.44 -1509.45 -1707.13 -1706.11 
Logit Models shown; Dependent Variable is 'Likelihood that Listed Surplus is Exchanged; Clustered Standard Errors in parentheses; *p<.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01; Material Code 
dummies included for each model; Buyer/Seller Type dummies and Buyer/Seller size dummies added to all models; Reduced sample size for analysis of Item-use is due to omission of 
Miscellaneous items which were not listed under specific material codes. This did not allow classification as either process- or end-use. 
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Table 4-3. Time to Successful Transactions 
    Including All Years of Data Excluding Implementation Year (2004) 
  Hypotheses Full Use Price Frequency Full Use Price Frequency 
Variables   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Operational Policy Change H1b 0.33** 0.33** 0.22 0.04 0.54** 0.69*** 0.36** 0.31** 
    (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.03) (0.09) (0.09) 
Operational Policy Change H2b   0.53*       0.33     
× Process-Use     (0.21)       (0.18)     
Operational Policy Change H3b     0.56**       0.58**   
× Negotiable       (0.16)       (0.12)   
Operational Policy Change H4b       0.40**       0.35* 
× One-Time         (0.07)       (0.14) 
Process-Use   0.29 0.32 0.22 0.39 0.14 0.22 0.07 0.22 
    (0.31) (0.30) (0.31) (0.29) (0.30) (0.25) (0.29) (0.31) 
Negotiable   -0.05 0.11 -0.20** -0.02 0.02 0.25 -0.22 0.06 
    (0.09) (0.05) (0.05) (0.09) (0.17) (0.14) (0.17) (0.17) 
One-Time   -0.52*** -0.44*** -0.50*** -0.79*** -0.47*** -0.41*** -0.44*** -0.73** 
    (0.02) (0.06) (0.02) (0.07) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.16) 
Total Hits on Listing   0.06 -0.05 0.03 0.06 -0.03 -0.16** -0.06 -0.03 
    (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) 
Total Hits on Listing2   0.06* 0.08** 0.07* 0.06 0.08** 0.10*** 0.08** 0.08** 
    (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
Hazardous   0.31 0.35 0.32 0.33 0.43** 0.50** 0.43** 0.44** 
    (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.16) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) 
Textual Information Length   -0.09 -0.08 -0.10 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.10 -0.09 
    (0.14) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) 
Visual Information Dummy   0.29* 0.31* 0.26 0.28* 0.21 0.22 0.19 0.21 
    (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.19) (0.20) (0.19) (0.18) 
Buyer-Seller Familiarity   -0.20 -0.23* -0.20 -0.20* -0.16 -0.19 -0.17 -0.17 
    (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) 
MNExchange.Org Diffusion in Seller County   0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.00 -0.02 -0.01 
    (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) 
MNExchange.Org Diffusion in Buyer County   0.05 0.08** 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.04 
    (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Constant   1.65 1.28 1.90 1.77 1.93* 1.61 2.22* 2.03* 
    (0.83) (0.75) (0.81) (0.77) (0.82) (0.75) (0.79) (0.75) 
Observations   869 779 869 869 701 630 701 701 
Adjusted R-squared   0.292 0.299 0.297 0.294 0.291 0.305 0.295 0.292 
Log Likelihood   -1263.57 -1113.80 -1259.85 -1261.60 -1047.69 -925.80 -1044.74 -1046.58 
OLS Models shown; Dependent Variable is Logarithm (Time to Exchange)’; Clustered Standard Errors in parentheses; *p<.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01; Material Code dummies included 
for each model; Buyer/Seller Type dummies and Buyer/Seller size dummies added to all models; Reduced sample size for analysis of Item-use is due to omission of Miscellaneous items 
which were not listed under specific material codes. This did not allow classification as either process- or end-use. 
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Figure 4-3 plots the predicted probabilities against time using a local polynomial 
regression with an epanechnikov kernel. The plots illustrate the severity of negative impact on 
exchange outcomes due to the policy change. In general, the analysis provides three insights. 
First, the Operational Policy Change leads to significant drop (approximately 30%) in the overall 
likelihood of successful exchanges. Second, the decline is far more substantial for process-use, 
negotiable and one-time items (compared to end-use, free and recurring items respectively). 
Finally, Figure 3 shows that the likelihood of successful exchange declined over time following 
the operational policy change. 
4.5.4 Effects of Policy Change on Time to Successful Transactions  
Table 4-3 shows the results for hypotheses H1b, H2b, H3b and H4b related to the effect of 
operational policy change on time to successful transactions. The regression model used is: 
Log [Time to Exchange] = γ0 + γ CRXCR + γ1Operational Policy Change + γ2 Operational  
   Policy Change × Process-Use + γ3 Operational Policy Change  
   ×Negotiable + γ4 Operational Policy Change × One-Time + γ5  
   Process-Use + γ6 Negotiable + γ7 One-Time    … (3) 
where XCR is the vector of controls and γs are respective coefficients. We use a DID regression 
approach with clustered standard errors. To examine H1b, we use a reduced form of equation 3 
without the DID estimators for the items categories, while still retaining the dummy variables. 
The sample for the analysis of time to exchange consists of only those items that were exchanged 
at some point in time.  
The Operational Policy Change has a significant positive effect (Column 1, β=0.33, 
p<0.05) on the time to exchange, which supports H1b. Also, the effect of Operational Policy 
Change is significant for process-use items (Column 2, β=0.53, p<0.10), which suggests a 
significant increase in time to exchange process-use (versus end-use) items following the 
Operational Policy Change. Overall, the results support H2b. We also find a significant effect of 
Operational Policy Change on time to exchange for negotiable (versus free) items (β=0.56, 
p<0.05), which suggests that free items exchange faster when compared to negotiable items in the 
absence of intermediaries. Hence, H3b is supported. Finally, Operational Policy Change had a 
significant effect on the time to exchange one-time (versus recurring) items (β=0.40, p<0.05), 
which supports H4b. 
Figure 4-4 plots the predicted time to exchange using a local polynomial regression with 
an epanechnikov kernel. These trends illustrate the severity of negative impact on the time taken 
to establish successful exchanges after the policy change. In general, the analysis provides three 
insights. First, there is a significant rise (approximately 80%) in the overall time to reach 
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successful exchanges following the operational policy change. Second, the rise is far more 
substantial for process-use (compared to end-use), negotiable (compared to free) and one-time 
(compared to recurring) items respectively. Finally, the increase in the time to successful 
exchanges was almost instantaneous, but reached a stable level over time. This clearly shows that 
eliminating intermediaries from MNExchange.Org created transactional difficulties. This finding 
has implications for designing hybrid or mixed-mode platforms. 
Table 4-4. Non-parametric tests for Changes in Seller Listings 
  
Listings per 
Week (Mean) Difference Percentage Kolmogorov Mann Wilcoxon  
Type of Items Before After in Means Change Smirnov Whitney Sign-Rank 
All Items 13.70 13.56 -0.14 -1% p>0.10 p>0.10 p>0.10 
End-use items 6.09 9.57 3.48 57% p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 
Process-use 
items 6.06 2.41 -3.65 -60% p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 
Free Items 4.59 9.22 4.63 101% p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 
Negotiable Items 9.23 3.90 -5.33 -58% p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 
Recurring Items 2.96 4.37 1.41 48% p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 
One-Time Items 10.86 9.21 -1.65 -15% p<0.05 p<0.05 p<0.05 
 
Table 4-5. Non-parametric tests for Changes in Buyer Views 
  
Hits per Week 
(Mean) Difference Percentage Kolmogorov Mann Wilcoxon  
Type of Items Before After in Means Change Smirnov Whitney Sign-Rank 
All Items 2.02 3.28 1.26 62% p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.001 
End-use items 2.13 3.38 1.25 59% p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.001 
Process-use items 2.12 3.11 0.99 47% p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.001 
Free Items 2.31 3.49 1.18 51% p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 
Negotiable Items 1.83 2.61 0.78 43% p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 
Recurring Items 1.67 3.00 1.33 80% p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 
One-Time Items 2.52 3.48 0.96 38% p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 
4.6 Robustness checks 
A major challenge in quasi-experimental designs is that of attributing the effects to the 
“intervention” i.e. Operational Policy Change. We alleviate these concerns by conducting a 
series of robustness checks that address potential alternative explanations.  
4.6.1 Accounting for Policy Implementation Delays 
It is common knowledge that operational policy changes do not take place overnight. Typically, 
such changes involve intense deliberation and beta testing before implementation. Even the 
process of implementation can take a few months. In our dataset, there were strong indications for 
delays in implementation of the Operational Policy Change. For example, archival records 
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showed that new operational policy changes were initiated in early 2004, but were “formalized in 
October 2004”. To account for such implementation delays and their spurious effects on our 
findings, we eliminate all transactional data for the year 2004. We conducted our analysis using 
this reduced sample.  
The results are shown in Table 4-2 (Columns 5-8) and Table 4-3 (Columns 5-8). Overall, 
our findings do not change qualitatively after eliminating the observations during 2004. All 
hypothesized effects are significant and stronger for the logit models estimating ‘likelihood of 
exchange’ (Table 4-2). The coefficients (Table 4-3) have slightly higher associated p values for 
the regression on Log (Time to Exchange); however, the coefficients are in the right direction. 
Yet, our results find substantial support overall, after accounting for the implementation delays.  
4.6.2 Potential Changes in Seller Composition & Usage Frequency 
Another factor that could bias the results is the potential change in the composition of sellers. For 
example, certain types of sellers (characterized by the industry they represent) entering or exiting 
the market might lead to changes in the nature of transactions. Figure 4-5 shows the seller 
composition before and after the policy change. The results show that there were minor 
fluctuations in the number of sellers representing education, government, manufacturing and non-
profit sectors. The composition of sellers from the commercial sector underwent large change 
(>100%). Interviews with the MNExchange.Org Director suggested that these changes may be 
due to more sellers declaring their ‘industry type’ after the policy change (as observed in the 
lower number of ‘undeclared’ sellers in Figure 4-5). Discussions with MNExchange.Org staff 
confirmed that this trend was due to minor ongoing changes in the registration policies, which 
induced more users to declare information about their organization. This is seen in the reduction 
of ‘undeclared’ users. As a result, we did not find any reason to believe that changes in seller 
composition were the causal mechanism underlying aggregate-level changes in transactions. 
In online markets, it is common to observe long tails (Brynjolfsson et al. 2011), 
indicating few users accounting for a large amount of usage. We therefore examined potential 
changes in sellers’ online usage behavior. Changes in the sellers’ online usage could indicate that 
MNExchange.Org became either more concentrated or more diversified, which could partially 
explain changes in transactions for certain items. Figures 6a and 6b do not show any significant 
changes in seller usage patterns. Most sellers do not revisit the exchange after initial registration; 
barely 2% of sellers use (i.e. post an item) the exchange platform more than five times over the 
two years following registration. Similar trends persist after the policy change. Overall, usage 
frequency did not substantially change. A non-parametric comparison test indicated non-
significant differences (p>0.10) between distributions for usage frequency (before vs. after).
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Figure 4-3. Local Polynomial Regression Plots [Predicted Probabilities of Transaction] 
   
 
Figure 4-4. Local Polynomial Regression Plots [Predicted Times to Transaction] 
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Figure 4-5. Seller Composition      
     
 
Figure 4-6. Sellers’ Usage (Listing) Frequency 
 
 
Figure 4-7. Buyer Composition    
       
 
Figure 4-8. Buyers’ Usage (Viewing) Frequency 
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4.6.3 Potential Changes in Buyer Composition & Usage Frequency 
Another factor that could bias our results is the potential shift in the buyer composition. For 
example, certain types of buyers (characterized by the industry they represent) entering or exiting 
the market might lead to changes in the nature of transactions. Figure 4-7 shows the buyer 
composition before and after the policy change. The results show some changes in the number of 
commercial and non-profit buyers. In discussions with MNExchange.Org, these increases (4-7%) 
could be almost entirely attributed to the fact that more number of buyers declared their type 
during registration in the latter years. The composition of buyers from the education, government 
and manufacturing sector remained largely unchanged. Overall, we conclude that changes in 
buyer composition are unlikely to have caused a drop in transactions.  
We next also examined whether the policy fundamentally changed buyer usage patterns. 
Figure 4-8 does not show any sudden shifts in buyer usage patterns. Most buyers do not revisit 
the exchange after initial registration; barely 2% of buyers engage in online search activity on 
MNExchange.Org more than 20 times after registration. These trends persist after the policy 
change, suggesting that buyers’ usage behavior was not likely the reason behind the drop in 
transactions and increases in transaction times. A non-parametric comparison test indicated non-
significant differences (p>0.10) between distributions of buyer usage frequency (before vs. after). 
4.6.4 Changes in Information Content 
Sellers typically provide a textual description of the item being offered. The textual description 
provides information that can reduce buyers’ uncertainty about the product quality (Dimoka et al. 
2012) and increase exchanges (Dhanorkar et al. 2014). A reduction in the information provided 
by sellers (especially after the policy change) could elevate the buyers’ concerns uncertainty 
about the product. This may lead to lower exchanges as observed in our findings. In other words, 
the lower transactions could be due to the lack of information rather than the lack of 
intermediation. Figure 4-9 shows the information (in number of characters) provided by sellers 
before and after the policy change. Surprisingly, we observe a greater increase in the sellers’ 
information content for process-use items (compared to end-use items) and negotiable items 
(compared to free items). This could mean that, anticipating problems with the lack of 
intermediaries, sellers compensated by providing more information. Interestingly, even the 
increased information content for process-use items was not able to overcome the lack of 
intermediaries. Evidently, intermediaries provide transactional benefits that go beyond merely 
reducing information asymmetries. We do not observe a large increase in information content for 
one-time items (compared to recurring items). 
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Figure 4-9. Changes in Description Length 
 
 
 
Figure 4-10. Cumulative Registrations by Region 
 
Figure 4-11. Recycling Rates in Minnesota 
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4.6.5 Exogenous Shocks 
The above results provide a convincing argument for the existence of the Intermediation Problem. 
However, the decline in transactions (and supply) could also be caused by other exogenous 
effects during the study period. To test for these exogenous effects, we search for evidence for 
any sudden regulatory changes shifts in Minnesota. We also examined a potential second order 
effect of regulatory changes on registrations. 
As a first step, we examine whether user registration patterns had any significant 
abnormalities during the 2003-2005 period, which could give erroneous results. One plausible 
reason for sudden changes in registration patterns is exogenous shocks (e.g. regulatory changes, 
industry-specific changes), which could also have a spillover effect on transaction outcomes. For 
example, exogenous shocks such as policy and regulatory changes can spur supply and demand 
for used materials and wastes (Atasu et al. 2009; Gui et al. 2013b). Also, increased regulatory 
stringency can be a resource- and time-intensive endeavor (Sadiq & Governatori 2010) for users, 
and is likely to delay transactions in the absence of a knowledgeable intermediary. We examine 
whether any such shifts can be observed in user registrations. Figure 4-10 plots the time series of 
cumulative registrations by year, fitted with a local polynomial using an epanechnikov kernel 
(95% confidence interval). We intentionally cluster the data based on regions – metro counties 
and outer counties – to acknowledge differences in industrial activity. As expected, registration 
rates (per year) are significantly higher for the metro region. The trends suggest that there were 
no significant discontinuities in the registration patterns in either region. Rather, the local 
polynomial shows a uniform rise in cumulative registrations between 2000 and 2010. Hence, a 
change in total registrations is unlikely to have caused the drop in transactions. 
Recycling policies could also alter transactions on OMWEs. In the state of Minnesota, 
the Minnesota Pollution Control agency (MPCA) sets rules and standards for waste disposal, 
reuse and recycling. These policies get implemented at the county-level. An important metric of 
environmental progress for MPCA (and counties) is recycling rates. Recycling rates can 
potentially affect exchanges on OMWEs. Increases in recycling rates suggest stronger 
environmental norms and improvements in recycling infrastructure (e.g. transportation, handling, 
sorting etc.). Hence, sudden increases in recycling rates could spur transactions through positive 
spillovers. On the other hand, a sudden decline in recycling rates could have a negative spillover 
effects on transactions. Figure 4-11 shows that year 2002 had a significant (p<0.10) spike in 
recycling activity. As such there is no reason to suspect that this spike would potentially bias our 
findings since the decline in transactions occurred almost three years later (in 2005). However, 
we still re-analyzed our data after dropping listings from 2002. This approach did not alter our 
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findings qualitatively. Finally, we also conducted interviews with employees of 
MNExchange.Org and MPCA to confirm whether other regulatory interventions might have 
caused changes in transactions. The discussions revealed no reasons to attribute such dramatic 
shifts in transactions to regulatory factors.  
4.7 Additional Evidence – Second Order Effects  
If the adverse effects on transaction outcomes (as measured by likelihood of exchange and time to 
exchange) are actually due to the Operational Policy Change, we should be able to observe 
second order effects on buyer and seller behaviors as well. Such evidence of second-order effects 
can provide additional support for our hypothesized findings.   
4.7.1 Second-Order Effects of Operational Policy Change on Seller Behaviors 
Sellers have been known to alter online listing behavior based on their perceived expected 
transaction outcomes (Overby & Jap 2009). Apart from the aggregate effects, we had earlier 
predicted greater transactional challenges with process-use, negotiable and one-time items. Our 
results showed a ‘lower transaction likelihood’ and ‘increased time to exchange’ for these items. 
If our results are truly driven by transactional challenges and not by other factors, we should see 
sellers increasingly avoid listing item types that are likely to face higher transactional difficulties. 
Furthermore, under high uncertainty, sellers of lower quality (and lower price) products have a 
higher incentive to remain in the online market; while sellers of higher quality (and higher price) 
products will exit the online market in absence of intermediaries (Akerlof 1970). This should be 
observable though the second-order effect of a decline in the supply of process-use, negotiable 
and one-time items following the policy change.  
 To examine whether there was a decline in the supply of certain types of items, we rely 
on the number of Listings per Week for the different categories of items. Any drastic changes in 
the Listings per Week (i.e. supply) could indicate sellers’ reluctance to engage in transactions of 
specific items. Table 4 shows the changes (within categories) in sellers’ Listings per Week before 
and after the policy change. Not surprisingly, the overall supply rose, given the evolution of 
MNExchange.Org, but this rise is not uniform across item type. There is a significant rise in 
Listings per Week for end-use items (57%) and a sharp decline in Listings per Week for process-
use items (-60%). There is also a significant rise in Listings per Week for free items (101%) but a 
sharp decline in Listings per Week for negotiable items (-58%). Finally, we observe an increase in 
the Listings per Week for recurring items (48%) but a small decline in the Listings per Week for 
one-time items (-15%). To statistically test these differences, we conducted a series of non-
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parametric tests25 (Table 4-4), which provide support for a supply decline for certain categories 
of items. 
Figure 4-12 graphs the results of a local polynomial regression (using epanechnikov 
kernel) for Listings per Week plotted against time. This plot provides a more granular illustration 
of the effect of Operational Policy Change. The trends suggest a rise in the Listings per Week for 
end-use items but a significant decline in process-use items supply following the operational 
policy change. Similarly, we see a decline in negotiable items while free items supply increased 
following the Operational Policy Change. We also see a rise in supply of recurring items but a 
decline in one-time items following the Operational Policy Change. These trends provide 
additional support for second-order effects resulting from the Operational Policy Change.  
4.7.2 Second-Order Effects of Operational Policy Change on Buyer Behaviors 
Often the rise or decline in supply and demand on online markets is a mutually evolving process 
(Overby & Jap 2009). Our results showed a ‘lower transaction likelihood’ and ‘increased time to 
exchange’ for process-use, negotiable and one-time items following the operational policy 
change. Such transactional challenges could lead to reduced buyer interest (as observed through 
views or hits) if buyers recognize the difficulties in engaging in OMWE transactions. Hence, an 
anticipation of transactional challenges may engender buyer disinterest in MNExchange.Org, at 
least for certain item categories. In addition, reduced supply of certain categories could lead to 
further reduction in demand.    
 Unlike some other markets, B2B markets typically do not entail bids or auctions (Koch & 
Schultze 2011). As a result, we do not observe either the final seller/buyer prices or the book 
values of the items (Dewan & Hsu 2004). We therefore examine the second-order effects of 
Operational Policy Change on the Hits per Week (i.e. unique buyer views) for the different 
categories of items. Any drastic changes in the Hits per Week could indicate buyers’ increased 
interest in certain items and reduced interest in other categories. Table 5 shows the changes 
(within item categories) in buyers’ Hits per Week before and after the policy change. We can see 
higher Hits per Week following the policy change for all categories of items. As suggested earlier, 
this could largely be an artifact of greater diffusion of MNExchange.Org within the state i.e. more 
users viewing listing in general. There is a marginally higher rise in Hits per Week for process-
use items (59%) compared to end-use items (47%). There is also a marginally higher rise in Hits 
per Week for free items (51%) compared to negotiable items (43%). Finally, we observe a 
                                                     
25 The Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Mann-Whitney test are analogous to the independent samples t-test, where we assume 
distributions for Views per Week (before and after) to be independent. In our context, the independence assumption is likely to 
be violated. Hence, we also conduct a Wilcoxon Sign-Rank test (which is a non-parametric analog to the paired samples t-
test) which assumes dependence between the samples taken ‘before’ and ‘after’ the policy change.   
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significantly higher rise in the Hits per Week for recurring items (80%) compared to one-time 
items (38%). To statistically test differences within categories, we conducted Kolmogorov-
Smirnov and Mann-Whitney tests (shown in Table 4-5). Overall, the increase in buyer demand 
appears to have been lower for process-use, negotiable and one-time items.  
Although the above analysis shows the differences in Hits per Week before and after the 
Operational Policy Change, it does not account for changes over time. Figure 4-13 summaries 
results from a local polynomial regression (using epanechnikov kernel) for Hits per Week plotted 
against time. This plot provides a more granular illustration of the effect of Operational Policy 
Change. The trends suggest a consistent rise in the Hits per Week for all categories of items, 
which can be expected as MNExchange.Org gets more diffused into the local industry. Yet, we 
observe a dip in Hits per Week shortly after the policy change was implemented. We also find 
marginally higher declines in buyer views for process-use, negotiable and one-time items, which 
provides additional robustness to our hypothesized findings. 
4.8 Discussion 
More than 100 OMWEs operate in the U.S. today26 (EPA 2013a). Collectively, OMWEs possess 
the potential to repurpose billions of lbs. of industrial materials, by-products and waste as well as 
save millions of dollars in disposal fees and inventory costs. MNExchange.Org alone has diverted 
more than 25 million lbs. of reusable and recyclable materials from landfills, saving businesses 
over $6 million over eight years. Needless to say, it is essential to exploit the full potential of 
OMWEs. Our research extends the exploratory work of Dhanorkar et al. (2014) and addresses an 
important question of intermediation. We show that human intermediaries play an important role 
in to establishing exchanges in OMWEs, especially for process-use, negotiable and one-time 
items. Interestingly, we find that end-use item exchanges have fewer transactional challenges 
even in the absence of intermediaries, which is further supported by the success of platforms such 
as Craigslist.com. Furthermore, we clearly show that B2B markets such as OMWEs gradually 
gravitate towards free items in the absence of intermediaries, which in a way symbolizes a 
“market for lemons” (Akerlof 1970). In the absence of human intermediaries and the resulting 
uncertainty, users on B2B markets also show a greater preference for recurring exchanges, to 
reduce their transaction costs (Kleindorfer & Wu 2003). While our research relates to the work of 
Belavina and Girotra (2012), we also generate unique insights on “surplus chain intermediaries”.  
                                                     
26 The number of operating OMWEs is far greater (conservative estimates indicate at least 200) when local/county-level 
exchanges are included. OMWEs are common in other regions such as Canada (British Columbia IMEX), U.K. (Eastex), 
Singapore (Waste is Not Waste) and India (CII Waste Exchange). 
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Figure 4-12. Changes in Item Listings per Week [i.e. Supply] 
 
Figure 4-13. Changes in Item Hits per Week [i.e. Demand] 
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Our study highlights an important challenge faced by OMWEs. On the one hand, OMWEs have 
resource-constraints, which make decentralized online platforms favorable. Online platforms provide 
OMWEs with higher degrees of freedom to reallocate and manage human resources. Yet, our analysis 
suggests that this approach might be detrimental for process-use transactions. In the context of 
MNExchange.Org, the elimination of intermediaries led to increased transactional challenges i.e. higher 
“transactional” or “frictional” costs (Brynjolfsson & Smith 2000; Hann & Terwiesch 2003) of 
undertaking exchanges. The direct effect is seen on two primary transaction outcomes – transaction 
likelihood and transaction delays. Specifically, we observe a significant rise in time to successful 
transactions and a significant decline in the probability of successful transactions. We recommend that 
OMWEs should therefore adopt a hybrid policy which capitalizes the benefits of scale from internet-
based platforms (Bakos 1998) while also providing informational and transactional benefits (Wu 2004) 
through human intermediaries.  
End-use transactions of domestic surplus are already being facilitated by successful platforms 
such as Craigslist.Org (Seamans & Zhu 2013). Given the success of Craigslist.Org (and similar other 
platforms) with residential users, OMWEs need to fill a similar gap in surplus chains by facilitating 
transactions between commercial and industrial facilities. The most significant benefit of OMWEs often 
comes from their capability to redirect industrial items away from disposal options such as landfill, 
incineration etc. (MPCA Officer 2014). To successfully provide this service, OMWEs need to carefully 
develop their operating policies, potentially in favor of human intermediaries. This recommendation goes 
against the move-to-the-market hypothesis (Malone et al. 1987; Brynjolfsson & Mcafee 2012), but is still 
relevant for OMWE success in facilitating transactions.  
 From an environmental sustainability perspective, our paper also contributes to the technology 
debate. On the one hand, a commonly held belief by ecological modernists stresses that “technology [is] 
our planet’s last best hope” (The Guardian Environmental Network 2013). This view hails technology as 
the solution to environmental and ecological problems. On the other hand, leading thinkers and scientists 
believe that “technology cannot solve all environmental problems” (European Environmental Agency 
2014). Our study takes a perspective that technological solutions, especially online platforms, can have 
limited success when decisions are driven by unpredictability and uncertainty. Hence, this study provides 
a word of caution against the sole reliance on online technologies Rather, it is important to assess the 
context, products and users before developing operating policies in B2B online markets.   
Our study has limitations and calls for future research in this domain. First, we use the 
MNExchange.Org platform as our empirical setting. Although MNExchange.Org operations are similar to 
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various other OMWEs, there may be some differences (product types, web display etc.) which could 
potentially limit the generalizability of our research. Additional research can further establish the 
generalizability of our findings and the usefulness of OMWEs by examining other similar exchanges. As 
of today, several OMWEs exist in the U.S. and outside. In addition, parallel markets have emerged for 
fashion surplus (e.g. LikeTwice.com) and arts surplus (e.g. MNArtsMarket.com), which need careful 
examination. Second, our findings may also have limited applicability to other online B2B settings (Koch 
& Schultze 2011) for primary/virgin products, since quality heterogeneity and regulatory concerns might 
play a less important role. In these settings, the presence of human intermediaries might be less critical for 
maintaining high market efficiency. Finally, we focus on two primary metrics of OMWE efficiency – 
likelihood of exchange and time to exchange. Although our conversations revealed that these metrics 
were most useful for evaluating OMWEs, other conversion metrics based on clickstream data might also 
be useful for future research purposes.    
 
 92 
 
Chapter 5  
MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS 
5.1 Implications for Environmental Policies to Promote Source Reduction  
Research in environmental management has explored various organizational and behavioral 
motivations (DeCanio 1993; 1998; Muthulingam et al. 2013) that affect the adoption of EI 
initiatives. Unfortunately, academic research has focused less on the role of external influences in 
improvement projects. We show that punitive and supportive external influence tactics can have a 
significant influence on improvement projects. This finding is especially pertinent, given that not 
only environmental but also quality systems are, today, being shaped by various external 
regulatory bodies such as the FDA (for food and pharmaceutical companies), CPSC27 (for 
consumer products companies) and the HHS28 (for healthcare facilities). Accounting for external 
influences is increasingly important today given the degree to which regulations shape 
operational activity. Furthermore, there is increasing interest in exploring effective tactics that 
ensure supplier conformance to quality and environmental standards. Recent evidence shows that 
traditional command-and-control approaches (e.g. supplier audits by buyers) can have limitations 
in ensuring product, process and environmental quality. For example, professional auditors and 
“gatekeepers” exhibit various behavioral biases (Ball et al. 2013; Short et al. 2010) and suppliers 
tend to evade buyers’ enforcement efforts (Plambeck & Taylor 2012). Our study contributes to 
this literature by showing that command-and-control approaches can have significant limitations 
when inappropriately timed. However, support-oriented intervention schemes could be effectively 
integrated with traditional punitive actions to ensure compliance. While a poor integration 
between these two polar tactics is counterproductive, a well-planned execution could lead to 
higher and faster compliance.  
The problem of ineffective switching between production-related and improvement-
related tasks can lead to abandonment of improvement efforts (Tyre & Orlikowski 1994; Victor et 
al. 2000). If applied appropriately and in a timely manner, external influence tactics help 
encourage switching behavior and reduce abandonment of improvement programs. For example, 
ailing companies with dysfunctional processes might need intermittent punitive actions to trigger 
new improvement programs. These punitive actions might create a conducive climate (Klein & 
Sorra 1996) for initiating supportive tactics. Once initiated, improvement efforts are constantly in 
need of reinforcing supportive tactics (e.g. reminders) to ensure completion. For external 
                                                     
27 Consumer Products Safety Commission 
28 US Department of Health and Human Services 
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consultants and policy-makers, this finding has implications for better planning and anticipation 
of the disruptive and refocusing effects of their actions. Hence, when used well, both punitive and 
supportive tactics are useful tools for managers and policy-makers. While earlier studies have 
largely overlooked the factors that affect the evolution of improvement efforts across time, our 
study highlights the importance of a longitudinal perspective to understand the dynamic nature of 
improvement adoptions.    
Broadly, our study considers two different approaches - punitive and supportive to ensure 
compliance. Earlier research has highlighted the differences in these approaches. For example, 
research in cognitive and behavioral sciences has shown that people can form different 
perceptions depending on the punitive/authoritative versus supportive/enabling dimensions of 
their interactions (Fiske et al. 2007). Earlier studies in organizations (Adler & Borys 1996), 
criminology (Colvin et al. 2002) and education (Mainhard et al. 2011) have also alluded to these 
two general types of approaches while highlighting their pros and cons. However, these two types 
of approaches have been traditionally thought of as being independent. Our study shows that 
punitive and supportive approaches can be introduced and implemented in a complementary 
manner. It is however essential to take into account the timing of such approaches and 
interventions to achieve the desired behavioral changes.  
Final Recommendations: 
• Recommendations for Policy-Makers: Policies should be geared toward using 
the most effective aspects of supportive and punitive tactics. Often, one type of approach 
falls short of providing short- and long-term environmental benefits. In such 
circumstances, a hybrid approach can be effective. Yet, the timing of events and 
interventions plays a critical role in driving positive environmental change. Hence, 
coordination between punitive and supportive tactics is important. Policy-makers can 
develop policies that take into account other existing policies and initiatives to provide 
the most effective and long-standing solutions.   
• Recommendations for Supply Chains: The challenge of externally promoting 
change is also ubiquitous in supply chains. In supply chains, punitive tactics such as 
performance evaluations, inspecting/certifications, as well as more supportive forms, 
such as joint process improvement initiatives are commonly implemented.  Such 
approaches need not be viewed as polar opposites, but as complementary tactics that can 
be used to achieve supplier conformance and reliability. Gatekeeper institutions, 
downstream buyers and auditing firms can revisit their policies to drive positive 
environmental and process change through a complementary use of punitive and 
supportive tactics. 
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5.2 Implications for Developing Online Markets to Promote Reuse 
The problem on information asymmetry and the ensuing challenges are extremely relevant to the 
OMWE context. On the one hand, online markets are expected to lower the buyer’s costs incurred 
in searching for the appropriate product and seller (Bakos 1991). Yet, the transaction of 
secondary products such as industrial surplus is especially difficult (Ghose 2009) due to 
information asymmetries between buyers and sellers. It has been long established that high 
information asymmetry leads to a “lemons” problem where low-quality goods dominate the 
market and drive out high quality products (Akerlof 1970). In the context of OMWEs, the lemons 
problem can result in increased transactions of ‘free’ products with relatively lower quality while 
the (potentially) higher quality, non-free products become less attractive. This could mean that 
higher quality yet higher uncertainty products (e.g. materials such as rubber, chemicals, wood 
etc.) are less frequently traded in OMWEs. Consequently, OMWEs will need to focus on 
reducing the buyers’ uncertainty through the better user interfaces29 and richness of product and 
transaction information30. From an OMWE user standpoint, higher transparency can lead to a 
higher likelihood of successful surplus exchange. Sellers on OMWEs need to provide adequate 
and accurate product (description, visuals, manuals etc.) and transaction (transportation, 
availability, quality etc.) information to alleviate buyer uncertainty. 
 Each party involved in the exchange of surplus is likely to choose a contract that will 
economize their costs of doing a transaction i.e. they will attempt to minimize their search costs, 
bargaining costs, and enforcement costs (Dahlman 1979). Search costs are incurred in the process 
of identifying a transacting partner. Bargaining costs are incurred in the process of negotiating the 
contractual terms and conditions. Finally, enforcement costs include monitoring the transacting 
partner’s behavior and outcomes of the exchange31. Furthermore, product- and seller-related 
uncertainty can escalate transaction costs, which then reduces the intent to engage in transactions 
(Teo & Yu 2005). Finally, customer acceptance of an online product depends on the transaction 
costs incurred when purchasing online relative to purchasing in a physical channel32. Hence, 
                                                     
29 For a discussion on user interfaces and E-commerce, see Lee, Hau L, and Seungjin Whang. 2001. “Winning the Last Mile 
of E-Commerce.” MIT Sloan Management Review 42 (4): 54–62.  
30 For a discussion on the importance of information richness, see Dimoka, Angelika, Yili Hong, and Paul Pavlou. 2012. 
“On Product Uncertainty in Online Markets: Theory and Evidence.” MIS Quarterly 36. 
31 For details about the TCE perspective, see Williamson, O E. 1995. “Transaction Cost Economics and Organization 
Theory.” Organization Theory: From Chester Barnard to the Present and beyond: 207–256. For a discussion of the 
costs involved in transactions, see Dahlman, Carl J. 1979. “The Problem of Externality.” Journal of Law and 
Economics 22 (1): 141–162.   
32 For a discussion on the quantification of transactions costs of online versus physical channels , see Chintagunta, Pradeep, 
Junhong Chu, and Javier Cebollada. 2012. “Quantifying Transaction Costs in Online/Off-Line Grocery Channel 
Choice.” Marketing Science 31 (1): 96–114. For a discussion on what drives consumer acceptance of online products, 
see Liang, Ting-Peng, and Jin-Shiang Huang. 1998. “An Empirical Study on Consumer Acceptance of Products in 
Electronic Markets: A Transaction Cost Model.” Decision Support Systems 24 (1): 29–43. 
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regulatory policies should be shaped to minimize the transaction costs of using OMWEs. Since 
established supply chains rarely exist for exchanging industrial surplus, producers and consumers 
of surplus can incur significant transactions costs in surplus exchanges. From a policy 
perspective, this has implications for reducing industrial access to traditional disposal alternatives 
in order to spur OMWE usage. Similarly, the positive externalities from investments in regional 
repurposing norms and infrastructure could lead to reduced transaction costs in OMWE 
exchanges for users. For companies, OMWEs might still not be optimal when making ad-hoc 
transactions. Ad-hoc transactions have higher search-, bargaining- and enforcement-related 
transactions costs. Rather, OMWEs could be more effectively for transactions involving recurring 
(e.g. weekly, monthly) surplus transactions. For users, an appropriate strategy is using OMWEs to 
identify transactions with long-term trading potential. 
 A major challenge in OMWE exchanges is efficient matching of buyers and sellers of 
surplus items. To this end, OMWEs need to identify their role in efficiently coordinating surplus 
chains. Traditionally, many Materials & Waste Exchanges relied on centralized expert 
intermediation to match generators of surplus items with consumers. Experts performed the 
matching function, facilitated bargaining and coordinated transactions. Today, most OMWEs 
have almost completely transitioned into decentralized online platforms, thus allowing sellers to 
directly post listings and buyers to directly negotiate transactions. As a result, the role of the 
expert as an intermediary is being played by the online platform. However, many OMWEs 
continue to struggle with the question of whether ‘centralized expert intermediation’ or 
‘decentralized online platforms’ is a better approach? Apparently, there exists a trade-off between 
increased scalability versus reduced uncertainty, especially in markets with products of high 
quality uncertainty such as OMWEs. Decentralized online platforms are expected to improve 
scalability and lower the buyer’s search costs, potentially providing a more efficient matching 
between buyers and sellers (Bakos 1991). Such internet facilitated dis-intermediation i.e. 
elimination of intermediaries has also been predicted by the popular press(Friedman 2007). Yet, 
there has been an unprecedented rise of physical intermediaries in supply chains despite the 
advancements in technology and internet (Belavina & Girotra 2012). The challenge for OMWEs 
therefore lies in recognizing the circumstances (e.g. product usage, product types, user 
characteristics) under which online platforms versus expert intermediation strategies can be 
successful.  
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Final Recommendations: 
• Recommendations for Companies: Companies should adopt OMWEs as a 
complementary alternative to conventional repurposing and disposal options. Most states 
in the U.S. now have OMWEs. Also, most European and Asian countries have OMWEs or 
similar platforms. Major benefits of using OMWEs include reduced disposal fees, lower 
compliance costs and higher environmental visibility. Yet, these benefits might accrue 
with increased experience and active usage. Sellers on OMWEs should focus on 
providing accurate and adequate product and transaction information to reduce buyers’ 
uncertainty. Buyers should account for short- and long-term transaction costs when 
identifying trading partners. Finally, all users should carefully evaluate regulatory 
implications of trading (or disposing) their surplus. Many OMWEs provide regulatory 
assistance, advice and intermediary services, which users can benefits from. 
• Recommendations for Policy-Makers: Policies should be geared toward 
encouraging OMWE adoption and usage, especially in urban regions with higher 
industrial activity. The regulatory uncertainty with surplus exchange (especially 
hazardous materials) will need to be reduced to allow clear directions on what can and 
can’t be exchanged through OMWEs. Regional administrative offices can have a strong 
influence on OMWE usage by building positive repurposing norms within local 
communities and businesses. For example, various statewide and county-level 
environmental initiatives (e.g. education, market development) are critical for promoting 
a favorable atmosphere for encouraging OMWE usage. Peripheral services (e.g. 
transportation, hazardous waste management, technical assistance) need to also be 
developed for OMWEs to flourish and succeed.  
• Recommendations for OMWEs: OMWEs need to work on (i) reducing 
information asymmetries through easy access to textual, visual and seller information (ii) 
building in technological features that allow integration with user systems and peripheral 
services (e.g. easy listing, transportation and handling, mobile access) (iii) provide 
intermediary services where transactions entail extremely high uncertainty for the buyers 
and (iv) engage policy-makers to provide incentives for OMWE usage over other disposal 
options. Some of these proposed strategies overlap with other conventional online 
markets (eBay, Amazon) and classifieds (Craigslist), yet others are unique to OMWEs. 
Especially given the regulatory complexity in some OMWE transactions, intermediary 
services and regulatory partnerships are unique strategies that will need to adopted by 
mature, as well as emerging OMWEs.  
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Appendix 
 
 
Appendix A2-1. Sample Recommendations 
Procedural Improvements (Low Technological Complexity) 
Recycle vacuum pump seal water back to the seal with some purge.  
Segregate food waste for animal feeding or composting. 
Collect usable material by sending air through equipment without atomization, collect waste acetone from clean-up of metal paint equipment. 
Painting, Gun washer solvent reduction. Modify change out procedure to maximize use of gun wash solvent before disposal.  
  
Equipment Improvements (High Technological Complexity) 
Replacement of poor function Liquid Measuring Equipment with one that is leak proof, covered, color-coded, accessorized. 
Switch to reusable sprays, instead of more costly manufactured aerosols requiring labor for disposal processing. 
Install (plumb) a reservoir (old purge tank) for recycling cooling water for large walk in coolers and one freezer.   
Replace Trim coolers on the compressors which use a lot of water when it is hot outside. 
  
Material Improvements (High Technological Complexity) 
Procure re-refined oils from commercial supplies/Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) to generate savings. 
Consider nickel plated fasteners instead of zinc plated parts (hinges, etc.)  
Eliminate testing waste and production downtime by selecting an acetone/NMP mixture composition in equilibrium with vapor for a precision 
cleaning application 
Explore ways to formulate low/no P formulations which have greener/cleaner formulation. 
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           Appendix A2-2. EI Ownership 
Classified as Senior Manager Classified as Employee/Mid-Level Manager 
CEO Assistant Technician Process Support Specialist 
Facility Manager Boiler engineer Housekeeping Project Engineer 
General Manager Chief Engineer Human Resources/Safety Quality Systems Manager 
Manager of Manufacturing Corporate Communications Lab Coordinator Quality and Environmental Manager 
Manager, Product Utilization EH & S Coordinator Sales Manager R & D Engineer 
Manufacturing Manager EHS Manager Maintenance Research Project Manager 
Plant Manager EHS Specialist Maintenance Engineer Safety Coordinator 
President Energy Manager Maintenance Manager Safety Officer 
VP of Operations Environmental Engineer Maintenance Mechanic Section Manager - Project 
Vice President EHS Supervisor Maintenance Supervisor Section Manager Maintenance 
Vice President, Facility Operations Environmental Manager Nutrition Services Site Utilities Coordinator 
Owner Environmental Program Manager Office Manager Surgical Services 
Production Manager Facilities Planning Assistant Operating Room Trades Manager 
Operations Manager Facility Coordinator Paint Operations Volunteer Coordinator 
Director of Environmental Service Facility Maintenance Manager Pharmacist Waste Water Superintendent 
Physical Plant Director Head Maintenance Supervisor Pharmacy Director Lean effort manager 
Process Engineer Pharmacy Tech Plant Maintenance Engineer 
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Appendix A3-1. Correlation Table  
Variables VIFs   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Exchange   1                     
Total Hits on Listing 1.37 -0.1144* 1                   
Total Hits on Listing2 1.1 0.1433* -0.0276* 1                 
Time Listed 1.91 -0.0062 0.3904* 0.1595* 1               
Hazardous 1.03 0.0037 -0.1017* 0.0191* -0.0173* 1             
Recurring 1.39 -0.0307* 0.3082* 0.0202* 0.4845* 0.0006 1           
Free Listing 1.22 -0.0133* 0.1385* -0.0384* -0.2588* 0.0344* -0.1022* 1         
OMWE Users in Seller's County 2.29 -0.0078* -0.0091* -0.1233* -0.2736* 0.0058 -0.0483* 0.1416* 1       
OMWE Users in Buyer's County 1.12 -0.0087* 0.0220* -0.0822* -0.2179* -0.0003 -0.0680* 0.1978* 0.2075* 1     
Seller's Access to Disposal 1.34 -0.0043 0.1008* 0.0104* 0.1078* -0.0380* 0.1420* 0.0212* 0.2350* -0.0244* 1   
Seller's Access to Repurposing 2.07 0.0155* -0.0093* -0.0124* -0.1295* -0.0041 -0.0447* 0.0280* 0.6845* 0.0768* 0.2249* 1 
Seller's Access to other OMWEs 1.43 0.0023 -0.0552* -0.0489* -0.1953* 0.0157* -0.0322* 0.0291* 0.3548* 0.1026* 0.2817* 0.2671* 
Buyer's Access to other OMWEs 1.04 -0.0042 0.0114* -0.0215* -0.0386* -0.0120* -0.0008 0.0410* 0.0466* 0.0501* 0.0201* 0.0252* 
Repurposing/Disposal in Seller's County 1.12 -0.0091* -0.0235* -0.1399* -0.0542* 0.0109* 0.0163* 0.0601* -0.0979* 0.0526* -0.2005* -0.1638* 
Textual Description Length 1.04 0.0080* -0.0570* 0.0120* -0.1270* 0.0200* -0.0856* 0.0361* 0.0361* 0.0553* -0.0199* -0.0025 
Visual Description Content 1.04 -0.002 -0.0415* -0.0400* -0.1597* -0.0104* -0.1071* 0.0472* 0.0743* 0.0691* -0.0386* 0.0215* 
Seller Size 1.1 0.0185* -0.0081* 0.0098* -0.0713* 0.1070* -0.0267* 0.1389* 0.0784* 0.0592* -0.1061* 0.0335* 
Buyer Size 1.08 -0.0027 -0.0384* 0.0009 -0.0307* 0.0191* -0.0329* -0.0418* -0.0418* 0.0035 -0.1295* -0.0498* 
Geographical Distance 1.17 -0.0208* 0.0401* 0.0134* 0.1450* 0.0079* 0.0530* -0.0835* -0.2651* -0.0835* -0.0279* -0.3117* 
Past Buyer-Seller Familiarity 1.05 0.0147* 0.0028 0.0032 -0.1406* -0.0161* -0.0487* 0.0921* 0.1549* 0.1006* -0.0102* 0.0891* 
Buyer's Experience as Seller 1.02 0.0301* -0.0545* -0.0043 -0.0434* 0.0059 -0.0143* 0.0045 0.0224* 0.0196* -0.0038 0.0159* 
Seller's Experience as Buyer 1.21 0.005 -0.1202* -0.0042 -0.1809* 0.0157* -0.0132* -0.0118* 0.0855* 0.0985* -0.1787* -0.0076 
Variables VIFs 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
Exchange                       
Total Hits on Listing 1.37                     
Total Hits on Listing2 1.1                     
Time Listed 1.91                     
Hazardous 1.03                     
Recurring 1.39                     
Free Listing 1.22                     
OMWE Users in Seller's County 2.29                     
OMWE Users in Buyer's County 1.12                     
Seller's Access to Disposal 1.34                     
Seller's Access to Repurposing 2.07                     
Seller's Access to other OMWEs 1.43 1                   
Buyer's Access to other OMWEs 1.04 0.0467* 1                 
Repurposing/Disposal in Seller's County 1.12 -0.1898* 0.0099* 1               
Textual Description Length 1.04 0.0785* 0.0084* -0.0136* 1             
Visual Description Content 1.04 0.0557* 0.0121* 0.0451* 0.0161* 1           
Seller Size 1.1 0.1582* 0.0116* -0.0021 0.0839* 0.0216* 1         
Buyer Size 1.08 0.1230* -0.1136* -0.0225* 0.0340* 0.0162* 0.0951* 1       
Geographical Distance 1.17 -0.1051* -0.1300* 0.0352* -0.0228* -0.0303* -0.0475* -0.0457* 1     
Past Buyer-Seller Familiarity 1.05 0.0960* 0.0219* 0.0125* 0.0146* 0.0617* 0.0563* -0.0191* -0.0878* 1   
Buyer's Experience as Seller 1.02 0.0171* 0.0684* -0.0045 0.0140* 0.0075 0.0232* 0.0177* -0.1197* 0.0315* 1 
Seller's Experience as Buyer 1.21 0.2506* 0.0122* -0.0162* 0.1189* 0.0661* 0.1513* 0.1224* -0.0536* 0.0860* 0.0330* 
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Appendix A3-2. Snapshot of Existing MNExchange.Org interface 
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Appendix A3-3. Details about Discussions with staff from MNExchange.Org and other OMWEs 
 
Discussant Understanding OMWEs Data Collection Hypotheses Development Data Analysis Writing & Implications 
Current Director 2 Unstructured Interviews  3 Semi-Structured Interviews  3 Semi-Structured Interviews 
Role: Strategic Planning, 
Inform Environmental 
Policy, Manage other 
environmental services 
offered 
Discussed functioning, 
OMWE funding, challenges 
and goals, potential for data 
collection 
 
Discussed policy challenges 
and drivers of transactions on 
OMWEs. Practice-focused 
hypotheses 
 
Discussed policy implications 
and steps to be taken in future. 
Discussed practitioner 
dissemination 
Online Admin 2 Unstructured Interviews 3 Semi-Structured Interviews 3 Semi-Structured Interviews 4 Semi-Structured Interviews 3 Semi-Structured Interviews 
Role: Plan and Implement 
technical improvements for 
MnExchange.Org, Participate 
in policy discussions 
Discussed operational 
challenges, benchmarks and 
statistics. OMWE 
technicalities and online 
platform 
Discussions around 
terminology used. Potential 
biases in data and possible 
solutions 
Discussed operational 
challenges and drivers. Past 
examples of failed and 
successful transactions 
Monthly meetings to verify 
and interpret new results. First 
point of contact for trouble 
shooting 
Discussed operational 
strategies and implemented 
several changes. Addressed 
limitations of study 
Past Director 2 Unstructured Interviews 
 
1 Semi-Structured Interview 
 
1 Semi-Structured Interviews 
Role: Director of 
MnExchange.Org until 2009. 
Currently serves as a faculty 
at a large public university 
Discussed historical 
developments,  
changes to policies and key 
drivers of exchanges 
OMWEs 
 
Verified preliminary list of 
factors potentially driving 
transactions. Outsider's 
perspective of OMWEs 
 
Presented final findings and 
discussed applicability to policy. 
Discussion section developed 
Past Online Admin 2 Unstructured Interviews 
  
1 Semi-Structured Interview 
 
Role: Online Admin until 
2005. Currently serves as 
Environmental Consultant 
Discussed historical 
challenges and OMWE 
functioning and policy 
implications 
  
Discussed accuracy of 
archival data and 
interpretability of findings. 
Clarified potential biases in 
data 
 
Other MNExchange.Org 
Staff 
5×1 Unstructured 
Interviews 
3×1 Semi-Structured 
Interviews  
1 Presentation of Findings 1 Presentation of Findings 
Roles: Providing variety of 
Environmental services to 
firms in the state of 
Minnesota 
Confirmatory Interviews 
to verify details and roles 
played in OMWE. Past 
experience with firms 
Verified data collection and 
accuracy. Potential hypotheses, 
measures and tests 
 
Presented results at monthly 
meeting to get feedback on 
results. Post-hoc analysis 
added based on suggestions 
Presented results at monthly 
meeting to discuss implications. 
Discussion section developed 
further 
Other OMWEs in US 
    
1 Webinar 
Roles: Directors/Admins 
for 5 other OMWE platforms 
in New York, Alabama and 
Northeast US 
    
Presented results to the 
Materials Exchange Managers' 
Network. Discussion section 
developed further 
Unstructured and Semi-structured Interviews were conducted face-to-face. Additional ad-hoc telephonic conversations were also conducted. Online Admin was replaced after Data collection stage. Total 
time span for study was 2 years. 
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Appendix A3-4 Additional Robustness Checks (See Table on next page) 
Listing-level Robustness Analysis: Column 1 is a listing level analysis which transforms Textual 
Information Length into an ordinal variable. This was created based on each 25th percentile of 
number of characters (32, 56, 92, 150 characters etc.). This approach actually makes our findings 
weaker due to loss of information, as can be expected when a continuous variable is transformed 
into a categorical variable. Column 2 is a listing level analysis based the concern was that 
Recycling/Disposal in Seller’s County is endogenous since it might be simultaneously affecting 
(and being affected by) likelihood of exchange. We therefore ran a 2-stage least squares model, 
where Recycling/Disposal in Seller’s County was instrumented using county-level fertility rate 
(based on demographic data) per year as the instrument. The instrument is correlated with 
Recycling/Disposal in Seller’s County but is highly unlikely to have any relationship with the 
structural error terms (or the outcome variable “Exchange_Listing”), thereby satisfying the 
criteria for good instrument (Wooldridge 2002). This approach actually strengthened the impact 
of Recycling/Disposal in Seller’s County on likelihood of an exchange, but did not affect our 
findings qualitatively. 
Interaction-level Robustness Analysis: Column 3 shows interaction level analysis based on re-
estimation of Past Buyer-Seller Familiarity using cumulative experience. Instead of using a 
binary indicator variable for Past Buyer-Seller Familiarity (1 if buyer-seller pair had interacted 
before; 0 otherwise), we use a continuous variable based on the number of previous interactions 
between the same buyer-seller pair. Column 4 shows interaction level analysis based on re-
estimation of the three Experience variables (Past Buyer-Seller Familiarity, Buyer’s Experience 
as Seller and Seller’s Experience as Buyer) based on a two-year time window. Hence, only 
buyer-seller interactions occurring over the last 2 years were considered to measure “experience”. 
This approach does not qualitatively change our findings, although the coefficient values were 
affected to some extent. In the model considered under Column 5, we only retained the ‘final’ 
interactions for each buyer-seller pair in circumstances where a buyer-seller pair had multiple 
interactions for the same item listing. Notice the drop in observations. This approach did not 
change our findings significantly.  
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Table A3-4. Additional Analysis  
  Listing Level Models Interaction Level Models 
Variables (Hypotheses Tested) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Total Hits on Listing -0.74** -0.26* -1.83*** -1.84*** -1.79*** 
  (0.37) (0.16) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Total Hits on Listing2 0.12** 0.05 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 
  (0.06) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Time Listed 0.27*** 0.24** 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 
  (0.07) (0.10) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Hazardous  -0.38* -0.31 -0.30 -0.30 -0.29 
  (0.20) (0.25) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) 
Recurring -0.42*** -0.29** -0.21** -0.21** -0.23*** 
  (0.12) (0.13) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Free Listing 0.69*** 0.62** 0.66*** 0.66*** 0.65*** 
  (0.26) (0.31) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
MNExchange.Org Users in Seller's County  0.04 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.00 
  (0.05) (0.12) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
MNExchange.Org Users in Buyer's County      0.03 0.04 0.03 
      (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Seller's Access to other OMWEs 0.02 0.03 -0.32*** 0.01 0.01 
  (0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
Buyer's Access to other OMWEs      0.19*** 0.17** 0.17** 
      (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Seller's Access to Disposal  -0.32***   0.01 -0.32*** -0.29** 
  (0.11)   (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
Seller's Access to Repurposing  0.23***   0.16** 0.18*** 0.18*** 
  (0.07)   (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Repurposing/Disposal in Seller's County 0.47**   0.43* 0.43* 0.52** 
  (0.22)   (0.22) (0.22) (0.23) 
Repurposing/Disposal in Seller's County (Instrumented)   2.53*       
    (1.49)       
Textual Information Length      0.12*** 0.05** 0.14*** 
      (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) 
Textual Information Length (Ordinal) -0.02 0.02       
  (0.03) (0.02)       
Visual Information Content  0.12* 0.13*** 0.14 0.12 0.12 
  (0.07) (0.05) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
Seller Size  0.27** 0.31** 0.27*** 0.28*** 0.30*** 
  (0.13) (0.14) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Buyer Size      -0.38*** -0.35*** -0.39*** 
      (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Geographical Distance      -0.06*** -0.08*** -0.06*** 
      (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Past Buyer-Seller Familiarity     0.23***     
      (0.05)     
Past Buyer-Seller Familiarity (Cumulative)     0.48***   0.78*** 
      (0.08)   (0.07) 
Buyer's Experience as Seller      -0.00   0.49*** 
      (0.08)   (0.08) 
Seller's Experience as Buyer          -0.06 
          (0.08) 
Past Buyer-Seller Familiarity (2 years)       0.36***   
        (0.07)   
Buyer's Experience as Seller (2 years)       0.21*   
        (0.12)   
Seller's Experience as Buyer (2 years)       0.00   
        (0.08)   
Observations 4330 4330 100625 100625 78876 
Log Likelihood -1921.68 -1469.75 -4876.72 -4891.34 -4678.34 
Cluster Robust Standard Errors; *p<.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01; Material Codes for 14 Categories; Year dummies for 
2000-2008; Controls for 6 Buyer and Seller Types included (Commercial, Education, Manufacturing, Government, 
Non-Profit and Other);  
  
  
